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ABSTRACT 
The study develops and fits two economic models of migration 
decisions: a commonly used point-in-time discrete choice model and a new 
model based on the search theory. The search model for migration views 
migration as a series of sequential decisions made over time under 
uncertainty. It captures repeated migrations and better fits the life-
cycle aspects of migration decisions. The model predicts the relationship 
between the duration of stay, the hazard rate, and the determinants of 
migration. The study also develops a new approach for measuring an 
individual's wage performance as one determinant of migration. 
The models are fitted empirically to the micro-panel data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The study follows the interstate 
migration behavior of 915 male heads of households, who were age 19 to 45 
in 1968, from 1968 to 1987. First, wage equations are fitted to create an 
empirical measure of each individual's wage performance^ Then, based on 
the point-in-time model, the study fits the probability of migration using 
a standard probit model. Finally, from the search model of migration, the 
hazard rate for migration by using both a constant and a time-dependent 
hazard model is estimated. 
The results show that better local wage performance, being married, 
having school-age children, being white, being a union member, and being-
self employed or a farmer reduce the tendency to migrate. On the other 
hand, having more education, being young, and being unemployed increase the 
chances that an individual will migrate. With the increase in the duration 
of stay, the hazard rate for migration increases in the first four to six 
years and then decreases over time. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Pattern of Internal Migration in the United States 
The United States has been characterized by a geographically mobile 
population. Historically, the U.S. population has shifted to the West. 
Between the Civil War and the 1950s, there was a secondary shift from the 
South to the industrialized cities in the North. Starting in the 1960s, 
however, the pattern changed so that in the 1970s the South began to have a 
net in-migration. There has also been a large movement from the inner city 
to suburban areas during the last 20 years. Workers have sought new or 
better jobs in different localities and have decided to live in the best 
place they can. Many factors ranging from regional economic growth to 
personal factors such as family-related reasons have contributed to this 
phenomenon. 
The Current Population Reports (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1989) 
illustrates the pattern of geographical mobility in the United States from 
the 1960s to the late 1980s. The survey consists of data from 200,000 to 
250,000 individuals in the United States. The data on mobility status were 
collected by cross-sectionally comparing the each person's current 
residence with their residence one year earlier. Table 1.1 shows the 
annual rates of geographic mobility, calculated as a percentage of the 
population who moved or resided in different places in two consecutive 
years from 1960 to 1990. The rate of total movers ranged from 17.0 to 20.6 
percent annually for the period 1960 to 1990. Most of the movements were 
moves between houses in the same county; such moves accounted for between 
10.3 percent to 13.7 percent of the sample. The proportion of moves 
between counties in the same state has been around 3.0 percent, similar to 
the proportion of moves between states. Moves between regions have ranged 
from 1.5 percent to 2.0 percent, while international migration has been 
less than 1.0 percent. 
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The dynamics of local migration has dominated total migration for the 
last 20 years. Most of the change in mobility rates during the last 20 
years has been in the rate at which people made local moves. Because of 
the difficulty in tabulating moves within a local labor market using the 
data, the CPS report defines a local move as a move within the same county. 
Moves between counties in the same state and between states and the 
international migration are defined as long-distance migration. The rate 
of residential mobility fell from an average of about 20.0 percent annually 
in the 1960s to 16.6 percent in 1983 and then climbed to 20.2 percent in 
1985 before falling again to around 17.0 percent in the late 1980s. The 
increase in the total annual rate of moving in the mid-1980s was primarily 
due to the dynamics of local moves. The rates at which people moved longer 
distances, namely moves between counties or states, have not changed for 
the last 20 years. 
Table 1.1. Annual geographic mobility rates, by type of movement: 
1960-87 (percent) 
1960-61 1970-71 1980-81 1990-91 
Total movers 20.6 18.7 17.2 17.0 
Same county 13.7 11.4 10.4 10.3 
Different county 
- same state 
- different state 
- same region 
- different region 
3.1 
3.2 
1.5 
1.7 
3.1 
3.4 
1.4 
2.0 
3.4 
2.8 
1.3 
1.5 
3.2 
2.9 
1.5 
1.4 
International 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Current Population Reports (1989), 
and U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States (1968-93). 
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Regional migration patterns are important indicators of population 
redistribution. In-migration, out-migration, and net-migration for regions 
in the United States from 1965 to 1987 are presented in Table 1.2. In 
general, people have moved from the Northeast and the North Central regions 
to the South and the West for the last 25 years. According to Greenwood 
(1985), this pattern emerged because employment opportunities in the North 
and East have been lagging since the 19708 due to recessions in the mid-
19708 and early 19808. The CPS report (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1989) 
also indicates several factors contributing to this pattern. First, the 
South has more attractive tax incentives and cheaper non-unionized labor. 
Second, the rise of light industries such as electronics increased the 
demand for trucking rather than rail transportation. Third, the spread of 
air conditioning and the leveling of regional differences in standards of 
Table 1.2. Regional in-migration, out-migration, and net-migration in the 
United States: 1965-90 (thousands) 
Area 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 
Northeast 
In-migrants 
Out-migrants 
Net-migrants 
1,273 
1,988 
-715 
1,057 
2,399 
-1,342 
1,106 
2,592 
-1,486 
2,345 
3,285 
-940 
2,179 
3,636 
-1,456 
North Central 
In-migrants 
Out-migrants 
Net-migrants 
2,024 
2,661 
-637 
1,731 
2,926 
-1,195 
1,993 
3,166 
-1,183 
3,766 
5,321 
-1,555 
4,295 
4,521 
-226 
South 
In-migrants 
Out-migrants 
Net-migrants 
3,142 
2,486 
656 
4,082 
2,253 
1,829 
4,204 
2,440 
1,764 
6,798 
5,017 
1,781 
6,839 
5,630 
1,209 
West 
In-migrants 
Out-migrants 
Net-migrants 
2,309 
1,613 
696 
2,347 
1,639 
708 
2,838 
1,945 
893 
4,510 
3,795 
715 
4,208 
3,603 
605 
Sources: Greenwood (1985) and U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States (1985-93). 
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living and educational opportunities, combined with the success of the 
civil rights movement, have influenced migration patterns. 
When an economic agent migrates to follow economic opportunities, 
he/she will change at least marginally the economic opportunities of others 
in the new place. For example, a study by Greenwood and Hunt (1984) shows 
that the in-migration of one individual to a southern state was associated 
with 1.3 additional jobs, while in-migration to a western states created 
0.4 additional jobs. The important point to make is that the migration 
does not necessarily reduce the employment opportunities of native workers. 
Another important pattern in residential mobility and population 
redistribution in the United States has been the process of sub­
urbanization. For many decades, increased farm mechanization and 
urbanization of economic opportunity have led to rural-to-urban migration. 
Since the 1970s, however, the pattern has changed. The percentage of the 
U.S. population residing in metropolitan areas has declined, with a 
corresponding change in the direction of migration. The definition of 
metropolitan areas had to be adjusted due to the rapid growth of areas 
surrounding metropolitan areas. In fact, redefinition of metropolitan 
statistical areas occurred in 1983. The 1989 CPS report (U.S. Department 
of Commerce, 1989) shows large movement from the central city to its 
suburbs. 
According to Chalmers and Greenwood (1980), several factors have 
contributed to this rural-urban migration turnaround. First, the relative 
cost of doing business in older urban centers has been changing and the 
number of resource-based industries in nonmetropolitan areas has been 
growing. Second, rising income and wealth are increasing the demand for 
location-specific amenities. Third, changes in the demographic structure 
of the population, the labor forces and the government policies have 
affected migration patterns. 
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Literature Review 
Many studies have tried to explain why people move geographically. 
Migration studies have maintained a strong orientation toward determinants 
as opposed to the consec[uences of migration. The development of empirical 
migration research has been facilitated not only by theoretical innovations 
but also by the availability of new micro data sets. For the past 20 
years, the study of the determinants of migration has been based on point-
in-time utility maximization. The empirical models used standard 
univariate discrete choice models such as probit and logit. Generally, the 
studies put the incidence of migration on the left-hand side of the 
equation and the variables explaining the probability of migration 
including individual and regional characteristics on the right-hand side. 
The literature review presented in this section is not exhaustive. The 
discussion in each chapter includes citations from related references. The 
first part of thi- review presents an overview of previous empirical 
studies on the migration decision. The second part presents some previous 
empirical applications of search theory. 
Previous studies on the determinants of migration 
The focus of migration studies has been in finding the determinants 
rather than the consequences of migration. The use of binary discrete 
choice models and micro-panel data have been extensive (Greenwood, 1975, 
1985). Stark and Bloom (1985) reported that empirical research on labor 
migration has benefitted from the development of econometric techniques 
such as analysis for qualitative dependent variables, the model for 
selection bias correction, and techniques for analyzing longitudinal micro 
data. The importance of micro-panel data in migration studies has been 
recognized. The concern is that previous empirical studies of migration 
have not utilized micro-panel data over a long enough period to capture 
sequential migration decisions or repeated migration. 
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Selected studies on the determinants of migration for the last 20 
years are presented in Table 1.3. Most of these studies used micro-panel 
data and a binary variable as the dependent variable. Studies 1 and 4 used 
aggregate data. Previous studies commonly focused on a specific 
determinant of migration, such as education and age, personal unemployment, 
or marital status, rather than on a broad range of possible determinants. 
Education and age have consistently been included in the migration model. 
When the unit of observation is the household, marital status and number of 
children are included in the model. Some studies have focused only on the 
effects of unemployment-related variables. 
Table 1.3. Deteirminants of migration in previous studies^ 
Study Education Age Race 
Unemolovment 
Personal Local 
Harital 
Status 
Nunber 
of 
ChiIdren 
Income 
or 
Wage climate 
1. Schuartz (1976) X X - - - - - - -
2. Mincer (1978) X X - - - X X - -
3. Da Vanzo (1978) - - - X X - - - -
4. Graves (1979) - - - - X - - - X 
5. Graves and 
Linneman (1979) X X X X - X X X -
6. Schlottmann and 
Herzog (1981) X X - X - - - - X 
7. Nakosteen and 
Ziinner (1980) - X X - X - - - -
8. Goss and 
Schoening (1984) X X - X - - - X -
9. Herzog and 
Schlottmann (1984) X X - X X X - - -
10. Goss and Paul (1986) X X X - - - - X -
11. Pissarides and 
Wadsuorth (1989) X X - X X X X - -
12. Goss and Paul (1990) X X X X X - - X -
^The sign 'X' means that the study has incorporated the effect of the 
corresponding variable on migration decisions. 
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Host studies have shown the importance of education and age on the 
migration decision. All the studies in Table 1.3 show a positive effect of 
education and a negative effect of age on the migration decision. Both 
migration and education represent human capital investments. Migration and 
education might be complementary because investing in one enhances the 
returns to investing in the other. Young adults are more likely to move 
because they have the longest expected time over which to benefit from 
migration. 
Using a binary discrete choice model, Schwartz (1976) reported the 
interaction between migration, education, and age. The study concluded 
that the shape of the earning-age function and the way education affects it 
could explain the empirically observed relationship of migration measures 
to distance moved, age, and education. The fact that there is age 
selectivity of migrants is also supported by Schlottmann and Herzog (1981) 
and an early study by Sjaastad (1962). 
Models of migration behavior have commonly emphasized individual 
rather than family utility maximization. Mincer (1978) applied a point-in-
time discrete choice model to show that family ties tend to deter 
migration, reduce the labor force participation and earning level of wives, 
and increase the employment and earning level of husbands in migrating 
families. Mincer found that two-earner families have stronger ties to any 
resident location, which deters migration. Since this study, every study 
on migration has incorporated fcunily-related variables such as marital 
status and the number of children in the family into the model. Generally, 
the results have been consistent in across studies: being married and 
having children reduces the probability of migration. 
Graves and Linneman (1979) developed a consumption-based model of the 
migration decision. Migration behavior was derived by classifying the 
goods consumed into those which are traded and nontraded. Graves and 
Linneman found that the changing demand for nontraded goods led to an 
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incentive to migrate. Therefore, the probability of migrating is 
positively related to any variable that causes a change in the demand for 
nontraded goods. The empirical model is a standard probit procedure. In 
terms of family-related variables. Graves and Linneman showed that the 
existence of school-age children in the family and being married tend to 
deter migration. Similar results were found by Pissarides and Wadsworth 
(1989). 
Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980) developed a standard discrete choice 
model of migration based on inter-location income differentials rather than 
on utility differentials. The objective of their research was to obtain 
good estimates of earning functions for migrants and nonmigrants by 
including selection correction in their empirical model. A standard probit 
procedure was used to estimate the probability of migration and to correct 
the earning functions. Nakosteen and Zimmer found that higher resident 
state employment and per capita income growth significantly reduced the 
probability of migration. Among mutually exclusive personal 
characteristics, they found that being white, young, and male increased the 
probability of migration. 
The tendency for unemployed people to migrate has been supported by 
many studies. Da Vanzo (1978) showed that families whose heads were 
unemployed or dissatisfied with the job were indeed more likely to migrate. 
Therefore, unemployed persons or persons who are actively searching for a 
job have a higher probability to migrate. Graves and Linneman (1979), Goss 
and Schoening (1984), and Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) found a similar 
positive effect of personal unemployment on migration. 
Schlottmann and Herzog (1981) examined the demographic and socio­
economic deteirminants of migration for employed and unemployed persons. 
They used binary logit models to explain the probability of migration and 
have found that, in general, for individuals at risk to migrate, age and 
education selectivity of migration were confirmed. However, for unemployed 
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primary migrants, education selectivity was not observed. The provision of 
welfare services was found to have little or no impact on the migration 
decision of the unemployed. 
Previous studies have obtained conflicting results for the direct 
effects of local labor market variables, especially the local unemployment 
rate, on the probability of migration. One possible reason for such 
conflict suggested by Greenwood (1975) is the simultaneity inherent in 
studies that use actual unemployment data. Unemployment is often measured 
at the end of the migration period and hence may have been affected by the 
migration itself. Another possible reason is that the actual and 
anticipated unemployment rates differ so that the actual unemployment rate 
is a mixed variable. By using aggregate employed and unemployed workers. 
Da Vanzo (1978) found an insignificant relationship between unemployment 
rate and migration. Herzog and Schlottmann (1984) found a positive and 
significant effect of the residents area unemployment rate on migration. 
However, a later study by Goss and Paul (1990) argued that the effects of 
the unemployment rate on migration were over-estimated because previous 
studies have ignored unemployment insurance benefits. Pissarides and 
Wadsworth (1989) found a positive and significant effect of personal 
unemployment on migration. The effect of the local unemployment rate, 
however, was not found to be statistically significant. They found only 
that at higher overall unemployment rates, migration propensities are 
reduced. 
Another unclear result is the effect of wage rate on migration. 
Studies by Goss and Schoening (1984), and Goss and Paul (1986, 1990) found 
no significant effect of an individual's wage on his probability of 
migrating. Graves and Linneman (1979) included the absolute change in 
wages between years. Similarly, they did not find any significant effect 
of wages on migration. One simple reason for this result is the 
correlation between wages and other variables that affect migration, such 
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as education and age. Other studies (see Table 1.3) did not include the 
actual wage in the equation, but incorporated the determinants of wage in 
the reduced form of the migration equation. The unclear effects of the 
wage on migration is one problem that this study is trying to solve. 
The effect of resident climatic conditions on net-migration rates was 
studied by Graves (1979). He used the Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (SMSA) ae the geographical unit, and regressed net migration rates on 
local median income, unemployment, temperature, humidity, and average wind 
speed. The significant effect of the climatic variables showed that the 
omission of these variables could lead to biased estimates of other 
parameters. Because Graves used aggregate data, namely, the number of 
people moving in one SMSA, the study explained the number of people 
migrating rather than individual migration. 
Search theory 
Job search theory has been developed in the studies of unemployment 
and the working decision. Compared to the standard deterministic labor 
force participation model, job search theory treats uncertainty in the 
labor market explicitly. The idea is that unemployment has an investment 
aspect. The unemployed person makes a decision to work by responding to a 
stochastic wage offer. Stigler (1961, 1962) developed the first 
mathematical analysis of optimal search strategy of the unemployed worker. 
The model optimized the individual's utility subject to information 
constraints and other constraints. 
Lippman and McCall (1979) also developed a standard job search model. 
Using the premise that the objective of an individual is to maximize 
expected income net of search costs, they classified all possible job 
offers into two mutually exclusive classes: acceptable and unacceptable. 
These classes were separated by a reservation wage. Using a similar 
framework, an optimal search model was developed by Devine and Kiefer 
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(1951). In addition to the standard model by Lippman and McCall, Devine 
and Kiefer derived an explicit specification of the probability of 
accepting an offer. Furthermore, they extended the model by incorporating 
the possibility for layoffs and c[uits. They also extended the model to 
cover the possibility that an individual may exit from the labor force. 
Schaeffer (1985) developed a dynaunic optimization model to analyze 
the effect of human capital on migration. He demonstrated that a dynamic 
model which allows for a sequence of possible moves in a individual's 
lifetime is superior to a static model, which views migration as one-time 
move. His model incorporated the accumulation of human capital, rather 
than a stock of human capital, on sequential migration decisions. The 
study predicted a positive effect of human capital accumulation and job 
mobility on migration. Because of the close relationship between migration 
and job mobility, Schaeffer suggested that the migration model should 
incorporate the job search. Even though his model is appealing, the 
empirical study based on his dynamic optimization model is cumbersome. 
In general, the empirical search model can be classified into two 
groups: wage data based or duration data based. Because duration data are 
more readily available, progress has been made in developing econometric 
techniques for duration data. There are two common procedures: standard 
linear regression and the hazard function. The hazard function estimation 
is useful because it allows for more flexibility in specifying the duration 
distribution. In addition, censoring can be dealt with easily through 
appropriate specification of the likelihood function (Devine and Kiefer, 
1991). Most studies using hazard functions incorporate explanatory 
variables in the model by specifying a proportional hazard. This method is 
simple to interpret because the effect of the explanatory variable is 
obtained by multiply the hazard function by a scaling factor. Another 
common specification is the accelerated lifetime model where the effect of 
an explanatory variable is to re-scale the time unit directly. 
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Hazard functions and statistical analysis of waiting time data are 
closely related. A book by Klabfleish and Prentice (1980) has been the 
source of much of the analysis. In general, there are two types of 
estimation procedures: non parametric and parametric. The differences lie 
in the assumptions. Kiefer (1988) summarized the nonparametric and 
parametric procedures needed to estimate a survivor function and a hazard 
function. Cox (1975) developed a partial-likelihood approach to the 
proportional hazard function. This approach is called a semi-parametric 
method because it requires a basic form for the hazard function but leaves 
the underlying distribution undefined. Economic theory can provide a 
rationale for an assumption about the duration distribution. For example, 
a constant reservation wage policy would lead to a constant hazard rate 
over time and an exponentially distributed duration. Finally, Greene 
(1991) developed a parametric estimation of the hazard function. The 
procedure follows a standard maximum likelihood estimation where the 
likelihood function is built upon the underlying distribution of the 
duration. 
Even though search theory has been extensively used and developed in 
the area of unemployment studies, its application to migration has been 
relatively recent. Goss and Schoening (1984) incorporated job search time 
on the migration decision; however, their econometric model remained the 
point in time standard discrete choice model. By using a binary logit 
model, they found a negative effect of job search time on the probability 
of migration. Kiefer (1988) and Devine and Kiefer (1991) said that one 
potential application of search theory is in the area of migration or 
geographic mobility. However, published material that specifically applies 
search theory to migration is hard to find. One possible reason is that 
longitudinal data collected long enough to cover the migration history of 
an individual were not available until the late 1980s. 
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Statement of the Problems 
The first problem is the use of a point-in-time decision model for 
migration. Migration is a long-term decision made over time. Hence, 
migration is a part of life-cycle decisions. Previous studies have used 
standard point-in-time discrete choice models. These models take a "short-
teinn" perspective to the migration decision and do not capture the long-
term, or life-cycle, perspective. A thorough treatment of life-cycle 
effects requires that migration be studied as an event that occurs in 
continuous time. A more realistic and richer specification of models of 
migration may be possible, and they can be fitted to micro-panel data. A 
study using panel data over a longer time period can capture the life-cycle 
characteristics of migration decisions. 
Given that econometric models can only accommodate data for discrete 
time periods, a key issue is how to extend econometric models for multi-
period or lifetime analysis of individual migration behavior. One possible 
extension is a multi-period discrete choice model. Assume that an 
individual lives in T periods and makes migration decisions in every 
period. The relevant issue is the probability of an individual migrating 
during any one of the T periods. For example, define dummy variable = 1 
if the individual migrates during period t, and = 0 if otherwise. The 
probability that someone migrates at only period 3 can be expressed as 
Pr(Mj = 0, M2 = 0, M3 = 1, M4 = 0, M5 = 0, ..., = 0). Under this binary 
choice framework, the events will have 2^ possibilities. With a normality 
assumption for the disturbance in the decision function, for example, this 
model is represented as a multi-period probit model. 
Some difficulties exist in dealing with multi-period probit models. 
First, empirical estimation of this model is cumbersome. Several 
restrictions are needed to estimate the model (Avery, Hansen, and Hotz, 
1983; Chamberlain, 1980, 1985b). In addition, conventional discrete choice 
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models, such as probit or logit models, when defined for one time interval, 
are of different functional form when applied to another time unit. 
Second, in most economic models, there is no natural time unit within which 
agents maximize their utility, make their decisions, and take action. It 
is natural and analytically convenient to characterize the agent's 
decisions and actions in continuous time. Even if there is a decision 
period, there is no reason to suspect that it corresponds to the annual or 
c[uarterly data that are typically available (Heckman and Singer, 1985). 
Econometric estimation, however, is difficult for a continuous time model. 
An alternative approach is a waiting time model. Search theory can 
be applied to explain an individual's time duration of residency in one 
place using micro-panel data. The use of search theory enables us to 
capture life-cycle aspects of migration decisions without the complications 
of the multi-period discrete choice models. In addition, search theory can 
explicitly incorporate uncertainty about the future in the model. 
Statistical analysis can then be applied to duration data. 
To assess the expected gain from job or residential mobility, an 
individual must gather information about wage offers, quality of life, 
local amenities, and other nonmonetary benefits. An individual has to make 
a personal assessment of advantages and disadvantages with the information 
available. When a decision is based on incomplete information, 
expectations about the quality of life at a new residence may not be met, 
and this might lead to yet another move. The scenario fits well to what 
search theory provides because search theory presents sequential decision 
making in which uncertainty of future outcomes is treated explicitly. 
The second problem is related to the stream of individual income. 
Previous studies have not found any clear effect of an individual's wage or 
income on migration. Some studies did not include the individual's actual 
income in the model of migration decisions. They commonly specified the 
reduced form migration equation, which consists of some variables 
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determining an individual's income. There are at least two reasons for 
this approach. First, an individual's income has a strong correlation with 
his/her personal attributes affecting migration, especially education and 
age. Second, the use of income from one or two years of data does not 
capture the projected future streams. When a study included actual income 
or wage in the migration model, the result was not significant. 
These problems might contribute to the conflicting results related to 
local labor market variables, such as the effect of the local unemployment 
rate on migration. For example, it has been predicted that an individual 
tends to leave a state with a high unemployment rate. When the individual 
is employed and his/her wage is positively correlated with the local 
unemployment rate, however, he/she might have higher expected wages by not 
moving. Therefore, incorporating the direct effect of local labor market 
variables on the decision to migrate might be inappropriate. In fact, a 
study by Da Vanzo (1978) has shown that the current local unemployment rate 
matters only for those who are unemployed. Other studies have not found 
any significant effect of local labor market variables. One reason is that 
an individual's utility depends on individual wage performance for given 
local labor market conditions, rather than directly depending on the local 
labor market situation itself. 
What seems to be needed is a new measure of an individual's wage 
performance which has no or little correlation with other personal 
characteristics directly affecting migration. One possible measure is the 
residual of the wage equation, calculated as the actual wage minus the 
predicted wage of an individual. The predicted wage could be obtained from 
fitting the well-established wage equation (Topel, 1986; Tokle and Huffman, 
1991). Because the wage equation is also a function of local labor market 
characteristics, using the residual wage might also resolve the issue of 
how local labor market variables affect the migration decision. The effect 
of local labor market variables on individual migration decisions could be 
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traced through their effects on an individual's potential wage. First, 
combined with other personal characteristics, local labor market conditions 
will determine potential or predicted wages in the area where the person 
lives. Then, the realization of the individual's actual wage relative to 
the potential wage, which is calculated as the residual wage, may be 
related to the decision to move or to stay. In this case, the individual's 
utility and the decision to migrate is not directly a function of local 
labor market conditions. Therefore, the effect of local labor market 
conditions on migration decisions might differ across individuals depending 
on the effect of an individual's wage performance. This approach seems 
promising because it captures the individual's specific perception of how 
local economic conditions affect his/her utility and the migration 
decision. 
The last problem is the effect of local cimenities. The utility of 
being in one state is a function of local amenities, and the decision to 
move or to stay, therefore, should depend on local amenities. A model of 
migration decisions that does not include local amenities might lead to 
biased estimates. This study incorporates some measures of local 
amenities, such as the crime rate, state and national park area, and 
weather-related variables. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to provide further theoretical and 
empirical analysis of interstate migration. Local migration (i.e., 
movement within a state) is excluded from the study for several reasons. 
First, it is hard to distinguish migration between counties within one 
state from local migration which does not seem very interesting. Second, 
it is difficult to find information on local or regional characteristics 
such as job growth and unemployment rates for the county level. Third, 
state units are the smallest common geographical area for labor laws, such 
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as right to work, unemployment benefits, welfare benefits, etc. 
This study develops economic models representing an individual's 
migration decisions and fits the model using micro-panel data for a sample 
of individuals who have been participating in a long-term survey. Two 
major models are pursued. First, a standard point-in-time discrete choice 
model of migration decisions is developed and fitted. The purpose of this 
study is to replicate the result from existing models using a new data set. 
The result of the study can be compared to that of previous migration 
studies that used a similar framework. 
Second, the new approach, namely, incorporating search theory, will 
be used to derive a hazard rate for migration. Compared to previous 
studies on the determinants of migration using cross-sectional data, this 
study utilizes more information because the observations for individuals 
are taken from several consecutive periods of time. Because the length of 
time an individual lives in one state could be years, the hazard rate might 
change over time. Therefore, the study not only fits a constant hazard 
rate model but also a model with a time-dependent hazard rate. The results 
of this model can be compared to results from the previous model to 
investigate the contribution derived by using the new framework. 
Objectives of the Study 
Specifically, the objectives of the study are to: 
1. Develop both a point-in-time discrete choice model and a dynamic 
search theory approach to human migration decisions. The first 
framework has been commonly used in the research of migration for the 
last 20 years. Although the second framework is common in 
unemployment studies, its application to migration studies is 
relatively new. 
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2. Fit a wage equation and derive annual potential wage rates for sample 
individuals. Then, the variable representing individual wage 
performance is developed. This variable is used in the equation 
explaining the probability of migration in the point-in-time discrete 
choice model and the hazard rate in the search model. 
3. Perform an empirical analysis using a standard discrete choice 
model by fitting the equation representing the probability of 
migration. The result from this analysis can be compared with 
the result of previous migration studies, which largely used 
the same framework. 
4. Perform an empirical study based on the search theory framework 
by fitting hazard functions for migration. Both constant and time-
dependent hazard functions are estimated. The availability of Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, which follows every individual 
from 1968 to 1988, will make it possible to estimate the model 
affecting individual migration decisions. 
The research has important implications for reformulating the 
migration decision model for panel or longitudinal data sets. Compared to 
previous studies using a short-term view of migration, this study develops 
a model for a sequential migration decision over time and fits the model 
using 20 years of data. This study identifies variables that explain labor 
migration. These indicators will be useful for policy purposes dealing 
with labor mobility in the United States. 
Organization of the Study 
This study is organized as follows. The first chapter is the 
introduction, which consists of the literature review and the statement of 
the problems, purpose, and the objectives of the study. The second chapter 
presents the development of the economic model of migration decisions. 
This chapter consists of the point-in-time decision model and the 
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application of job search theory on migration. Chapter 3 discusses the 
data in general. The chapter discusses the individual and state data, the 
pattern of migration, and the procedure used to prepare the data set for 
estimation. The fourth chapter presents the general econometric techniques 
used to fit the models based on the data. This discussion includes both 
the standard point-in-time discrete choice model and the search theory 
approach. Chapter 5 elaborates the detailed empirical specification and 
variable definitions corresponding to the econometric models discussed in 
Chapter 4. The sixth chapter presents the results of the fitted wage 
equation and the probability of migration based on the discrete choice 
model. The seventh chapter discusses the fitted hazard function for 
migration based on the search model using the constant and time-dependent 
hazard rate models. The final chapter summarizes and concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE ECONOMIC MODEL 
This chapter develops the economic model of the migration decision. 
The chapter consists of two major parts. The first part discusses the 
point-in-time migration decision which leads to a standard discrete choice 
model. This model has been commonly used in previous studies on migration. 
The second part develops the model for sequential migration decisions using 
search theory. 
We assume that an individual lives for T periods (t = 1, 2, 3, ..., 
T). To fit the model of point-in-time decisions and to simplify the model, 
we use a discrete time model. At time t = 1, the individual is living at a 
particular location and enjoys utility represented by Unm(l). At the end 
of period 1, the individual makes a decision about staying or migrating to 
a new place, called the destination. Once the individual decides to 
migrate, he/she resides in the new place until the end of his/her life. 
The migration decision is based on the present value of the expected future 
utility of being at the origin versus being at a (new) destination. 
The expected utility for being at the origin (utility non-migrant, 
Unm) and the destination (utility migrant, Um) at time t are represented by 
Unm(t) and Um(t), respectively. To simplify the model, it is assumed that 
expected utility is constant over time so that Unm(2) = Unm(3) = ... = 
Unm(T) = Unm, and Um(2) = Um(3) = ... = Um(T) = Um. It is also assumed 
that the utility of being at the destination is net of the cost of 
migration. With the discount factor represented by r, the present value of 
the expected utility of being at the origin is: 
One Point-in-Time Decision Model 
T Unm(t) 
Vnm = S 
t=2 (1 + r)'-^ 
T Unm 
S 
t=2 (1 + r)'-^ 
(2.1) 
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The present value of the expected utility of being at the destination is: 
T Um(t) T Um 
Vm = 2 = S (2.2) 
t=2 (1 + r)'"^ t=2 (1 + r)'"^ 
Given that there are D possible destinations, it is also assumed that Vm is 
the maximum value achievable among all possible destinations such that: 
Vm = Max (Vmj, Vm2f Vm3, Vmp] (2.3) 
The individual makes a decision to migrate or to stay by comparing 
Vnm and Vm. We prefer this utility differential, rather than the income 
differential approach, because some factors affect utility directly rather 
than through income, (e.g., local amenities). This model is deterministic 
because an individual assesses future utility with certainty, and future 
utility is fixed. Information is complete and expectations are realized. 
The individual chooses to migrate if Vm > Vnm and to stay otherwise. 
Therefore, based on the utility assessment, in time t = 2 the individual 
lives in the best place possible. The decision can be summarized as: 
Migrate if Vm > Vnm 
Decision | (2.4) 
Do not migrate otherwise 
The probability of migration can be expressed as: 
Prob(Migrate) = Prob{Vm > Vnm) = Prob(Um > Unm) 
Prob(Stay) = 1 - Prob(Migrate) (2.5) 
The model in Equation (2.5) describes a migration decision made at 
one point in time at the end of period 1. This model translates the long-
term expectation shown in Equation (2.1) and (2.2) into a two-period model, 
neunely, time 1 and beyond. In other words, the model takes a short-term 
perspective to migration decisions. The model fits well in empirical 
migration studies based on data taken from a short period of time. When 
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migration is viewed as a long-term decision made over time, an extension of 
the model is needed. One possible refinement is the application of job 
search theory. 
Search Theory for Migration 
Search theory frequently has been applied in studies of unemployment 
duration. An individual remains unemployed unless he receives wage offer 
that is higher than his/her reservation wage. In this migration study, we 
assume that an individual will move to a new location if the present value 
of his/her expected utility is greater in a new place than at the current 
residence location. Every individual is assumed to eventually migrate and 
to reside in a new place. Our interest, however, is in how long the 
individual stays in one place before moving. 
In a search model, similar to a neoclassical framework, utility is 
maximized subject to constraints. However, the assumption of complete 
information is not rec[uired. The assumption of complete information is 
replaced by an assumption about expectations, usually rational expectations 
(Devine and Kiefer, 1991; Lippman and McCall, 1979). The basic feature is 
that in every period, every individual looks to improve his/her welfare by 
possibly moving. Some basic assumptions that build upon Devine and Kiefer 
are: 
1. An individual maximizes the expected present value of utility over 
his/her expected finite future life span T, discounted to the present 
at a constant discount rate r. 
2. The indirect utility flow while he/she stays at the origin is Unm 
(Utility nonmigrants) and, to simplify the derivation, is assumed to 
be constant over time. 
3. During some time interval, the person may receive an opportunity 
(offer) to move to another place. The opportunities to move are 
received at a rate represented by a Poisson distribution with 
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parameter 8. The probability of receiving at least one offer within 
a short interval of length h is &.h + 0(h), where 0(h) is the 
probability of receiving more than one offer in the interval and the 
limit of 0(h)/h goes to zero as h goes to zero. 
4. An opportunity to move is summarized by an indirect utility 
assessment, net of any cost of migrating, and equals Um (Utility 
migrants). If the offer is accepted, the individual will move from 
the origin to the destination and will enjoy utility represented by 
Um continuously over the period he/she stays in the new place. 
5. Successive utility associated with offers (Um) received over the 
duration, or spell, of residence at the origin are independent 
realizations from a known distribution with finite mean (A^Um) 
variance ^ um^' cumulative distribution F(Um), and density f(Um). 
6. Once rejected, an offer cannot be recalled. When a higher utility 
offer for a new destination is accepted, the individual moves to the 
destination and is assumed to stay there until he/she dies. 
The assumption of lifetime utility maximization looks similar to the 
neoclassical utility-maximizing framework. The individual is essentially 
picking a location where he will maximize his full income, net of moving 
cost. Rather than focusing on utility, we are considering indirect utility 
where prices, full income, observed and unobserved family attributes 
explain utility. The continuous time and constant indirect utility flow 
assumptions make the derivation less complex. The search theory based 
migration model views migration as being caused by a push factor, i.e. a 
push to go to a better residence. 
A finite life span of T is important for the time dependent hazard 
rate model. He will show later that the reservation utility increases as T 
decreases. In other words, the younger the individual, the smaller is 
his/her reservation utility, and the higher is his/her tendency to move. 
Similarly, the longer the individual stays in one place, the higher is 
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his/her reservation utility, and the smaller is the tendency to move. A 
known utility offer distribution is important for empirical purposes. The 
assumption of a Poisson offer distribution is convenient and tractable. 
The implication is that the probability of an individual receiving an offer 
does not depend on the length of time spent residing at a place. 
Derivation of the migration decision 
Assuming that the (net) utility while at the origin is constant, 
offers are identically distributed, and the offer distribution and arrival 
rates are known and invariant, the value of utility while at the origin is 
defined implicitly as: 
Unmh 6h (1 - 5h) 
Vnm = + E[Max{Vm(Um) ,Vnm}] + Vnm + 0(h)k = Vm(Ur) (2.6) 
(1 + rh)(1 + rh) (1 + rh) 
where h represents a short period of time. The first term in the center 
portion of the ec[uation is the discounted present value of net utility at 
the origin over a short time period h. The second term is the discounted 
expected value of utility when an offer is received with probability £h. 
Vm(Um) is the present value of utility when the offer is accepted and the 
individual migrates. The third term is the expected value of utility when 
no offer is received, which occurs with probability (1 - $h). The last 
term captures the event when more than one offer is received, where the 
limit of 0(h)/h goes to zero as h goes to zero and k is the value of 
following an optimal policy when more than one offer is received. At a 
maximum, Vnm in Equation (2.6) has to equal the value of the reservation 
utility Vm(Ur). The reservation utility policy is to accept Um and to 
migrate to a new place if Um > Ur, where Ur is the reservation utility. 
Assuming that the agent lives over the period of time T in the 
future, the expected present value of Vm(Um) is: 
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T 
Vm(Um) = Um / Um dt 
0 
= Um(l - e"'^)/r (2.7) 
Therefore, the maximum for (2.6) while living at the origin is Vnm = Vm(Ur) 
= Ur(l - e~'^)/r. Based on the derivation presented in Appendix A, Equation 
(2.6) can be simplified as: 
00 
Ur = Unm/(1 - e'*^) + S/i [/ (Um - Ur)dF(Um)] (2.8) 
Ur 
Define the probability that a person will migrate in a short period 
of time h as: 
CO 
H.h = (5h + 0(h)) J" f(Um) dUm (2.9) 
Ur 
The first segment of the right-hand side of equation (2.9) represents the 
probability that the individual receives at least one offer to migrate. 
The second term represents the probability that the offer is accepted. 
Dividing by h and taking the limit as h -> 0, we get the hazard rate: 
CO 
H = 5 / f(Um) dUm (2.10) 
Ur 
Equation (2.8) shows how the reservation utility changes as the 
explanatory variables change. By construction, the reservation utility is 
a function of the rate at which the offers are received (£), the utility of 
being at the origin (Unm), discount rate (r), expected utility offers from 
a new destination (Unm), and expected life span (T). Equation (2.10) shows 
how the hazard rate is a function of Um, Ur, and &. Given that all else is 
equal, a decrease in the reservation utility leads to an increase in the 
hazard rate. However, the reservation utility is also a function of Um and 
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6 ,  which means that in addition to their direct effect on the hazard rate, 
Um and S have an indirect effect through the reservation utility. Because 
Unm, r, and T do not appear in Ec[uation (2.10), their effects on the hazard 
rate are indirect through the change in the reservation utility. 
Comparative static analysis could be undertaken to show how the 
changes in reservation utility (Ur) and hazard rate (H) are caused by 
changes in 6, Unm, r, the mean of utility offer /ium' Table 2.1 
shows the outcome of the comparative statics. Given the results in 
previous studies and the economic theory, some variables which have direct 
effects will be discussed. 
Table 2.1. The effects of 5, Unm, r, and T on Ur and 
Exogenous Variable 
Endogenous Variable 6 Unm r /^Um T 
Reservation utility (Ur) + + + -
Hazard rate (H) ? - + + + 
^Detailed derivations can be found in Appendix A. 
An increase in the rate at which the offers are received (S) 
increases the reservation utility. If 8 increases, an individual will have 
greater confidence in having a better place to live in the future which 
will cause the individual to be more selective and to increase his/her 
reservation utility. The indirect effect on the hazard rate will in turn 
be negative. However, the total effect on the hazard rate turns out to be 
ambiguous. On one hand, with better information and more offers, the 
individual becomes more selective and his/her hazard rate will be lower. 
On the other hand, with more information and offers, the individual will 
have more chances to move and the hazard rate will be higher. 
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Human capital, such as education, that affects the chance of 
receiving an offer to move can be represented by the parameter S. Higher 
education generally leads to more job offers and increases the hazard rate 
for moving. People with more education also face a larger labor market. 
In Becker's model of general and specific training (Becker, 1975), the 
conclusion is that general education increases a worker's productivity, not 
only in the current firm, but also in other firms/locations. Thus, the 
prediction is that people with more general education are more likely to 
move. 
An increase in an individual's utility at the origin (Unm) will 
increase his/her reservation utility and decrease the hazard rate. The 
intuition behind this statement is clear. Better living conditions at the 
current location reduce the incentive to migrate. 
Many variables may contribute to utility at the origin and can be 
measured and used in empirical studies. For example, an individual's wage 
at the origin will be important. Wage increases will increase the utility 
at the origin and reduce the tendency to move. However, the effect of the 
actual wage on migration could be mixed because the wage has a strong 
correlation with education and other personal characteristics that are 
likely to affect migration. Therefore, the individual's measurement of 
wage should be free from this multi-collinearity problem. 
Other variables that may affect utility at the origin are personal 
unemployment, union membership, and local amenities. Unemployment 
experience may increases his hazard rate for moving. Membership in a labor 
union could increase job security and income and reduce the tendency to 
move. Local amenities, such as a low crime rate and a high percentage of 
state and national park in a state might affect his utility. High crime 
rates represents a disamenity, and the individual will most likely move 
away from these problems. State and national parks are positive local 
cunenities and thus may reduce the hazard rate for moving. 
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The inclusion of finite life span T in the model explains the 
dependence of the reservation utility and the hazard rate on time. An 
increase on an individual's expected length of life (T) reduces his/her 
reservation utility and increases the hazard rate for moving. Because T 
decreases over time, the reservation utility increases and the hazard rate 
decreases over time. There are two consequences to this pattern. First, 
the hazard rate is higher for younger than for older adults. This 
assertion fits well to the fact that most migration takes place when people 
are young adults because they have more time to recover the cost of 
mobility. Therefore, age is expected to be an important variable affecting 
the hazard rate for moving. Second, the longer an individual stays in one 
place, the higher is his/her reservation utility to move. In other words, 
the model predicts that the longer the individual lives in one state, the 
smaller is his/her tendency to move. 
A higher mean for expected utility at the destination (AtUm) 
increase both reservation utility and the hazard rate for moving. This 
increases the individual's confidence of having a better life in the new 
place, which leads to a positive effect on reservation utility and an 
indirect negative effect on the hazard rate. However, there is a direct 
positive effect of on hazard rate in Equation (2.10). The direct 
effect is dominant so that an increase in the expected utility at a new 
residence increases the hazard rate for moving. 
The model assumes that the expected utility corresponding to moving 
is evaluated net of moving costs. All else being equal, a higher 
cost of moving will reduce expected utility at a new destination. Previous 
studies, such as Mincer (1978), suggest that family-related variables, such 
as the number of school-age children and marital status, are positively 
related to the cost of migration. Other studies have shown that being 
married and having school-age children reduce the chance of the family 
migrating. Because of the attachment to the localities, being self-
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employed or a farmer increases the opportunity cost and reduces the hazard 
rate for moving. 
As the discount rate (r) increases, the future expected benefits are 
discounted more heavily. The comparative static result shows that an 
increase in r would reduce an individual's reservation utility at the 
origin and increase the hazard rate for moving. One reason is that the 
reservation utility is a function of discounted expected utility [see 
Equation (2.8)]. This model is different from deterministic models, such 
as the labor force participation model where the reservation wage is not a 
function of the wage offer. Because reservation utility is an increasing 
function of discounted expected utility in this model, reservation utility 
will decrease as expected utility is more heavily discounted. Because the 
effect of r on the hazard rate occurs only through reservation utility, the 
hazard rate for moving will be higher. The interpretation is when the 
discount rate increases, the cost of waiting is higher. Because every 
individual is assumed to migrate eventually, the increase in the discount 
rate makes the individual migrate sooner. 
We do not emphasize the effect of the discount rate on an 
individual's migration decision in the empirical study for two reasons. 
First, this study explores the effects of personal and local 
characteristics on migration. We assumed that every individual in every 
state faces the same discount rate; therefore, including the discount rate 
in the empirical model is not necessary. Second, we assumed that the 
discount rate, represented by the real interest rate, has been constant 
over time.^ 
Nominal and real interest rates from 1953 to 1993 are presented in 
Appendix E. Except for the late 1970's and early 1980's, the real interest 
rate was constant around 1 to 2 percent. It is possible that the movement 
of the real interest rate in the late 1970's and early 1980's might affect 
migration decisions. Future empirical research may incorporate the effect 
of interest rate on migration decisions. 
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We could rearrange the information in Equation (2.8) to obtain: 
[Ur - Unm/(1 - e"'^)]r «= «[1 - F(Ur) ] (E(Um|Um > Ur) - Ur] (2.11) 
This equation has an appealing interpretation. The left-hand side 
represents the marginal cost of rejecting an offer to migrate. The right-
hand side represents the marginal expected benefit from rejecting an offer 
to move, given that the offer would be accepted if Um > Ur. In other 
words, this equation equates the marginal cost and marginal expected 
benefit of rejecting an offer and continuing to live at the origin. 
Equation (2.11) is the optimality condition for an individual's 
reservation utility policy. The individual stays at the origin but 
searches for a new place to live unless the utility offer is greater than 
the reservation utility. From a dynamic programming point of view, this 
optimality condition affirms that the optimal decision maximizes the sum of 
the flow of utility in the current period and the mathematical expectation 
of the discounted flow of utility in the future, given that the future 
decision is optimally made (Divine and Kiefer, 1991). 
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CHAPTER 3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
This chapter describes the data used in this study. The observations 
in this study are for adult males surveyed for the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID). The survey started in 1968 and followed individuals over 
time- hence a panel. The data contain a large amount of information on 
personal and family characteristics, including residence. These data are 
supplemented with information on the characteristics of the states in which 
these individuals reside, such as local labor market, cost of living, 
amenities, and disamenities. The first and second sections of this chapter 
describe the PSID and state data, respectively. The third section 
illustrates the pattern of migration based on the actual sample used in 
this study. The last section presents the procedures used to prepare the 
data set for empirical estimations. 
The PSID Microdata 
The PSID data are collected by the Institute for Social Research, The 
University of Michigan. The participants consist of a panel of individuals 
selected in 1968 who are re-interviewed every year. New individuals are 
added to the survey when they join the household of an original 1968 data 
panelist. Individuals who leave an original PSID household are followed 
and re-interviewed as long as they can be located. According to the PSID 
user's guide (Hill, 1992), the data started with approximately 5,000 family 
units consisting of 18,000 individuals across 40 states in 1968 and had 
grown to around 7,000 families and 37,500 individuals by 1988. The PSID 
has annual information on personal, employment, and local characteristics 
of every individual. It provides a wide variety of information at the 
family and individual levels, and some information about the location in 
which the households reside. The central focus is the economic and 
demographic data; substantial detail exists on income source and amount, 
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employment, family composition changes, and residential location. The PSID 
uses a hierarchical file structure. Household, family, and individual 
information make up each household (or housing unit) record. Every year, 
newcomers and every individual who died or left the households are 
recorded. 
The original PSID consisted of two independent samples: a cross-
sectional national sample and a national sample of low-income families. 
The first was drawn by the Survey Research Center (SRC) and therefore is 
known as the SRC sample. The SRC sample was an equal probability s£imple of 
households in the 48 contiguous U.S. states. The second sample was drawn 
from the Survey of Economic Opportunity among lower-income fcimilies, 
conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Office of Economic 
Opportunity. To better represent the U.S. population in general, we used 
the SRC sample for this study. 
This study will cover the 20-year (1968-87) migration behavior of 
individuals and uses the SRC sample from the 1968-88 PSID data, compiled on 
two CD-ROMs. Because the income data are for the previous year, the study 
did not fully utilize the data from the last year of observation (1988). 
The 20-year period is long enough to capture repeat migration and to 
provide more qualified data on the duration of an individual's stay in one 
state. Every individual was followed from the year after he/she completed 
school to the time when he/she retired, died or was lost. We expect 
different migration behavior for males and females and have chosen to 
exeunine only the migration behavior of males. The data from all years 
1968-88 were used to fit the search model. The point-in-time discrete 
choice model can be fitted by using data from two consecutive years. To 
increase the proportion of the migrant sample and to simplify the sampling 
procedure, five-year data from 1968-73 were used to fit the discrete choice 
model. 
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The sample for this study consists of 915 male individuals who were 
the heads of households and were between 19 and 45 years of age in 1968. 
Individuals who refused to participate in the survey, were in mental 
institutions, prisons, or religious orders, or were recorded as technical 
error anytime between 1968 and 87 were deleted from the sample. 
Individuals who joined the army are assumed to have less control of their 
migration behavior. Therefore, they are followed until the year before 
joining the army and then are treated as lost or missing. It is important 
to note that the starting and ending year for each observation are not the 
same for every individual. 
State Data 
The state data consist mainly of variables representing annual local 
labor market characteristics, cost of living, and local amenities in each 
U.S state from 1968 to 1987. Most of the data are taken from the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States (1968-1993). The state data on 
labor market and cost of living are to be used to predict the potential 
wage for each individual living in a particular state. Local amenities 
also enter the equation explaining the migration decision. Tables B.l and 
B.2 in Appendix B illustrate the local characteristics used in this study. 
Following Tokle and Huffman (1991), this study uses state 
unemployment and employment growth rates to represent the local labor 
market characteristics. The unemployment rates are taken from the 
unemployment rate of civilian workers. Equilibrium unemployment rates 
differ across states and these differences tend to persist over time. Some 
states, such as Michigan, West Virginia, and Mississippi, have a higher 
unemployment rate than the U.S. average. Kansas, Iowa, and Nebraska are 
known as areas with low unemployment rates. The state annual employment 
growth data are derived from the number of workers in non-agricultural 
establishment in every state from 1968 to 1987. In general, the United 
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States experienced increasing employment growth in the 1970s and a 
declining rate in the 1980s. Southern states such as Arizona, California, 
and Nevada have experienced a higher employment growth than have other 
states. In the late 1980s, however, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and 
Oklahoma suffer a sharp drop in employment growth. Some northern states, 
such as Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia have 
experienced employment growth below the U.S. average. 
The local cost of living is proxied by the price of land and the 
percentage of urban population in a state. The data on the land prices are 
taken from Huffman and Evenson (1991). North-eastern states such as New 
Jersey, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Connecticut have the highest land 
prices. Land prices in states with fertile agricultural land such as the 
midwestern states are also higher than the U.S. average, but land prices in 
midwestern states decreased in the mid-1980s due to the farm crisis. The 
mountain region and the Western states, starting from South Dakota, North 
Dakota, and Nevada, have had lower-than-average land prices. However, 
California has had land prices higher than the U.S. average, as has 
Florida. 
The percentage of urban population in every state is another 
indicator of the cost of living. On average, about 67 percent of the 
population in the U.S. lives in urban areas. The percentages differ across 
states, but are relatively constant over time. Naturally, Washington, DC, 
is the only area with 100 percent of the population living in urban areas. 
California and New Jersey have 90 percent of their populations living in 
urban areas. Other states with more than 80 percent urban population 
include New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts. The 
midwestern states and the mountain region have a relatively small 
percentage of urban population. 
Local amenities or dis£imenities are represented by temperatures, 
crime rate, and the proportion of a state's area devoted to state and 
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national parks. The data on state temperatures are represented by 30-year 
average January and July temperatures. We assumed that the temperature 
variability is constant over time. 
Crime rates are represented by the annual number of murders and 
incidents of nonnegligent manslaughter per 100,000 population in each 
state. The crime rate in the United States increased from around 6.3 
percent in 1968 to 7.8 percent in 1978 before moderately declining to 7.0 
percent in 1987. Washington, DC, has an extremely high and increasing 
crime rate, increasing from 19 percent in the 1970s to 36 percent in the 
late 1980s. Similar trends occurred in Michigan and New York, where the 
rates increased from around 6 percent in the late 1960s to more than 11 
percent in the late 1980s. Alaska, Texas, Louisiana, Florida, and Georgia 
have had crime rates consistently around 10 percent or higher for the 
period studied. The New England states and the midwestern states have had 
the lowest low crime rates. 
The percentage of total state and national park areas in every state 
is also used to measure local amenities. Washington, DC, has a relatively 
high percentage (16 percent) of land belong to the national park system. 
Other states with high percentages are California, Connecticut, New Jersey, 
and Massachusetts. We assumed that the total areas of state and national 
parks were relatively constant during the 1968-87 period. 
Pattern of Migration 
By observing the state of residence of every individual in the sample 
from 1968 to 1987, we obtain a picture of observed migration behavior.^ 
Most individuals in the sample did not engage in interstate migration 
during 1968-87. The distribution of the number of interstate moves can be 
^An individual who lives in near a state border, especially in a large 
metropolitan area, might have a short distance (local) move that is 
clasBified as a long distance (between states) move. However, for most 
moves, this is not the case. 
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seen in Table 3.1. Among the 915 individuals in the sample, 722 (78.9 
percent) stayed in the same state throughout the period. Among the 193 
individuals who migrated at least once, 97 (more than 50 percent) moved 
only once. The frequency of movers decreased as the number of moves 
increased. Only five individuals moved more than 4 times during 1968-87. 
By examining the sample who migrated at least once (193 individuals), 
we found that 91 (47.2 percent) had lived in the same state for two 
different subperiods, and that 72 (37.8 percent) moved back to the state 
where they grew up. By selecting individuals who had moved away from the 
state where they grew up and who had migrated at least twice in their 
lifetime, we found that 53.7 percent moved back to the state where they 
grew up. These summary results suggest that late moves are affected by 
prior experiences. When individuals decide to move to another state, the 
state where they grew up or states where they have lived before are 
frequent destinations. 
Table 3.1. The distribution of the number of interstate moves, 1968-87 
Number 
of move 
Frec[uency Percent Frequency 
(Cumulative) 
Percent 
0 722 78.9 722 78.9 
1 97 10.6 819 89.5 
2 59 6.4 878 96.0 
3 23 2.5 901 98.5 
4 9 1.0 910 99.5 
5 3 0.3 913 99.8 
6 2 0.2 915 100.0 
The length of time that an individual lived in one state is defined 
as a residence spell. A spell is complete if the time when the spell 
started and ended can be determined from the data. When the starting year 
is not observed, the spell is left-censored. Similarly, when the ending 
year is not observed, the spell is right-censored. The distributions of 
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starting and ending times for residence spells are presented In Figure 3.1. 
It is clear that the starting and ending years for the sample varied across 
individuals. From Figure 3.1, we see that 844 individuals might have left-
censored spells. In general, every individual has one right-censored spell 
because the most recent residence spell is incomplete. However, additional 
criteria are used to deteirmine the status of the last spell when the ending 
year is not observed. When an individual died, we assumed that the last 
spell is incomplete. We assumed that if the individual had not died, he 
would have stayed in the same state. We also assumed that the last spell 
of individual who joined the army or was lost is complete. There is a 
greater chance that an individual moved to another state when he became 
lost or joined the army. Among 915 individuals in the sample in 1968, 56 
(6.12 percent) died, 144 (15.74 percent) were lost^, and 132 (14.4 
percent) retired during 1968-87. The sample has a large proportion of 
36 ( 3.9 %) 
5 ( 0.5 %) 
874 (96.6 %) 
232 (25.4 %) 
100 (10.9 %) 
583 (63.7 «) 
1968 1987 
Figure 3.1. Distributions of starting and ending times of 
observations for the 915 males in the sample. 
^Individuals who refused to participate in the survey at any time during 
1968-87 were deleted from the sample. Individuals who were classified as 
'lost' consist of those who joined the army (30.5 percent), and those who 
moved out from the United States and/or were really lost (69.5 percent). 
TT . 
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left-censored spells because outcomes before 1968 were not perfectly 
recorded. Among the 874 individuals who started living in a state before 
1968, 702 remained in the same state up to 1987. Thus, 702 spells are 
potentially both left- and right-censored. 
We derived a total of 1,268 independent residence spells from 20 
years of observations for all 915 individuals in the sample. When we 
consider only the completed spells which started in 1968 or after, 207 
spells (16.32 percent) were both right and left completed. It is thus 
clear that at least 874 spells are left-censored. The PSID does not have 
clean information on how long the individuals had lived in a state before 
1968. When we made the assumption that an individual who grew up in a 
state remained in the state until 1968 and defined the starting year of the 
spell as the year when he became age 19, the number of left-censored spells 
decreased. We then derived 284 completed spells (22.40 percent). However, 
some left-censored spells remained because some individuals moved from the 
state where they grew up before 1968. The starting year for the residence 
spell of these individuals remained unknown. In Chapter 5, we discuss the 
empirical procedure to estimate the starting year for these individuals. 
When we closed all the left-open spells, we derived a total of 496 
completed spells (39.17 percent). 
Procedures Applied to Prepare the Data 
This section presents the procedures used to prepare the data for 
empirical analysis. The estimation of probit equations and hazard 
functions utilizes all relevant personal and local characteristics, which 
were taken annually. The first step in preparing the data was to select 
the sample of individuals from the PSID data set. Having selected the 
sample, information relating to the residential mobility of every 
individual from 1968 to 1987 was collected. This step included identifying 
the starting and ending years. In addition, other relevant personal 
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characteristics corresponding to every individual were collected for every 
year from 1968 to 1987. 
The second step was to gather annual data for state (local) 
characteristics covering the period 1968-1987. These variables included 
local labor market conditions, cost of living, temperature, and crime rate. 
Then, the predicted unemployment and job growth rates were calculated. 
The third step was to develop the main data set used in the 
estimation by merging the 20-year individual and local data, based on state 
of residence in each year. The structure of the data remained 
longitudinal. In other words, we maintain the base structure from the PSID 
and added the characteristics of residence into it. 
The fourth step was to change the structure of the data into an 
annual cross-sectional structure, which was needed to fit the wage 
ec[uation. Then, the predicted and residual wage corresponding to every 
individual in every year was calculated and included in the data set. Thus 
the main data set consists of personal characteristics, local 
characteristics, potential, and residual wages, in every year for the 1968-
87 period. 
The final step consisted of deriving the data corresponding to the 
spell of residence. To do this, the structure of the data was formed back 
to be longitudinal. Then, the single data observations were changed from 
annual individual to residence spells. In other words, the data from one 
person for 20 years could make one, or more spells. This final procedure 
set the residence spell as the unit or single observation and made the data 
set ready for the estimation of the hazard function. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
This chapter discusses the general econometric models of migration. 
More precise empirical specifications of the models and definitions of the 
variables are presented in the next chapter. The first section of this 
chapter presents the discrete choice model, which consists of a standard 
probit model. The second section elaborates the statistical analysis of 
time duration data to fit the search model of migration. 
From Equations (2.1) and (2.2) in Chapter 2 and following Maddala 
(1983), we write the reduced form of the indirect utility function: 
The Discrete Choice Model 
Um = X 
Unm = X + Cjjjjj (4.2) 
(4.1) 
The selection equation can be expressed as: 
M* = (Um - Unm)A (4.3) 
where 
M* 
Unm 
X 
Um 
= variable representing the decision to move/stay 
= utility corresponding to migrating, 
= utility corresponding to staying, 
= variables explaining migration decision. 
^m' ^ nm' ^  ~ vectors of parameters, and 
®m' ®nm = random disturbances. 
M* in Equation (4.3) is not observable. However, a dummy variable M is 
observed and takes the value of 1 if an individual migrates and 0 if he 
stays at the same place during the observation period. We can write 
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M = 1 if M* > 0 
= 0 otherwise. (4.4) 
Because the migrant and nonmigrant samples are mutually exclusive, 
individuals can not be observed as a migrant and nonmigrant simultaneously. 
The probability of migration for the i'*' individual is; 
Pr(Mj = 1) = Pr(M*i > 0) = Pr [ (Umj -  Unmj)A > 0] 
= Pr [(Cnmi ~ ^ ~ ^ nm)) 
= F(XiB) (4.5) 
where F(.) is a distribution function of (e„^ - ® ~ ~ ^ nm) • 
Assumed that (£„,„ ~ equals to e, and e is normally distributed with a 
zero mean and a constant variance, the model leads to a standard probit 
model. When there are nl individuals who migrate out of a total n 
individuals in the sample, the likelihood function can be written: 
n^ n 
L(b |m,X) = n  Prob (Mj  =  1 )  H Prob (Mj  =  0 )  
i=l i=ni+l 
n^ n 
= n  F(XiB)  n  (1  -  FXjB)  
i=l i=ni+l 
n Di 1-Di 
= n  F(XiB) (1 - FXjB) (4. 6 )  
i=l 
where Dj = 1 if an individual migrates and 0 otherwise. By maximizing the 
likelihood function in Equation (4.6) we could obtain the estimate of B 
using maximization procedure found in Maddala (1983) or Greene (1990). The 
log form of the likelihood function is: 
n n 
Ln L = S Dj In F(Xi/3) + S (1 - Dj) ln(l -
i=l i=l 
(4.7) 
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Taking the first-order condition and setting it equal to 0 for 
maximization yields 
n n 
aLn L/a^ = S Dj(f/P) Xj + S (1 - Di)(f/(1 - F) )Xj = 0 (4.8) 
i=l i=l 
where f and F are the respective values of relevant density and cumulative 
distribution functions at X^/9. This equation is nonlinear in /9, so that 
the estimate of the parameter can not be found directly. The common method 
for finding the maximum is the iterative procedure called the Newton-
Raphson method. Judge (1988) and Greene (1990) provide the detailed 
derivation for obtaining the parameter estimates and their asymptotic 
standard errors. It can be shown that the estimators are consistent, 
asymptotically normally distributed, and asymptotically efficient. Having 
found the estimate of /9, called B*, the marginal effect of Xj on the 
probability of migrating is: 
aPr(M = l)/aXj = aF(XB)/aXj = Bj*f(XB*) (4.9) 
where f(.) is the normal density function. 
The Search Theory Model 
The search theory model has two stochastic processes embedded in it. 
One is in the utility at the destination, or the offer utility, and the 
second is in the duration. The model with constant reservation utility 
yields an exponential duration distribution g(t) = H.exp(-H.t) and a 
particular density of an accepted utility fjj(Um) = f(Um)/[l - F(Ur)] for Um 
> Ur. The parameter H, which is the hazard rate, is equal to the product 
of the offer-arrival rate and the acceptance probability, H = 6.[1 -
F(Ur)], where F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the 
stochastic variable Um. The densities of utilities and durations are 
related in the sense that they depend on common parameters, which determine 
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Ur and f(w), but the stochastic variable utilities and durations are 
independent. Therefore, the joint probability distribution of utilities 
and durations is given by p(Um,t) = f^(w).g(t). The distribution of 
utilities and durations are expected to differ across individuals due to 
variation in personal and local characteristics. Given these explanatory 
variables X and parameter p, the joint density function is p(Umj|,t£|x^,/9), 
where i represents the individual index. 
However, specifying the joint density distribution of durations and 
utilities is difficult to implement. Both utility and its distribution are 
usually not observed, and even if indirect utility is observed, only those 
larger than the reservation utility are observed. This fact needs to be 
taken into account by constructing the density of accepted utility fj^(Um) 
from f(Um). In addition, an informative specification of the joint density 
function of durations and utility requires some arbitrary assumptions about 
functional forms. One approach, or research strategy, is to focus on 
duration and utility separately. Focusing on duration seems better because 
duration data are more readily observable. The specifications of the time 
duration models are presented later in the section discussing the 
econometric models. 
The econometric methods for analyzing time duration data are based on 
specification of a hazard function rather than a density function. It is 
possible to go back and forth between hazard and density functions, so the 
difference is merely one of convenience in specification, estimation, and 
interpretation. The probability distribution of duration can be specified 
by the distribution function 6(t) = Pr(T* < t), the corresponding density 
function g(t) = dG(t)/dt, and the survivor function S(t) = 1 - 6(t) = 
Pr(T* > t). The hazard function for migration, or the limiting probability 
that a spell will be completed in a short time period h, is: 
H(t) = Lim Pr(t < T* < t+h|T* > t)/h = g(t)/[l - G(t)) (4.10) 
h->0 
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H(t) can be interpreted as the rate at which spells will be completed at 
duration t, given that a spell lasts until time t. This hazard function is 
a convenient definition of duration dependence. Positive (negative) 
duration dependence means that the probability that a spell will end 
shortly increases (decreases) as the spell increases in length. 
For many econometric time duration models, it is natural to analyze 
conditional duration distributions where the conditioning is with respect 
to observed variables X and unobserved parameters Indeed, by analogy to 
most regression analysis, much of the attention is focused on the effect of 
the regressors X on hazard rates and durations. With the explanatory 
variable X, we define the hazard function as: 
H(t,X,y8) = Lim Pr(t < T* < t+h|T* > t,X,^)/h 
h->0 
= g[t|X(t),/3]/(l - 6(t|x(t),)9)] (4.11) 
The integrated hazard conditional on X and P is: 
t 
A(t,i9,X) = / H(u|x,/3) du (4.12) 
0 
Ec[uation (4.12) does not have a particular interpretation, but it is useful 
in practice because this integrated hazard follows a standard exponential 
distribution. The survivor function can be written as: 
t 
S(t,/9,X) = Pr(T > t|/9,X) = exp[- / H(u|x,)9) du] (4.13) 
0 
and the conditional density function for duration can be written as: 
g(t,/3,X) = H(t,X,/3).S(t,^,X) (4.14) 
It is important to specify how the explanatory variables X and 
parameters actually affect the hazard function. One common and simple 
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way to Interpret those relationships is by making a proportional hazard 
model where the effects of X and are multiplied. This is a re-scaled 
hazard function: 
H(t,X,)9) = Ho(t) .$(X,^) (4.15) 
where Ho(t) is a baseline hazard that corresponds to $(X,j3) = 1. This 
specification leads to the log of the conditional hazard being a linear 
function of t, X, and p. $(X,/9) is nonnegative and the common form is 
exp(X^) with one value X in every spell t. Many studies utilize an 
overtime constant hazard specification normalized to Ho{t) = 1, so that: 
H(t,X,;3) = exp{X)9) (4.16) 
The partial effect of X on H(.) is: 
dLn H(t,X,/9)/ax = aLn H(t,X,/9)/ax = ^ (4.17) 
The coefficient p can be interpreted as the constant proportional effect of 
X on the conditional probability of completing a spell. Because of the 
assumption of a constant hazard rate over time which underlies an 
exponentially distributed duration, the expected length of completed 
duration E(t''') = 1/H(.), the survivor function becomes: 
S(t,^,X) = exp[-exp(Xy9) ] (4.18) 
The economic model of migration decision based on the search theory 
implies that the hazard rate of moving can be a function of the expected 
length of remaining life. The constant hazard rate specification might not 
capture this aspect. The common specification of the time-dependent hazard 
rate is made by assuming that the distribution of the completed time spell 
is Weibull. Following Kiefer (1988), one form of hazard function can be 
specified by writing Ho(t) = at"'^, and the hazard function becomes: 
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H(t,x,)9) = at"-^exp(XP) (4.19) 
The effect of individual X to H(.) is similar to Equation (4.17). In 
addition, by taking the derivative of H(.) with respect to t, we could 
find: 
aH( t,X, / 3 ) / a t  =  a ( a  -  l ) t(a - 2)exp(X)9) (4.20) 
This result means that when a > 1, the hazard rate increases as the length 
of stay increases, and decreases otheirwise. The expected length of 
completed duration is E(T*) = exp(-X^).r[(a + l)/a], where r(.) is a geunma 
function. 
For the purpose of estimating the time-dependent hazard rate, we 
specify the hazard function by following Greene (1991) as: 
H(t,X,)9) = (4.21) 
where X = exp(Xj9). Taking the derivative with respect to t, we get: 
aH(t,X,/3)/3t = X^'" 1/a (l/<7 - 1) (4.22) 
This result means that 3H(t,X,^)/3t < 0 when CT > 1, and 3H(t,X,/9)/at > 0 
otherwise. All else being ec[ual, the hazard rate decreases as the length 
of stay increases when a > 1, and decreases otherwise. Taking the 
derivative of Ln H(t,X,/9) with respect to X, we find: 
aLn H(t,X,/9)/ax = fi/a (4.23) 
The effect of X on the hazard rate will be positive if ^ is positive. It 
is important to note that when a = 1, Equation (4.23) in the time-dependent 
hazard rate model is similar to Ecpiation (4.17) in the case of a constant 
hazard rate. The function of a is therefore to re-scale the effect of yd. 
When the hazard rate is decreasing (increasing) over time, namely, when a 
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Is greater (smaller) than one, the marginal effect of X on the hazard rate 
shown in Equation (4.23) is also smaller (bigger). The survival function 
corresponding to the hazard rate in Equation (4.21) is: 
S(t,X,p) = exp{-[exp(Xi9)t]l/'^} (4.24) 
The issue of left-censoring turns out to be important for the time-
dependent hazard function. Heckman and Singer (1985) showed that unless 
the hazard function is constant over time or the completed duration is 
exponentially distributed, left-censored spells are hard to deal with. In 
the exponential case, the distribution of duration after elapsed time t 
does not depend on t and so the distribution of the remaining duration in 
the left-censored spells is the same as the distribution for uncensored 
spells. 
The problem of left-censoring is not crucial in estimating the time-
dependent hazard function in unemployment studies. First, the length of a 
completed unemployment spell is relatively shorter than the residence spell 
in migration studies. Second, the data have complete information on 
unemployment history, or at least the length of time an individual has been 
unemployed at the beginning of the survey. In migration studies, however, 
every individual has resided in a certain place for some time before the 
survey took place. Because the PSID data do not have any clear information 
on how long an individual was at a residence before 1968, some additional 
procedures are needed to empirically estimate the time-dependent hazard 
function. Those procedures are discussed in Chapter 5. 
By assuming that the transition process between residence spells 
follows a Semi-Markov Process, the separate spells of an individual can be 
taken to be independent across spells (Devine and Kiefer, 1991). In other 
words, spell of living in one place is an independent event drawn from all 
possible outcomes in a scunple space. 
The estimation of the model follows a maximum likelihood procedure. 
Greene (1991) and Kiefer (1988) provide the procedure to estimate the 
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model. Recall that we have a hazard function H(t,X,/S,a), survivor function 
S(t,/9,X,a), and the conditional density function g(t,/9,X,a) = 
H(t,X,/3,a)S(t,X,/9,a). When a sample of n independently completed spells tj 
and explanatory variables X corresponding to them were available, the 
likelihood function will be |Xj,tj) = g [tj,;0,a,X(tj) ]. When spell tj 
is censored, the only information available is that the duration was at 
least tj. As a consequence, these observations contribute to the 
likelihood function only through the survivor function S[tj,/9,<7,X(tj) ], or 
the probability that the duration is longer than tj. Letting Sj = 1 if the 
i^ spell is completed and 5j = 0 otherwise, then the full log likelihood 
function will be: 
n n 
Ln L(^ ,CT) = S In g[ti,/3,a,X(ti)] + 2:(1 - ^jjln S[ti,/3,a,X(ti) ] (4.27) 
i=l i=l 
Based on specification of the hazard function corresponding to the 
distribution of the duration, we can estimate parameter ^  by maximizing the 
log-likelihood function in Equation (4.27). 
To simplify the estimation procedure, Greene (1991) created a 
transformation, wj = (In tj-Xj^)/a, such that the log-likelihood function 
becomes: 
n n 
Ln L(^ ,CT) = S ijln [g(Wi)/CT) + S(1 - 5j)ln S(wj) (4.28) 
i=l i=l 
The derivatives for the first-order conditions are: 
aLn L/a/9 = [«iaLn g/3wj + (1 - 5i)3Ln S/awj] (-Xj/a) = 0 (4.29) 
aLn L/aa = (S^aLn g/awi+ (1 - Sj)aLn S/awj] (-1/cr) - (SJa) = 0 (4.30) 
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The iterative procedures are used to find the maximum of the likelihood 
function. The starting values of every iteration are the parameter 
estimates based on. Ordinary Least Square estimates of the regression 
between the log of the duration and the explanatory variables. Two common 
iterative procedures suggested by Greene (1991) are Newton's method and the 
Davidson-Fletcher-Powell (DFP) method (Fletcher, 1980). For well-behaved 
likelihood functions, such as Tobit, logit, and probit, Newton's method is 
a natural choice. For the less well behaved, such as in the likelihood for 
the hazard functions, the DFP method is used. This study uses the 
convergence criterion = 0.0001. It is important to note that the maximum 
likelihood estimation leads to a consistent, asymptotically normally 
distributed, and asymptotically efficient estimator. 
Heterogeneity, or individual specific effects, might influence the 
expected duration. Unmeasured heterogeneity can cause estimation bias in 
duration models (see Chamberlain, 1985a; Heckman and Singer, 1985). 
Following Devine and Kiefer (1991) and Greene (1991), the heterogeneity 
effect is represented by a random variable v that is distributed 
independently from both X and t, so that the survivor for exponential or 
Weibull model is modified into: 
S(t|v) = V exp{-[exp(X)9)t]^'''} (4.31) 
where the random variable v is a heterogeneity effect. Following Greene 
(1991) we assumed that v is distributed as gamma with parameters k and R, 
with k = R so that the expected value of v is normalized to one. Greene 
showed that the modified hazard function becomes: 
H(t,X,y9,v) = S(t)9(A/ff)(At)l'''-^ (4.32) 
where X = exp(X^), S(t) is the expected value of v over S(t|v), and $ is 
the variance of v. When the limit of S(t)^ goes to 1 as 0 goes to 0 
(variance of v equal to zero), the hazard function converges to the 
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original exponential hazard function. The interpretation is that 6 
captures the sensitivity of the hazard function to heterogeneity. The 
further 6 deviates from zero, the greater is the effect of heterogeneity. 
There is a conunon convergence problem in estimating the model with 
heterogeneity because the log-likelihood is volatile in parameter 6. The 
detailed procedure used to deal with heterogeneity can be found in Greene 
(1991). 
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CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
This chapter presents the actual equations and definitions of 
variables used to fit the migration models. The specifications are based 
on the general econometric models discussed in previous chapters. Some 
traditional and some new variables are used as regressors in the migration 
models. Because the predicted wage is used to explain migration decisions, 
the first section of this chapter presents the specification of the wage 
ec[uation. The second and third sections discuss the specification of the 
probit equation and the hazard function, respectively. 
The Wage Equation and Relative Wage Performance 
One important variable in the migration decision is the individual's 
income at his current location. A larger full income leads to a larger 
utility and a lower chance of migrating to another state. To get free of 
labor supply decisions and endogeneity of cash income, an individual's wage 
and time endowments are used to proxy his full income. Because everyone 
has the same time endowment, it becomes part of the intercept term. 
However, the actual wage is correlated with other personal and local 
characteristics that affect the migration decision. Therefore, this study 
develops a new measurement, the individual's relative wage performance. 
To develop the relative wage performance, lets begin by writing the 
specification of the individual's hourly wage: 
Ln(Wii,/Pj.)= (5.1) 
where 
Wjj^ = nominal hourly wage of individual i living in state k, 
P|^  = price index for inputs used to produce indirect utility in 
household of individual living in state k, 
Xj = personal characteristics. 
52 
Zk 
= state characteristics which affect ledsor productivity. 
Ak 
= hedonic state amenity attributes. 
= random disturbance representing luck, E(cj) = 0, 
fix 
= 
return to personal characteristics. 
fix 
= 
return to local productivity characteristics. 
= 
return to hedonic local attributes. 
When the markets work well, the price of traded goods are 
approximately the same across states. The prices of nontraded goods, 
however, might differ greatly between states. We assume that the hedonic 
price index for goods and services purchased in state k is a linear 
function of the national price index, prices of state nontraded goods, and 
regional price. Define the state price index as: 
Ln(P,j) = aiLn(P) + (1 - ai)Ln(PLAND,j) + ajURBANjj + agCLIMATEjj + 
a4REGIONjj + 
= aiLn(P) + (1 - aj) [Ln(PLAND|j)-Ln(P) ] + (l-al)Ln(P) + 
a2URBANij + a3CLIMATE,j + 04REGION,j + 5^ 
= Ln(P) + (1 - aj) [Ln(PLAND,j)-Ln(P) ] + QjURBAN^ + 
agCLIMATE^ + a4REGI0N,j + (5.2) 
= national price index for goods and services purchased by 
households, 
= nominal price of land in state k, 
= percentage of urban population in state k, 
= climatic characteristics of state k, 
- regional dummy variables, and, 
= random disturbance, E{Sy^) = 0. 
where 
P 
PLANDjj 
URBAN  ^
CLIMATE^  
REGIONj^  
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By substituting Equation (5.2) into Equation (5.1), we obtain the following 
wage equation: 
Ln(Wjij/P) = + (1 - «!) [Ln(PLAND,j/P) ] + ctjURBANj^ + 
ajCLIMATE,^  + a4REGIONjj + (5'3) 
Equation (5.3) shows that by incorporating PLAND, URBAN, CLIMATE, and 
REGION on the right hand side, we can use the national price index to 
create the dependent variable. The parameter representing the effect of 
factors affecting wages are estimated as if we had used the state price 
index for purchased goods and services to deflate the wage. 
This representation of the labor demand equation follows the 
convention in the labor literature of making the demand function facing an 
individual with given attributes perfectly elastic. The interpretation of 
this market wage is as the potential wage of an individual with certain 
personal and local characteristics. Given that state labor markets in the 
United States are well integrated, i.e. individuals and firms are free to 
move, and entry and exit occurs, the estimated coefficients on the 
regressors in Equation (5.3) are estimates of equilibrium compensating 
differentials (see Rosen, 1986). If Equation (5.3) is fitted to a panel 
data set of individuals living in all states then the estimated 
coefficients represents the United States labor market's average valuation 
of characteristics. In the PSID data, the nominal wage is calculated from 
total annual earnings from work divided by total annual hours of work. 
Based on Equation (5.3.) and following Tokle and Huffman (1991), the 
complete specification of the real market wage or real potential wage of 
individual i in state k and year y is: 
54 
Ln(Wijey/Py) = Po + i^iEDUiy + fi2'^XP•^y + PiEXP^y^ + + /35Ln(PLANDijy/Py) + 
ySgURBAN^y + jSyJOBGRjjy + )9gUNRATEjjy + /SgCRIMEijy + /SiqJAN^ + 
iSllJULYk + ySnTIMEy + /9i3TIMEy2 + + ^SisDWiy + 
^leDNCjy + Ciy (5.4) 
The term £jy is a random disturbance and for convenience in the estimation 
of the hazard function, cjy is assumed to be distributed independently of 
the distribution of the duration of residence spells.'* The description of 
the variables used in the wage equation can be found in Table 5.1. 
The use of actual values of state employment growth and unemployment 
rates is based on the assumption in the economic model of migration derived 
above. In search theory, individuals are assumed to observe both their 
indirect utility and their wages perfectly. However, previous studies 
(Tokle and Huffman, 1991; Topel, 1986) suggest that individuals and firms 
respond to the expected value of local variables rather than to actual 
values. For this reason, another wage equation is fitted using the 
predicted value of employment growth (PJOBGR|jy) and the predicted value of 
the unemployment rate (PURATEj^y). The residual employment growth (RSHOCKj^y) 
and the residual unemployment rate (RURATEj^y) are included in the second 
equation to capture unanticipated shocks in the state labor market. The 
second wage equation is specified as: 
Ln(Wiky/Py) = o + ajEDUjy + a2EXPiy + Q3EXPiy2 + Q4RACEi + Oj Ln(PLAND^y/Py) + 
QgURBANjjy + ttyPJOBGR^y + agPURATEj^y + OgRSHOCK^y + OiQRURATE^y + 
a^jCRIMEjjy + + ai3JULyij + Qj4TIMEy + aj5TIMEy^ + 
"l6°Siy "l7°Wiy "ig^NCjy + ejy (5.5) 
^hen the distributions of residual wage and duration are independent, 
the conditional distribution of the duration given the residual wage is the 
distribution of the duration itself. Therefore, the likelihood function 
for estimating the hazard function can be formed based on the conditional 
distribution. 
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Table 5.1. Variable names and sample means in the wage equation 
Symbol Variable Description Sample mean 
Dependent variable; 
Ln(H^y/Py) Log of real hourly wage of individual i 
in year y (Ln $/hr)® 2.431 
Personal characteristics; 
BDUjy Education of individual i in year y (in years) 12.709 
EXPjy Experience of individual i in year y (Age-EDU-6) 
in years) 23.597 
EXP^y^ Experience squared/100 6.581 
RACE} Dummy variable, equal to 1 if individual i is 
white and 0 otherwise 0.929 
State labor market; 
JOBGR|^y Employment growth rate in state k in year y 
(percent) 2.257 
UNRATEj^y Unemployment rate in state k in year y (percent) 6.397 
PJOBGR]^ Predicted job growth in state k between years y 
and y-1 (see text) 2.213 
PURATEj^y Predicted unemployment rate in state k in year y 
(see text) 6.357 
RSHOCK]j.y Relative employment shock in state k in year y 0.000 
(see text) 
RURATE]^y Residual unemployment rate in state k in year y 
(see text) 0.040 
Cost of living and amenities; 
Ln(PLANDi^y/Py)Log of real price of land in state k where individual 
lives in year y ($/acreB)^ 1,118.550 
URBANj^y Proportion of urban population in state k in 
year y (percent) 71.771 
CRIMEj^y Crime rate in state k in year y (percent) 8.090 
JANjj Thirty-year average of January temperature in 
state k (degrees F.) 33.167 
JULYjj Thirty-year average of July temperature in 
state k (degrees F.) 75.648 
Time and regional dummies; 
TIMEy Time indicator, 1968 =1, ..., 1987 = 20 10.123 
TIMEy^ Time squared/100 1.357 
DSjy Dummy variable equals 1 if individual i 
lives in the South and 0 otherwise 0.290 
DWjy Dummy variable equals 1 if individual i 
lives in the West and 0 otherwise 0.226 
DNCjy Dummy variable equals 1 if individual i 
lives in the North Central region and 0.272 
0 otherwise 
Number of observations 15,367 
'Py = Gross National Product (GNP) implicit price deflator for 
personal consumption expenditure (1987 = 1.00). 
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The complete definition of variables and the sample mean values are 
presented in Table 5.1. Ec[uations (5.4) and (5.5) are fitted to annual 
data for all individuals in the sample, treated cross-sectionally. From 
the 915 individuals observed over 20 years, we derived 15,367 annual 
observations. 
Predicted job growth in state k in year y (PJOBGRj^y) is the 
difference between the forecasted value of the natural logarithm of the 
state's private sector employment in years y and y-1. The forecasts were 
obtained from a regression of the natural logarithm of non-agricultural 
employment for 1968-91 on a quadratic trend. The residuals from these 
regressions, ej^, are indexes of time-varying local demand conditions in 
state k in year y. Next, the natural logarithm of national (U.S.) 
aggregate employment was regressed on a quadratic trend. The residual from 
this regression, e^, captures the aggregate labor demand disturbance in 
year y. The relative local labor disturbance of state k in year y 
(RSHOCKi^y) is defined as RSHOCKj^y = ej^y - By This variable expresses the 
current labor demand shock as a deviation from the aggregate labor demand 
shock. 
The predicted state unemployment rate in state k in year y (PURATEj^y) 
measures the anticipated state equilibrium unemployment rate. This rate is 
obtained by regressing the state's annual unemployment rate for 1968-91 on 
a quadratic trend. The unemployment rates have not tended to converge over 
time. At any point in time, there are significant regional unemployment 
differences that tend to persist. For example, unemployment rates in 
Michigan and West Virginia are traditionally higher than rates in Iowa and 
Nebraska. It has been commonly accepted that unemployment rates tend to be 
counter-cyclical to the movement of the business cycle. The unanticipated 
unemployment rate is captured by the residual unemployment rate (RURATE|^y), 
which is calculated as the difference between the actual and predicted 
unemployment rates in state k in year y. 
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The specification of the wage equation does not include correction 
for selection bias. The men in the sample were screened to remove those 
who had unusual employment characteristics. This screening process 
provides a relatively homogenous group that stays in the labor force until 
retirement. We found that among all the observations used to fit the wage 
equation, the proportions of one full year of unemployment and a half-year 
of unemployment are only 0.1 percent and 0.96 percent, respectively. The 
proportion of reported wages equal to zero was only 4.4 percent of all 
observations. Because of these small percentages, we decided not to pursue 
the selection bias correction in fitting the wage equation. 
Previous empirical studies provide information about the expected 
sign of the estimated coefficients. A higher level of education is 
expected to lead to higher earnings, and therefore the sign of is 
expected to be positive. Post schooling experience is expected to have a 
positive but diminishing effect on the wage. Hence, the expected signs of 
^2 and /93 are positive and negative, respectively. Previous studies have 
shown that being white significantly increases wages; therefore, the 
expected sign of coefficient is expected to be positive. 
The local labor market, cost of living, and amenity factors are also 
expected to affect real wages. The differences in cost of living and local 
amenities are captured by the price of agricultural land (PLANDj^y), 
proportion of urban population (URBAN|^y), and regional dummy variables 
(DSy, DWy, and DNCy). To derive the real land price from nominal land 
prices, we used the GNP implicit price deflator for personal consumption 
expenditure. In the model, land prices were entered as natural log values. 
When both land price and the proportion of urban population are positively 
correlated with wages, the signs of and are expected to be positive. 
When workers or firms are immobile in the short run, local economic 
conditions will affect real wage rates. Therefore, state labor market 
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variables are also included in the model. An increase in local labor 
demand increases market wages. The growth of non-agricultural employment 
(JOBGRj^) in a state is used to capture this effect, and the expected sign 
of P-j is positive. Another local labor market characteristic affecting 
wages is the local unemployment rate. In general, real wages are 
positively correlated with the local unemployment rate because localities 
with high unemployment rates pay a wage premium to attract workers. The 
expected sign of /9g is also positive. The crime rate could affect the real 
wage in a similar way to the unemployment rate. The market wage consists 
of a wage premivim to attract people to an area with a higher crime rate. 
Therefore, the expected sign of /dg is positive. Following Tokle and 
Huffman (1991) the average temperatures during January and July are 
included in the model. 
An individual's relative wage performance is defined as the 
difference between the his actual wage and his national expected market 
wage. The "residual wage" of individual i in year y is: 
AWjy = Ln(Wiky/Py) " E [ Ln ( Wjj^y / Py ) ] (5.6) 
where E[Ln(Wy^y/Py) ] is the predicted wage obtained from Equation (5.4) and 
(5.5). By construction, this residual wage is not correlated with other 
factors affecting the market wage. The hypothesis is that a larger 
residual wage or better local wage performance will reduce the tendency to 
migrate and therefore lengthen a residence spell. In other words, when the 
actual wage received by an individual is less than his potential wage, he 
tends to move to another state. This residual wage is calculated and used 
in the right-hand side of the equation explaining migration. For the 
hazard function model, the residual wage is expressed as an annual average 
over a residence spell. 
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Because of the following characteristics, the residual wage is 
expected to be an important determinants of migration. First, the residual 
wage represents luck. The residual wage consists of a random disturbance, 
which explains why two persons having the same state of residence (i.e. 
state attributes) may have different wages. Second, the residual wage 
captures the unmeasured state-specific returns to factors affecting wage 
rates, which might differ from the general return for the United States. A 
positive residual wage means that the state-specific return is on average 
greater than the general U.S. return, so that the individual tends to stay 
at the current residence. When the residual wage is negative, an 
individual has an incentive to migrate. Therefore, the residual wage 
captures the unmeasured wage differentials across states which affect 
migrations. 
Third, the residual wage incorporates tenure effects due to firm or 
location specific human capital associated with the current residence or 
the origin. Because the wage increases with the increase with the length 
of tenure, the probability of an individual moving decreases as his tenure 
accumulates in a given state. Furthermore, the location or firm- specific 
tenure is useful in explaining migration in the time dependent hazard rate 
model. The significance of the tenure effect on the residual wage can be 
shown by fitting a wage equation that includes a variable representing 
tenure. The issue is, however, more complicated because tenure specific to 
location or firm is endogenous to the wage. Because high-paying jobs 
usually last longer, more stable jobs pay more throughout the tenure within 
a firm, and more able workers generally stay on the job longer and receive 
higher wages, the pure effect of job tenure on wage is difficult to measure 
(Topel, 1991; Brown, 1989; Abraham and Farber, 1987). For illustration, 
this study shows the significance of state specific tenure on the residual 
wage by fitting the wage equation that includes a variable representing 
tenure in the model. The result can be found in Appendix C. 
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The Probit Equation 
The standard discrete choice model is fitted to the data from 1968 to 
1973. The data from the first six years were chosen in order to maintain 
the random selection in 1968 and to maximize the sample size. From 1968 
through 1973, an average of 20 to 30 individuals out of 915 individuals 
(around 3 percent) in the sample migrated to another state every year. 
Only five or fewer individuals migrated in two consecutive years. In one 
year of data, the size of the migrant sample is too small. Previous 
migration studies used one or two years of data (e.g., Goss and Paul, 1986; 
Graves and Linneman, 1979). Because migration was defined as any move from 
the current residence, these studies treated local moves and long-distance 
moves ec[ually and therefore the size of migrating sample was large. 
Because of the lack of data on local characteristics, these studies 
incorporated only personal characteristics in the models. 
To increase the number of migrants, this study combined observations 
from the first seven years of data (1968-1973). Because the first year 
that an individual is observed can be as late as 1972, the year 1973 was 
chosen to capture every individual in the sample. To maintain the model of 
a point-in-time decision, the definition of migration was modified. We 
defined the dummy variable representing migration (M) as equal to 1 if 
individual moved at least once between 1969 and 1973. When an individual 
lived in the same state for the 1968-73 period, we set M equal to 0. As a 
result, the proportion of the sample with M = 1 increases to 16.4 percent. 
The set of explanatory variables used to explain the migration 
behavior contains personal characteristics of individuals and local 
characteristics of the place the individuals lived before they made the 
final move. For those who did not move, the data are taken from the state 
of origin. For those who moved at least once, the data are taken from all 
the states the individuals lived in prior to the most recent move. When 
the expected utility of being in the new state is not realized, an 
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individual will most likely make another move. In this framework, the move 
that counts is the last move the individual made. 
The local variables that directly affect migration behavior, such as 
crime, local amenities, and temperature, are measured relative to the U.S. 
average. For example, the crime rate that is used in the migration 
equations, both probit equation and hazard function, is the state crime 
rate minus the United States average crime rate. This relative measurement 
is important because including the realized destination into the discrete 
choice model would lead to misspecification error. 
Some variables are measured as an average value of several years of 
observations, whereas others are measured at the beginning of the period of 
observation. Based on Equation (4.5) in the previous chapter, the 
probability of migration for individual i is specified as 
Prob(Mi = 1) = F(ao + ^lAWj + ajEDUj + agAGEj + a4AGE2i + ajCHILDj + agMARRj 
+ a7DSLFARMj + agRACEj + agUNEMPj + ajoUNIONj + aiiCRIMEj 
+  a i 2 P A R K i  +  a i 3 J A N i  +  a i 4 J U L Y i )  ( 5 . 7 )  
The complete definition of the variable and the sample means are 
presented in Table 5.2. As indicated in the previous section, lower wage 
performance is expected to increase the tendency to migrate. Therefore, 
the expected sign of is negative. Table 5.2 shows that migrants have 
negative means for residual wages, meaning that their realized wage at the 
origin has been lower than their potential wage. In contrast, the means 
for the nonmigrant group are positive. 
An individual's general education is expected to have a positive 
effect on migration rate. Men who have higher levels of general education 
participate in a larger labor market and receive more job offers. Previous 
studies on migration have consistently shown that education has a positive 
effect on migration rates. 
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Table 5.2. Variable names and sample means for the problt equation 
Sample Mean 
Symbol Variable Description Migrant Non-migrant 
(Mi =1) (Mj = 0) 
AW: 
EDUj 
AGEj 
CHILDj 
MARR| 
DSLFAKM^ 
RACE: 
Residual wage measured as an average per year 
in log (one of two types): 
1. AWlj, derived from Equation (5.4) -0.768 0.040 
2. AW2i, derived from Ec[uation (5.5) -0.782 0.044 
Education measured at the starting time of 12.569 12.407 
observation (in years) 
Age measured at the starting time of 30.050 33.818 
observation (in years) 
Number of children in school measured at 0.916 1.461 
the starting time of observation 
Share of time being married^ 0.455 0.905 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if farmer or 0.104 0.187 
self-employed and 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if white 0.911 0.913 
and 0 otherwise 
UNEMPj Average annual unemployment hours (hr/year) 33.465 32.385 
UNIONj Dummy variable, equal to 1 if in a labor 0.243 0.288 
union at the beginning of observation 
and 0 otherwise 
CRIME: 
PARKj 
JAN^ 
JULY; 
Crime rate in the state of origin, relative -0.052 -0.417 
to U.S. average 
Percentage of state and national park areas 0.027 -0.080 
in the state of origin, relative to U.S. 
average 
Average January temperature in the state of 3.363 0.501 
origin, relative to U.S. average 
Average July temperature in the state of 0.070 0.130 
origin, relative to U.S. average 
Number of observations 202 713 
^The length of time being married and living in the state of origin 
divided by the length of time being in the state of origin. For example, 
when individual remains married over the period living in the state of 
origin, MARK = 1. 
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The signs of the coefficients for AGE and AGE^ are expected to 
support the view that younger men have a higher tendency to migrate. Age 
reduces the net present value of the benefit from moving by reducing the 
benefit and increasing the cost. Young men have a longer horizon after 
migrating and have better chance of overcoming the costs of migration than 
do older men. The mean age of the sample male in Table 5.2 shows that the 
sample of migrants is younger than the sample of for nonmigrants. 
For a male, the number of children in the school, being married, 
being self-employed or a farmer, and belonging to a labor union, are 
characteristics expected to reduce the probability of migrating. The cost 
of migration is higher for those who are married and have school-age 
children. Tenure benefits accrue with union membership tends to reduce the 
probEibility of migration. Famers or self-employed individuals tend to 
have firmer ties to the origin. Therefore, being a farmer or self-employed 
is expected to reduce the probability of moving. The means shown in table 
5.2 support these expectations. The sample of migrating males has a 
smaller proportion of self-employed individuals or farmers, smaller number 
of school-age children, and smaller share of time married than does the 
sample of nonmigrants. Table 5.2 also shows that the scunple of migrants 
has a smaller proportion of men who are union members than the sample of 
nonmigrants. Host previous studies (see Table 1.3) have indicated that 
being white or unemployed increases the chances of moving. Being 
unemployed may reduce utility and provide some incentive to move and find a 
job elsewhere. Table 5.2 shows that the migrants have larger mean of 
average annual unemployment hour. 
Locational amenities affect compensating differentials and the 
tendency to move. The sign of the coefficient on PARK is expected to be 
negative. The coefficient on CRIME is expected to be positive because a 
higher crime rate at one's current location reduces the cost of moving. 
Nonetheless, the difference between the migrant and the nonmigrant sample 
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means for those two variables seems to be small. The average temperatures 
in July and January are included to capture the effect of weather-related 
factors affecting the migration decision. 
The Hazard Function 
Search theory provides us with a hazard function for migration. For 
a given length of time, it captures the instantaneous probability that an 
individual will receive an acceptable offer and move. We can specify a 
reduced form hazard function for individual i and residence spell j as a 
function of personal and local characteristics. Let the explanatory 
variable corresponding to that spell be X. From the previous chapter, the 
general form of the hazard function is given as: 
H[tij,X(tij),j8,a,CT) = A/CT(At)l/''-^ (5.8) 
where 
A = exp[X(tij)^), 
a = time-dependence parameter. The hazard rate increases, stays 
constant, or decreases over time when a is less than, equal to, or 
greater than 1, 
i =1,2, ...,n, denotes individual i, 
j = 1, 2, ..., Cj, denotes the spell j, and 
= maximum number of spells for individual i. 
In general, the hazard function corresponding to spell ty is a function of 
variables representing the reduced form indirect utility function evaluated 
at the current residence, the cost of migration, and other variables that 
capture a person's opportunity of receiving an offer to move. 
Search theory and previous migration studies discussed in the 
literature review provided some ideas for variables. Education and 
experience are two personal characteristics that help explain an 
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individual's income and also directly influence the decision to migrate. 
People with higher education tend to receive more offers to move because of 
greater employment opportunity. Based on the comparative static equation 
discussed in Chapter 2, an increase in the rate at which offers are 
obtained leads to a higher reservation utility and smaller hazard rate to 
migrate. In addition, more educated people have a higher wage offer. 
Through the change in the expected utility offer, the comparative static 
result shows that higher education or wage offers increase the migration 
hazard rate. Highly educated people generally face a larger labor market 
than do others. Therefore, educated individuals are more likely to move 
between states. Education can also have nonwage effects due to gains in 
the efficiency of acquiring and processing information (Huffman, 1985). 
Other personal characteristics affecting the cost of migration are 
included in the model. Being married, the number of children in school, 
and being self-employed or a farmer could account for some migration costs. 
The expected utility, net of migration cost, due to migration will be 
smaller for households who have children in school and are self-employed 
than for others. The racial characteristic is expected to matter and is 
included in the migration model. 
Studies reviewed in previous chapters have shown the significance of 
personal unemployment on the migration decision. These studies have found 
that unemployed people have a higher tendency to migrate. This study 
included a variable representing personal unemployment (annual average 
unemployment hours) in the model. The indication of whether an individual 
belongs to a labor union is also included in the model. In addition, 
variables representing local eunenities, such as the proportion of area in 
state and national parks, crime rate, and weather, are included. 
When the length of a spell is endogenous, explanatory variables that 
vary over time might be endogenous. To reduce endogeneity, these 
explanatory variables can be measured at the beginning of each residence 
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spell. Finally, the hazard function Httjj|x(tij) ,^,a,CT] = A/a(At)can be 
formed by specifying X(tij)/3 in A = exp(X(tjj)^) as follows: 
X(tij)^ = iSo + /9lAW(tij) + + )93AGE(tij) + /94AVUNHR (tjj) + /SjUNIONCtij) 
+ ^ 6DSLFARM(tij) + ^7DWHITE(t;j) + ^ SgMARRCtij) + ^SgCHILD (tjj) 
+ /9ioCRIME(tij) + i0iiPARK(tij) + + y9i3JAN(tij) (5.9) 
Detailed definitions and the sample means of variables in the 
equation can be found in Table 5.3. The means are derived from the 
completed and censored spells. The censored spells in Table 5.3 consist of 
left-censored, right-censored, or both right- and left-censored spells. A 
left- and right-censored spell means that an individual lived in the same 
state throughout the observation period, and the exact starting year when 
he lived in the corresponding state is unknown. In the estimation of 
hazard functions with a constant hazard rate model, left-censored spells 
can be treated as a right-censored spell. In the time dependent hazard 
model, all left-open spells must be closed. When all the left-open spells 
are closed, the number of completed spells will increase. The detailed 
procedure for dealing with the time-dependent model is discussed in the 
next chapter. 
Previous discussions provide some indication of expected signs of the 
parameters. Because individuals tend to move when their stream of income 
is not satisfactory, the residual wage will be negatively correlated with 
the hazard rate to migrate. Therefore, the expected sign of is 
negative. Education is expected to have a positive effect. Younger people 
have a higher tendency to migrate, so that the sign of the coefficient of 
AGE20 is expected to be positive. AGE20 is the time being in the one's 20s 
in a residence spell divided by the length of the corresponding residence 
spell. For excunple, when age at the first year of a residence spell is 25 
and the residence spell is 8 years, AGE20 = (30 - 25)/8. 
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Table 5.3. Variable names and sample means for the hazard function 
Symbol Variable Description 
Sample Means 
Completed 
Spells 
AW(tij) 
EDU(tij) 
AGE(tij) 
AVUNHR(tij) 
UNION (tjj) 
The average annual differences between 
actual and predicted wages in spell 
Censored 
Spells 
DSLFARM(tij) 
RACE (tjj) 
MARR(tij) 
CHILD (tjj) 
CRIME (tjj) 
PARK (tjj) 
JULY (tjj) 
JAN (tjj) 
Number of 
r'j (one of two types): 
AWl(tjj), derived from Eq. (5.4) 
2 .  A W 2 ( t j j ) ,  derived from Eq. (5.5) 
Variable representing the education of 
individuals (one of two types): 
1. EDUBEGIN(tj:) s level of education 
at the oeginning of a spell 
2. AVGEDU(t}j) = average level of 
education in the spell 
Variable representing individual's age 
effect (one of two types): 
1. A6E20(t}j) = share of time 
being in one's 20s 
2. AGEBBGIN(tjj) = age at the 
beginning of the spell (year) 
Average annual unemployment hours in the 
spell (hr/year) 
Dummy variable, equals to 1 if an individual 
belongs to union or 0 otherwise 
Membership is defined in two ways: 
1. UNIBEGIN(tij) = observed at the 
beginning of a spell 
2. DUNION(tjj) =: observed in any time 
in a spell. 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if self-
employed or a farmer and 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if white and 
0 otherwise 
Share of time being married in a 
residence spell 
Number of children in school age 
(one of two types): 
1. AVCHILD(tj:) = annual average 
number in a spell 
2. CHILDBGN(ty) = number at the 
beginning of a spell 
Average annual crime rate in the state 
corresponding to residence spell, 
relative to the U.S. average 
Percentage area of state and national 
parks in the state corresponding to 
residence spell, relative to U.S. 
average 
Average July temperature corresponding to 
residence spell, relative to U.S. 
average 
Average January temperature corresponding 
to residence spell, relative to U.S. 
average 
spells 
-0.183 
-0.199 
14.043 
14.081 
0.350 
34.473 
70.474 
0.135 
0.184 
0.150 
0.986 
0.713 
0.723 
0.766 
0.195 
-0.116 
1.382 
4.781 
207 
-0.159 
-0.161 
12.544 
12.573 
0.174 
34.341 
42.855 
0.258 
0.390 
0.315 
0.921 
0.796 
1.171 
1.305 
-0.472 
-0.050 
0.138 
1.563 
1,061 
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Because the effect of Individual age on migration is not linear, the age at 
the beginning of a spell will enter the hazard function in both a linear 
and a quadratic form (AGEBEGIN and AGEBEGIN^). 
The coefficients on personal unemployment and crime rate are expected 
to be positive because, all else being equal, being unemployed or living in 
an area with a high crime rate tends to increase the probability of moving. 
Table 5.3 shows that the sample of completed spells has significantly 
larger means for average annual unemployed hours than do the censored 
spells. Other variables which capture the cost of migration, such as an 
individual being married, being self-employed or a farmer, having children 
in school, and being a labor union member, tended to decrease the hazard 
rate of migration. 
In the model with a constant hazard rate, the estimation of the 
hazard rate is straightforward. We assumed that the completed duration is 
exponentially distributed and treat the left-censored spells similar to the 
right-censored spells. In other word, all the completed spells start in 
1968 or after. We could derive 1,268 spells, with 207 spells completed and 
1,061 censored. The estimation for the time-dependent hazard rate is more 
complicated and the procedures are presented next. 
Treatments for the time-dependent hazard function 
The estimation of a time-dependent hazard model requires that every 
spell be completed or right-censored. The model does not allow for any 
left-censored spells. In this study, the existence of left-censored spells 
is unavoidable because every individual has been in the state for some time 
prior to 1968. However, the PSID does not have information for how long 
individuals lived in the state prior to 1968. Because there has been no 
standard procedure for dealing with the issue of left-censoring, this study 
presents some empirical strategies, or treatments, to close some of the 
spells. Each treatment has its benefits and drawbacks. It is important to 
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note that these treatments should be considered as exploratory procedures. 
For the first treatment, we selected only completed and right-
censored spells that started in 1968. In other words, we ignore the spell 
starting before 1968. This selection led to 207 completed and 184 right-
censored spells. The benefit of this treatment is that all information for 
estimating the hazard rate, namely, the duration and all explanatory 
variables, are readily observable. The problem, however, is nonrandom 
selection. 
For the second treatment, we tried to utilize all completed and 
right-censored spells including those starting before 1968. We assumed 
that those residing in the same state where they grew up in 1968 had 
remained in that same state up to 1968. This assumption means that the 
starting time for the spells is the year when individuals were age 19. 
When an individual moved before 1968 from the state where he grew up, the 
starting time of the first spell, and thus the duration of the spell 
remained unknown. In this second treatment, we did not include these 
unobservable spells in the estimation. The second treatment has 284 
completed and 581 right-censored spells. The 284 completed spells consists 
of 207 spells starting in 1968 or after, and 77 spells starting before 
1968. Compared to the first treatment, the number of completed spells 
increased significantly with the second treatment. Therefore, the problem 
of nonrandom selection associated with the first treatment is reduced. 
There is still a problem because some of the explanatory variables, 
especially the actual wage, were not observed before 1968. The best 
infoirmation available is the value of explanatory variables in the first 
spell derived from the data in 1968 or earlier. The use of partially 
observed explanatory variables for some spells that started before 1968 
could lead to measurement error problems. To reduce the measurement error 
problem, we fit the model twice. First, we used the spells derived from 
all individuals in the sample. Second, we selected only individuals who 
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were 19 to 24 years of age in 1968. It is important to note that spells 
can not start until the individual is 19 years old. With the younger 
sample used in the analysis, the starting time of the first spell could go 
back as far as 1963.^ This approach decreases the number of partially 
observed spells and reduces measurement error problems without making 
nonrandom selection error. The use of a younger population resulted in 137 
completed and 141 right-censored spells. 
For the third treatment, we predicted the starting time for the left-
censored spells and then use all spells in estimating the time-dependent 
hazard function. The starting time is unknown because, prior to 1968, some 
individuals had micirated from the state where they grew up. In other 
words, the starting times for some first spells were observed and some were 
not. When some data are censored, we can apply Heckman's procedure to 
predict the unobserved starting time for those first spells (Heckman, 
1979). The idea of Heckman's procedure is to predict the unobserved length 
of spells based on the observed group, adjusted to the sample selectivity. 
The selection criteria is the migration which took place before 1968. 
There are 874 spells starting before 1968 in the sample. Among them, 
585 are right-censored and 289 are right-closed spells. In the right-
censored group, the starting time for 127 spells is unknown. Thus, 127 
spells are both right- and left-censored. In the right-closed group, the 
starting time of 138 out of 289 spells is unknown. These 138 spells are 
left-censored but right-closed. Therefore, 265 potentially unknown spells 
out of the total 1,268 are to be estimated. Because the right-closed and 
the right-censored spells came from different populations, we applied 
Heckman's procedure twice, first for the group of right-closed spells and 
second for the group of right-censored spells. Note that the right-
censored first spells are derived from individuals who never moved until 
^The young males sample consists of young men in 1968. In other 
words, the young males sample were observed since they were 19 to 24 years 
of age in 1968 or until they were 38 to 43 years of age in 1987. 
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the end of the period of observation. 
To be more specific, the procedure used to predict the unobserved 
starting time or the unobserved length of the first spell consists of 
several steps. First, we fit the equation representing the selection model 
for the distinction between observed and unobserved length, or duration, of 
the spell. Basically, we estimated a binary discrete choice model 
explaining why people moved or stayed prior to 1968.^ We could use the 
model for migration based on the point-in-time decision developed in 
Chapter 2. With a normality assumption, we fit the standard probit model 
with a dependent variable equal to 1 if an individual had moved from the 
state where he grew up before 1968 and 0 otheirwise. The explanatory 
variables are the relevant personal characteristics and local 
characteristics observed in the first year the person was observed and 
other family background characteristics such as father's education and 
number of siblings. The detailed variable definitions used in this 
selection model and the fitted equation can be found in Table D.l. in 
Appendix D. 
Having predicted when migration occurred before 1968, we derived the 
selection bias correction, known as the Inverse Mill's Ratio (IMR). Then, 
by using the observed sample, we regressed the duration of the spell as a 
function of some explanatory variables with the sample selection bias 
correction^. Finally, we used the fitted equation from the observed 
sample to predict the duration of the spell for the unobserved sample. 
^Pr (M68 = 1) = Xj9, where M68 = dummy variable equals to 1 if 
individual did not live in the same state where he grew up in 1968, and 0 
otherwise, X = explanatory variables, and = parameters. 
\n(t) = Za -f dA E, where t = length of residence spells, Z = 
explanatory variables, A = Inverse Mill's Ratio (IMR) for selection bias 
correction, e = random disturbance, and a, 6 = parameters. The IMR is 
derived from the selection equation as where f(.) and F(.) 
are normal density and cumulative distribution function, and is the 
estimate of /9. 
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When the predicted starting time was the year before the person was 19 
years old, we used the year when the person was 19. Also, when the 
predicted starting year was the year after the person was observed in 1968 
or after, we used the year when the person was first observed as the 
starting year. In other words, we used the predicted spells only when 
necessary. Indeed, from the total of 265 potentially unknown spells, 208 
are really predicted. The definition of variables used to predict the 
left-censored spells and the fitted equation can be found in table D.2 in 
Appendix D. 
With Heckman's procedure, the predicted length is theoretically 
distributed normal. Some complications occur because, in the time-
dependent hazard rate model, we have assumed that the distribution of the 
completed duration is Weibull. One reasonable strategy is to test whether 
the predicted duration of the completed spells is approximately distributed 
Weibull. We conducted the goodness-of-fit test on the distribution of the 
predicted duration. When the hypothesis that the predicted length of the 
spell is distributed Weibull can not be rejected, the predicted duration 
can be used to estimate the hazard function and the error associated with 
it is reduced. 
Finally, similar to the second treatment, to reduce the measurement 
error problem, we estimated the time-dependent hazard rate model using the 
third treatment twice. First, we used the full sample and derived a total 
of 1,268 spells, with 496 spells completed. Compared to the estimation for 
the exponential model, the number of completed spells increased 
significantly from 207 to 496. Second, we selected a younger population to 
reduce the measurement error derived from unobserved explanatory variables 
prior to 1968. The selection of a younger sample, namely, the males who 
were 19 to 24 years old in 1968, led to 350 spells, with 191 spells 
completed. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE WAGE EQUATION AND 
THE PROBABILITY OF MIGRATION 
The fitted wage and migration equations are presented and evaluated 
in this chapter. The first section presents the fitted wage equation, 
which will serve as an instrument in the migration ecpiation for the actual 
wage at the origin. The second part presents the equation explaining the 
probability of migration based on the point-in-time discrete choice model. 
The Potential Wage Equation 
Wage equations for every individual in every year were fitted based 
on the 915 individuals in the sample observed over 20 years (1968-87). The 
data on individual characteristics were merged with the data on state 
characteristics. Treated cross-sectionally, there are 15,367 individual 
annual observations. The equations were fitted using ordinary least 
sc[uares with the log of the real hourly wage as the dependent variable in 
the model. This wage equation is basically a wage offer ec[uation derived 
from the demand side of the labor market. In general, the results are 
similar to those in many previous studies for labor demand of individuals. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the specification does not include 
selection bias correction in the model. The estimates of two potential 
wage equations corresponding to Equations (5.4) and (5.5) are presented in 
Table 6.1; one with the actual and the other with the predicted state labor 
market characteristics. 
Except for the coefficients on state labor market characteristics, 
the estimates of the other coefficients look similar between the two 
models. Because of more regressors, a slightly higher R-square result for 
the second ec[uation is expected. In general, all coefficients have the 
expected sign and are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level. More than the other coefficients, human capital played a major role 
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Table 6.1. Potential wage equation (t-values are in parentheses) 
With Actual State With Predicted State 
Characteristics Characteristics 
(PWl (PW2) 
INTERCEPT 1.517 9.01) 1.350 ( 7.79) 
EDU 0.075 34.20) 0.075 ( 34.07) 
EXP (AGE-EDU-6) 0.051 20.80) 0.051 ( 21.83) 
EXp2/100 -0.098 -19.46) -0.098 (-19.62) 
RACE 0.112 4.80) 0.110 ( 4.73) 
Ln(PLAND/P) 0.044 2.81) 0.048 ( 3.07) 
URBAN 0.279 3.88) 0.295 { 4.10) 
JOB6R 0.015 5.50) -
UNRATE 0.015 3.60) -
PJOB6R - 0.060 ( 7.46) 
PURATE - 0.043 ( 7.15) 
RSHOCK - 0.009 ( 2.92) 
RURATE - -0.005 ( -1.06) 
CRIME 0.016 6.85) 0.015 ( 5.94) 
JAN -0.002 -1.59) -0.004 ( -3.39) 
JULY -0.018 -11.88) -0.017 (-10.42) 
TIME 0.010 1.79) -0.012 ( -1.88) 
TIME^/lOO -0.093 -4.07) 0.008 ( -0.29) 
DS -0.061 -2.27) -0.089 ( -3.03) 
DW -0.068 -2.49) -0.137 { -4.47) 
DNC -0.006 -0.32) -0.018 ( -0.92) 
n 
R-square 
15,367 
0.154 
15,367 
0.158 
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in determining an individual's wages. The coefficient for human capital 
characteristics are different from zero at the 1 percent level. The 
significance of state characteristics in the wage ec[uation shows that 
locality matters in determining individual wages. 
We found evidence that increased schooling and work experience lead 
to a higher wage. A one-year increase in schooling increased the real wage 
by about 7.5 percent. This magnitude is consistent with results reported 
in previous studies (Mincer, 1974; Topel, 1986). Using a sample from four 
CPS data sets, Tokle and Huffman (1991) found a 5.5 percent rate of return 
on. schooling for non metropolitan males and 7.1 percent rate of return for 
females. 
An increase in an individual's experience had a positive effect on 
his real wage but at a diminishing marginal rate. The maximum effect 
occurred at about 26 years of experience (approximately 45 years of age) 
for the PWl and PW2 equation, respectively. This pattern has been reported 
in many studies. Topel (1986) found the maximum at 33 years of experience. 
Compared to the results from Tokle and Huffman (1991), our results show a 
higher rate of return to schooling and the wage peaks at lower years of 
experience. Perhaps some of these differences are due to differences in 
the composition of the two samples. This study used male heads of 
households who were age 19-45 in 1968, while Tokle and Huffman focused on 
rural non farm married couples. 
The results of this study also support previous finding that racial 
differences affect wage rates. All other measured variables held equal, 
the white males in this study earned about 11 percent more compared to the 
nonwhite males. For comparison, Topel (1986) found an 18 percent 
difference in wages between white and nonwhite workers. Tokle and Huffman 
(1991) found about a 20 percent difference using the sample of rural 
nonfarm households. 
Wage rates also differed because of cost of living and local amenity 
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differences. Both the real price of land (PLAND/P) and the proportion of 
urban population (URBAN) in a state are positively related to the real wage 
rate. The elasticity of the real price of land on wage rates is around 
0.04 to 0.05. A 1.0 percent increase in the proportion of the state urban 
population contributed to about a 28 percent to 30 percent increase in real 
wage. These elasticities are consistent with those found in previous 
studies. Tokle and Huffman (1991) found the elasticity of the real price 
of land around 0.06 to 0.07. They also found an 18 percent to 25 percent 
increase due to a 1.0 percent increase in the urban population. These 
results support the view that wage rates in different localities should 
represent the difference in the prices of traded and nontraded goods. The 
price of traded goods between two areas should differ by the amount of 
transport cost. The price of nontraded goods such as housing, however, 
should differ by more. 
State labor market characteristics had a significant effect on an 
individual's wage. All the coefficients on state labor market 
characteristics, except for the unanticipated unemployment rate, are 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. The signs of the 
coefficients are as expected and provide empirical evidence to support the 
hypothesis developed earlier. The real wage rate seems to have 
incorporated compensation for state labor market condition. 
State employment growth has a strong positive effect on wages. Our 
results show that a 1.0 percent increase in actual state employment growth 
led to a 1.5 percent increase in wage rates. Real wage rates seem to be 
more responsive to predicted state labor market characteristics than to 
actual characteristics. A 1.0 percent increase in predicted state job 
growth led to a 6.0 percent increase in the real wage rate. Employment in 
a state can be viewed as the result of a supply and demand equilibrium 
condition. When demand grows faster than supply, the equilibrium wage 
tends to increase. In addition, the wage premium in localities having a 
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higher expected growth of labor demand compensates for the cost of 
geographical mobility. These results are stronger than those obtained by 
Tokle and Huffman (1991). 
Actual and anticipated state unemployment rates had a positive effect 
on wage rates. A 1.0 percent increase in the actual unemployment rate 
raised wage rates by 1.5 percent. Topel (1986) found that wages increased 
by 2.1 percent due to a one unit increase in the probability of personal 
unemployment. Similar to the effect of employment growth, the effect of 
predicted or anticipated state unemployment rates was also found to be 
stronger than the actual values. A 1.0 percent point increase in the 
predicted state unemployment rate caused a 4.3 percent increase in the real 
wage rate. This increase is greater than the result obtained by Topel 
(1986), who found a 1.1 percent increase. For comparison, Tokle and 
Huffman (1991) obtained a coefficient of 1.2. The result supports the view 
that localities with higher unemployment rates must pay a wage premium to 
entice current workers to stay and to risk losing a job. 
The significant effect of unanticipated labor market shocks on real 
wages can be seen in the second equation in Table 6.1. The coefficients 
for RSHOCK and RURATE are significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. This result means that the 
real wage rate responded to unanticipated state labor market conditions. 
The signs of the coefficients are as expected and are consistent with the 
result of Tokle and Huffman (1991). The underestimated employment growth 
rate and overestimated unemployment rate seem to increase the wage rate. 
Topel (1986) also found a positive effect of unpredicted state employment 
disturbance on the real wage rate. 
The wage equation also shows that the crime rate is a significant 
determinant of the local wage. The coefficient on the crime rate is 
positive and significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. A 
1.0 percent increase in the crime rate led to about a 1.5 percent increase 
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in the real wage rate. States with high crime rates must pay a premium to 
attract and keep workers. These results are consistent with earlier work 
by Roback (1982). 
The significance of the coefficient for JAN and JULY shows that 
normal state climate affects wage rates. It is realized that these 
temperature variables are correlated with the regional dummy variables, so 
that the best measure of their effect probably occurs when the regional 
dummies are excluded. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the regional dummies 
does not seem to reduce the significance of the temperature variables. The 
effects of July temperatures on the real wage seem to be stronger than that 
the effects of January temperatures. The general indication that an 
increase in July temperature is associated with a decrease in real wage 
rates is consistent with results obtained by Tokle and Huffman (1991). 
The long history that wages tend to be lower in the southern states 
is supported by this study. Compared to the northeastern states, wages in 
the southern states are about 6.1 percent to 8.9 percent lower. Residing 
in a western state also reduces the wage by 6.8 percent to 13.7 percent. 
However, wage rates in the northern-central states are not significantly 
different from those the northeastern states. The significance of the 
coefficients of the regional dummies shows the importance of unmeasured 
regional effects on the real wage. 
The estimated coefficients on time trends in general show that the 
real wage has decreased since the 19708. In the first equation using 
actual labor market characteristics, the real wage rate increased until 
reaching a peak in the early 1970s and then declined. In the second 
equation, however, the wage rates seem to decrease over time. The 
difference in the estimate between the first and second equations in Table 
6.1 is expected. The use of predicted values of state labor market 
characteristics, which are derived by regressing the actual values on a 
quadratic time trend, has picked up the trend component in the wage 
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equation. 
In summary, human capital variables have strong effects on the real 
wages of individuals. Education and experience play major roles in 
determining wages. In this study, the white males earned more than the 
nonwhite males. The difference in cost of living also affected wages. 
Areas with higher costs of living offered higher wage rates. State labor 
market conditions, represented by unemployment rate and employment growth 
rate, were found to be important determinants of the real wage. All other 
things held equal, localities with higher unemployment rates and faster 
employment growth rates offered higher wage rates. In general, the real 
wage has declined for the last 20 years. The southern and western states 
experienced lower wage rates compared to the northern-central and eastern 
states. 
The Probit Equation 
The probit model is the standard discrete choice model for explaining 
the tendency to migrate. The probit equation is fitted to the data for the 
915 individuals in the sample during the first six-year period (1968-73). 
It is important to note that this selection process led to the use of young 
individuals in fitting migration equations. The sample consists of males 
who were 19 to 29 years of age over 1968-73 period. During the period, 202 
individuals (22.08 percent) in the sample moved to a different state. 
Recall that multiple-year data is used to increase the number of migrants 
in the sample. The estimated migration equation showing the effect of 
explanatory variables on the probability of migration can be seen in Table 
6.2. Because the ec[uation is nonlinear, the marginal effect of each 
regressor is calculated based on Equation (4.9) and presented in Table 6.3. 
Previous studies of migration decisions have used a similar framework. In 
general, the signs of the coefficients are as expected and consistent with 
the results of earlier migration studies. 
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Table 6.2. Probability of migration equation (t-values are in parentheses) 
Explanatory With Actual State With Predicted State 
Variables Characteristics (PWl) Characteristics (PW2) 
INTERCEPT 1.541 ( 1.24) 1.520 ( 1.22) 
AWl -0.650 (-6.66) - -
AW2 - - -0.673 (-6.84) 
EDU 0.063 ( 3.31) 0.063 ( 3.33) 
AGE -0.139 (-1.81) -0.140 (-1.82) 
AGE^ 0.156 ( 1.33) 0.157 ( 1.34) 
CHILD 0.032 ( 0.66) 0.033 ( 0.68) 
MARR -1.123 (-7.02) -1.103 (-6.86) 
DSLFARH -0.473 (-2.96) -0.480 (-2.90) 
RACE 0.403 ( 1.82) 0.411 ( 1-85) 
UNEMP 0.0004 ( 0.70) 0.0005 ( 0.78) 
UNION 0.051 ( 0.38) 0.062 ( 0.46) 
CRIME -0.001 (-0.31) -0.001 (-0.17) 
PARK 0.009 ( 0.74) -0.001 (-0.03) 
JAN 0.003 ( 0.56) 0.002 ( 0.36) 
JULY 0.013 ( 1.02) 0.012 ( 0.90) 
Log likelihood 
Number of migrants 
Number of observation 
-337.9 
202 
915 
-336.4 
202 
915 
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Table 6.3. Marginal effect on the probability of migration, 
the mean of the explanatory variables, based on 
evaluated at 
table 6.2 
Explanatory 
variables Unit 
Using Actual State 
Characteristics (PWl) 
Using Predicted State 
Characteristics (PW2) 
AWl percent® -0.168*** -
AW2 percent - -0.168*** 
EDU year 0.016*** 0.016*** 
AGE year -0.036* -0.036* 
CHILD 0, 1, 2, ... 0.008 0.008 
MAHR (O-D® -0.291*** -0.283 
DSLFARM Dummy:0,1 -0.120*** -0.120 
RACE Dummy:0,1 0.104* 0.103* 
UNEMP hour 0.0001 0.0001 
UNION Dummy:0,1 0.014 0.016 
CRIME percent'' -0.0003 -0.0003 
PARK percent'' 0.002 -0.0003 
JAN degrees f'' 0.001 0.001 
JULY degrees f'' 0.003 0.003 
^The share of time spent married ranges from 0 to 1 
''Measured relative to U.S. average 
"'significant at the 10 percent level 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
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For this study, let's begin by examining the wage effect. We found 
that an individual's actual wage relative to his predicted wage in the 
state is a strong determinant of the migration decision. The coefficients 
for AWl and AW2, are negative and significantly different from zero at the 
1 percent level. The use of AWl and AW2, based on PWl and PW2, does not 
lead to any significant difference in the estimated coefficients. A 1 
percent decrease in the actual wage relative to the potential wage 
increased the probability of migration by 0.17 percent. We found strong 
empirical evidence that the tendency to migrate increases when individuals 
earn less than their potential locally. 
A study by Goss and Paul (1986) used individuals' earnings at their 
current residence to explain migration. They found a similar negative 
effect. There is, however, an empirical problem with putting the actual 
earnings of individuals directly into the migration equation because actual 
earnings are correlated with other explanatory variables affecting 
migration, especially education and age. By using the "residual wage", we 
get free from this problem. Therefore, the use of AWl and AW2 in this 
model is more appropriate. We conclude that the development of a new 
variable representing individual wage performance has led to a new and 
meaningful result. 
An individual's education was also found to be an important 
determinant of migration. The coefficient on education is positive and 
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. In other words, 
higher education leads to a higher tendency to migrate. A one-year 
increase in education contributed about a 1.6 percent increase in the 
probability of migration. This marginal effect is stronger than the effect 
found by Mincer (1978). This result is consistent with result showing that 
more education experience lowers the cost of acquiring information which 
reduces migration. The view that migration and education are complementary 
investments (Schwartz, 1976) is also supported. In fact, a higher 
83 
probfibility of migration for more educated individuals is common in 
previous migration studies (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989; Graves and 
Linneman, 1979; Goss and Paul, 1986). 
The positive effect of general education on migration can also be 
related to Becker's model of general and specific training (Becker, 1975). 
He mentioned that specific training increases the productivity of a worker 
in his/her current job. General training increases a worker's productivity 
not only in the current work place but also in other firms. Therefore, 
workers who have greater general skills from general education can benefit 
from a larger labor market and have a higher tendency to migrate. The 
result that general education increases the probability of migrating in 
this study fits well with the predictions from Becker's theory. 
In general, we found that as an individual gets older, he experiences 
a lower probability of migration. The signs of the coefficients for age 
and age-squared in Table 6.2 are negative and positive, respectively. 
Evaluated at the mean of age, the marginal effect of an added year of age 
on the probability of migration is around -3.6 percent. This result is 
consistent with the theory that individuals have less tendency to migrate 
when they get older. It also supports the theory that migration is an 
investment. As an individual becomes older, he/she faces a reduced net 
present value of migration because of increased costs and reduced benefits. 
Young people have a better chance of recovering the cost of migration 
because they live longer after the migration takes place. Previous studies 
have commonly put only a linear effect of age in migration ec[uations. In 
general, they have found a negative estimate of the coefficient for age 
(Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989; Schlottmann and Herzog, 1981; Graves and 
Linneman, 1979). 
The coefficient for RACE is positive and significantly different from 
zero at the lo percent level. The marginal effect shows that being white 
increases the chances of migration by 10 percent over being nonwhite. 
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Whites seem to be more likely to conduct long-distance migration, such as 
between-states migration. Previous studies have shown similar results 
(Graves and Linneman, 1979; Goss and Paul, 1986). 
An adult male who was married and had school-age children tended to 
reduce his probability of migrating. The coefficient for the share of time 
married in a residence spell is negative and significantly different from 
zero at the 1 percent level. We found that being married reduced the 
migration probability by about 28 to 29 percent. This result is consistent 
with those of other studies, (e.g.. Mincer, 1978) in showing that family 
ties increase the cost of migration. The number of school-age children, 
however, did not seem to affect male migration decision. The coefficient 
on the number of children in table 6.2 is not significantly different from 
zero at the 5 % level. Mincer (1978) found similar result showing that the 
significance effect of being married decreases with the inclusion of the 
number of children in the model. The insignificance of the coefficient for 
CHILD shown in table 6.2 might be caused by the use of young males sample 
in the analysis. 
The probability of migrating across state boundaries was lower when 
the individual is a farmer or self-employed. The coefficient for DSLFAHM 
is negative and significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
The marginal effect of being a faraer or self-employed was to reduce the 
probability of migration by about 12 percent. This result provides 
significant evidence that self-employed males have stronger local ties 
because of land or client bases than do other males, which increases the 
opportunity cost of moving. 
The estimated point-in-time discrete choice model does not show any 
significant effect of personal unemployment or being in a labor union on 
the migration decision. The insignificance of personal unemployment does 
not support the prediction of the theory. Previous studies, such as Da 
Vanzo (1978), have shown that unemployed people have a higher tendency to 
85 
move to another labor market to find a job. When the utility of being at 
the origin decreases because an individual is unemployed, the tendency to 
migrate should be higher. The hypothesis that being in a labor union 
increases job security and reduces the chance of moving is also not 
supported. Using PSID data within the same period, Graves and Linneman 
(1979) found insignificant effects of unemployment hours on the migration 
decision. 
One possible reason is the nature of the data, especially the use of 
young population in fitting the probit model. We will see in the next 
chapter that by using a hazard function representation and following 
individuals for 20 years, namely, 1968-87, we can get significant effects 
of personal unemployment and union membership on migration decision. When 
the hazard function is fitted to the younger sample, however, we found no 
significant effect of personal unemployment and union membership on 
migration. Therefore, these results suggests that the insignificance of 
personal unemployment and union membership is due to the use of younger 
sample in the analysis. 
The estimated probit model does not show any significance effect of 
local amenities, such as crime rate and percentage area of state and 
national parks, on the tendency to migrate. Similarly, temperatures as 
proxy for weather-related variables did not significantly contribute to 
migration outcomes. One possible reason for this finding is the use of 
several state characteristics for those who had repeated migration. When a 
person migrated more than once between 1969 and 1973, the move that was 
counted was the last move. Therefore, the characteristics of the origin 
were derived from more than one state. Another reason is the use of 
younger sample for the analysis. In the next chapter, we will see that the 
fitted hazard function for migration using younger sample showed similar 
insignificant effects of local amenities on migration decision. 
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In suniinary, we found that an individual's actual wage relative to his 
potential wage is a strong migration determinant. Human capital-related 
characteristics, especially education and age, are also important 
contributors. Family-related variables, especially marital status, reduce 
the probability of migrating. Similarly, being self-employed or a farmer 
decreases the chance of migrating to another state. The fitted migration 
equation, however, does not provide enough support for the effects of 
personal unemployment, being a labor union member, the percentage of area 
in state and national parks, or temperatures on migration tendencies. 
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CHAPTER 7. THE HAZARD FUNCTION FOR MIGRATION 
This chapter discusses the empirical results from the search theory-
based hazard function representation of the migration decision. Because no 
previous empirical studies of migration have used this approach, the hazard 
function results are "new findings." Results are presented for both a 
constant hazard rate over time where completed duration is assumed to be 
distributed exponential and a time-dependent hazard rate where the duration 
is distributed Weibull. 
The Constant Hazard Rate Model 
The equation representing the hazard rate for migration is fitted 
using the maximum likelihood procedure to data for 1,268 "residence spells" 
derived from 915 individuals in the sample. The constant hazard rate model 
treats the left- and the right-censored spells equally, and we derived 
1,061 censored and 207 completed spells. In Table 7.1, average values of 
explanatory variables over a residence spells are generally used as 
regressors. In Table 7.2, these same explanatory variables are measured at 
the beginning of each residence spell. Each table contains four ec[uations; 
two use FWl in deriving Aw and two use PW2 in deriving AW. In every pair, 
the first equation is the estimate without considering the heterogeneity 
effect. The second equation incorporates heterogeneity in the model, 
represented by the parameter 9 (see the end of Chapter 4). In general, 
there are strong similarities across all the estimated equations. The 
signs of the parameter estimates are also consistent across models. In the 
constant hazard rate model, a is constrained to equal one. 
Our results from the hazard function for migration have many 
similarities to the results using the standard discrete choice model 
described in the previous chapter. We found the search model approach does 
strengthen some of the results. Some explanatory variables which were not 
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Tzible 7.1. Hazard function of migration, constant hazard rate model, with 
some variables measured as average values of a residence spell 
(t-values are in parentheses) 
Using PWl Using PW2 
Without With Without With 
Explanatory Hetero­ Hetero­ Hetero­ Hetero­
Variable geneity geneity geneity geneity 
INTERCEPT -6.422 -6.406 -6.452 -6.442 
( -9.26 ) ( -7.66 ) ( -9-31 ) ( -7.71 ) 
AWl -0.244 -0.273 - -
( -2.68 ) ( -2.13 ) 
AW2 - - -0.272 -0.303 
( -2.98 ) ( -2.36 ) 
AVGEDU 0.095 0.136 0.095 0.137 
( 4.19 ) ( 3.70 ) ( 4.20 ) ( 3.71 ) 
A6E20 1.737 1.296 1.733 1.298 
( 9.87 ) ( 4.58 ) ( 9.86 ) ( 4.60 ) 
UNEMP 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
( 4.58 ) ( 2.74 ) ( 4.59 ) ( 2.75 ) 
DUNION -1.013 -1.333 -1.009 -1.325 
( -5.25 ) ( -5.35 ) ( -5.23 ) ( -5.34 ) 
DSLFARH -1.304 -1.631 -1.307 -1.632 
( -6.63 ) ( -6.43 ) ( -6.63 ) ( -6.44 ) 
RACE 1.715 2.051 1.722 2.051 
( 2.98 ) ( 3.30 ) ( 3.00 ) ( 3.31 ) 
MARR -0.691 -1.017 -0.668 -0.99 
( -4.18 ) ( -3.89 ) ( -4.03 ) ( -3.81 ) 
AVCHILD -0.142 -0.128 -0.141 -0.126 
( -1.99 ) ( -1.52 ) ( -1.97 ) ( -1.50 ) 
CRIME 0.007 0.017 0.007 0.017 
( 0.30 ) ( 0.57 ) ( 0.34 ) ( 0.57 ) 
PARK -0.016 -0.009 -0.017 -0.009 
( -0.42 ) ( -0.18 ) ( -0.43 ) ( -0.18 ) 
JAN 0.018 0.023 0.018 0.023 
( 2.61 ) ( 2.33 ) ( 2.58 ) ( 2.32 ) 
JULY 0.014 0.007 0.013 0.008 
( I'lO ) ( 0.42 ) ( 1.08 ) ( 0.45 ) 
e _ 2.608 _ 2.590 
( 3.70 ) ( 3.68 ) 
Log-likelihood -758.0 
Completed spells 207 
Total spells 1,268 
-742.1 
207 
1,268 
-757.4 
207 
1,268 
-741.7 
207 
1,268 
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Table 7.2. Hazard function of migration, constant hazard rate model, with 
some variables measured at the beginning of a residence spell 
(t-values are in parentheses) 
Using PWl Using PW2 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Without 
Hetero­
geneity 
With 
Hetero­
geneity 
Without 
Hetero­
geneity 
With 
Hetero­
geneity 
INTERCEPT -3.516 -3.964 -3.575 -3.990 
( -3.41 ) ( -2.07 ) ( -3.47 ) ( -2.09 ) 
AWl -0.184 -0.257 - -
( -2.05 ) ( -1.54 ) 
AW2 - - -0.215 -0.286 
( -2.40 ) ( -1.71 ) 
EDUBE6IN 0.134 0.211 0.135 0.212 
( 5.92 ) ( 4.89 ) ( 5.93 ) ( 4.90 ) 
AGEBE6IN -0.183 -0.200 -0.180 -0.199 
( -4.21 ) ( -2.13 ) ( -4.16 ) ( -2.13 ) 
AGEBEGIN^/100 0.274 0.309 0.269 0.308 
( 5.04 ) ( 2.50 ) ( 4.97 ) ( 2.49 ) 
UNEMP 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
( 4.95 ) ( 2.15 ) ( 4.91 ) ( 2.16 ) 
UNIBEGIN -0.512 -0.766 -0.507 -0.760 
( -2.33 ) ( -2.52 ) ( -2.31 ) ( -2.50 ) 
DSLFARH -1.342 -1.742 -1.344 -1.744 
( -7.02 ) ( -5.98 ) ( -7.03 ) ( -5.99 ) 
RACE 1.689 2.075 1.693 2.073 
( 2.96 ) ( 3.16 ) ( 2.98 ) ( 3.17 ) 
MARK -1.157 -1.263 -1.139 -1.240 
( -7.40 ) ( -3.83 ) ( -7.30 ) ( -3.78 ) 
CHILDB6N -0.140 -0.169 -0.139 -0.167 
( -2.34 ) ( -2.14 ) ( -2.32 ) ( -2.12 ) 
CRIME 0.002 0.052 0.002 0.052 
( 0.08 ) ( 1.60 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 1.59 ) 
PARK -0.060 -0.039 -0.060 -0.039 
( -1.57 ) ( -0.74 ) ( -1.57 ) ( -0.74 ) 
JAN 0.024 0.020 0.024 0.020 
( 3.42 ) ( 1.82 ) ( 3.41 ) ( 1.82 ) 
JULY 0.016 0.022 0.015 0.022 
( 1.29 ) { 1.10 ) ( 1.28 ) ( 1.12 ) 
9 — 3.835 — 3.814 
( 4.48 ) ( 4.47 ) 
Log-likelihood -794.0 -756.3 -793.5 -755.9 
Completed spells 207 207 207 207 
Total spells 1,268 1,268 1,268 1,268 
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significant in the probit equation, (e.g., personal unemployment and union 
membership) turn out to be significant in the hazard model. In general, 
the signs of the coefficients are as expected and consistent with economic 
theory. Based on Ec[uation (4.17), the estimated coefficient in the 
constant hazard rate model can be viewed as the marginal effect of an 
explanatory variable on the percentage change in the hazard rate. 
For the individual wage, we found that an individual's relative wage 
performance is a strong determinant of migration. The coefficients are 
consistently negative in all equations and are significantly different from 
zero at the 5 percent level in six out of eight equations presented in 
Table 7.1 and 7.2. The slight decrease in significance when heterogeneity 
is introduced is not surprising. The inclusion of heterogeneity, however, 
increases the size of the coefficient. The negative signs for the 
coefficients for AWl and AW2 mean that when an individual's wage compares 
well with his potential wage, his tendency to move to another state 
decreases. Compared to the use of actual values, the use of predicted 
state labor market characteristics in constructing the potential wage (PW2) 
leads to slightly stronger results. We also found that the use of PW2 
slightly increased the log-likelihood values. 
In general, when actual wages were 1 percent higher than the 
potential wage, the hazard rate for migration decreased by about 0.2 
percent to 0.3 percent. Compared to the results from the discrete choice 
model, the magnitude of the effect is slightly larger. There is 
significant evidence to support the hypothesis that males tend to move when 
their wage rate is unsatisfactory. In other words, individuals tend to 
move away from (remain in) a state when their wage is lower (higher) than 
the wages of other individuals with the same personal characteristics 
living in the same state. Because of location or form specific tenure in 
the residual wage, this result shows that individuals with a higher wage 
growth tend to stay longer. When utility is an increasing function of 
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income, the result provides some evidence supporting the comparative static 
prediction developed in Chapter 2. 
Schooling has a strong positive effect on the hazard rate of 
migration, given that all other things are equal. In all the models, the 
coefficient of schooling is positive and significantly different from zero 
at the 1 percent level. Schooling measured at the beginning of the spell 
(EDUBEGIN) has a slightly larger effect compared to the spell-average 
measure (AVGEDU). The difference in magnitude, however, is small because 
going back to school was not a significant activity of the males in the 
sample. We conclude that the effects of EDUBEGIN and AVGEDU on the hazard 
rate are similar. The inclusion of the heterogeneity effect seems to 
strengthen the result. A one-year increase in a male's education increases 
his hazard rate of moving by between 9 percent and 21 percent. Compared to 
results from the probit equation in the previous chapter, this magnitude is 
larger. Also, the result is similar to findings from previous migration 
studies (Mincer, 1978; Schwartz, 1976; Graves and Linneman 1979). The 
results support the prediction that more educated males have a larger set 
of job opportunities, receive higher wage, and more offers to move. The 
results also support the comparative static prediction discussed in Chapter 
2 .  
We also found the evidence that a male's age plays a significant role 
in the migration decisions. The effect of the proportion of time spent in 
a residence spell for males in their 20s (AGE20) can be seen in Table 7.1. 
The signs of the coefficients are strongly positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level. The inclusion of heterogeneity 
tends to reduce the size of the effect slightly. This result shows that 
increasing the share of the residence spell in which the individual is in 
his 20s increases the tendency to migrate. The marginal effect of being in 
his 208 is around 1.3 to 1.7. Because age changes over the duration of the 
spell, the second measurement of age (AGEBEGIN and AGEBEGIN^) measures the 
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age at the beginning of the residence spell. The effect of age measured at 
the beginning of the spell is presented in Table 7.2. The coefficients are 
generally different from zero at the 5 percent level when heterogeneity is 
not included in the model. The sign of the linear effect A6EBE6IN is 
negative, and the sign of the quadratic effect AGEBEGIN^ is positive and 
consistent across models. These results show that when the individual is 
older at the beginning of the spell, his likelihood of moving is reduced, 
but at a diminishing rate. This result also supports the fact that most 
migration occurs when males are young, but out of school. The effect of 
age on the tendency to migrate, therefore, is similar to the result in the 
probit equation. Previous studies (e.g.. Graves and Linneman, 1979; 
Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989) have presented similar findings. 
We found that an individual's personal unemployment experience, 
namely, annual unemployment hours, is positively related to the hazard rate 
for migration. It is worth mentioning that the probit model discussed in 
the previous chapter could not provide this evidence. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 
show that the effects are small in magnitude, but significantly different 
from zero at the 5 percent level. The magnitude of the coefficient is 
larger when heterogeneity is taken into account. Comparing coefficients 
for the same variables, we see that using regressors measured at the 
beginning of a residence spell or as a spell average value has no effect on 
the significance of personal unemployment experience. Even though we 
started from different economic and econometric models, this result 
supports previous migration studies (Da Vanzo, 1978; Herzog and 
Schlottmann, 1984, 1988). 
This empirical result supports the hypothesis that an increase in 
unemployed hours reduces a male's reservation utility for moving and 
increases the hazard rate. A 10-hour increase in annual unemployment hour 
increased the hazard rate by 1 percent to 2 percent. It is also evidence 
for the comparative static predictions discussed in Chapter 2 showing that 
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when the utility at the origin worsens, the hazard rate for migration 
increases. A possible correlation may exist between wage performance and 
personal unemployment hours in a spell. However, because the wage rate is 
measured as an hourly wage, we concluded that the correlation between the 
two is trivial. 
Union membership tended to reduce the hazard rate for migration. 
This result is different from that obtained with the probit model. The 
coefficient of union membership in all models is significantly different 
from zero at the 5 percent and 1 percent level. In terms of the magnitude 
of the coefficients, the effects are stronger when heterogeneity is taken 
into account. The use of the dummy variable DUNION led to a stronger 
effect compared to the use of UNIBE6IN. DUNION was set equal one if an 
individual belonged to a union at any time during the time spell. UNIBEGIN 
equals to one if the individual was in a union at the beginning of the 
spell. The difference in the magnitude of the effects is expected because 
UNIBEGIN is a subset of DUNION and therefore is more restrictive. The 
consistent negative signs in all the equations support the hypothesis that 
union-related benefits such as job security reduce the hazard rate for 
moving. In general, the marginal effect of union membership on the hazard 
rate is about -0.5 to -1.3. However, this result does not necessarily 
contradict Goss and Paul (1990), who found a positive relationship. One 
reason is for this difference is the use of different samples. Goss and 
Paul used a more restrictive sample, namely unemployed union members. 
We found that being self-employed or a farmer decreases the hazard 
rate for moving. The higher opportunity cost of moving because of a 
farmer's attachment to the localities or land reduces the tendency to move 
to other states. The cost of moving is also higher for others who are 
self-employed because they stand to lose customers and might need to change 
occupations. The sign of the coefficient for DSLFARM is consistently 
negative and significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level 
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across models. The use of PWl and PW2 does not lead to any significant 
difference. In terms of magnitude, the inclusion of heterogeneity seems to 
strengthen the results. In our sample, the marginal effect of being self-
employed or a farmer reduced on the hazard rate for is around -1.3 to -1.7. 
This effect is larger in magnitude compared to that found with the probit 
equation, and the signs are also consistent. 
We found that being white increased the hazard rate of moving. 
Across all models, the coefficient of RACE is positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent level. The effect is stronger when 
heterogeneity is taken into account. This result is similar to the 
stylized fact of migration found in the Current Population Reports (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1989). Individuals who are white have a higher 
rate of long-distance moves within the United States and are more likely to 
move between states. On the other hand, individuals who are black have 
higher rates of local moving, namely, moves between places in the same 
county. 
Compared to results from the probit model, the results from the 
hazard function model provide stronger evidence for the effect of family 
related variables on migration decision. One clear reason is the use of 
longer time period that follows individual for 20 years in the hazard 
model. In the probit model, the migration ec[uation was fitted to a younger 
sample. We found that being married reduces the hazard rate for migration. 
The coefficients on the share of time spent married in a spell (MARR) are 
all negative, large in magnitudes, and significantly different from zero at 
the 1 percent level. Having large number of children in school also 
decreases an individual's hazard rate of moving. The coefficients for 
AVCHILD and CHILDBGN are negative and significantly different from zero at 
the 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. Because the number of 
children in school tends to change over the duration of a residence spell, 
the effects of AVCHILD and CHILDBGN are different. The measurement at the 
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beginning of the spell leads to a larger coefficient. However, the 
coefficients in all models show strong negative signs. This result 
supports the hypothesis that family ties tend to reduce the tendency to 
move (Mincer, 1978). A greater number of children in school increases the 
cost of moving and thus reduces the hazard rate for migration. The 
marginal effect of an additional child is around -0.12 to -0.17. 
The results do not provide strong evidence for the effects of local 
amenities, especially CRIME and PARK, on migration decisions. In general, 
the coefficients are not significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level. The signs, however, fit the prediction. A positive sign for the 
coefficient for CRIME in the model incorporating heterogeneity reflects the 
view that males living in a state with a higher crime rate have a higher 
tendency to move. The consistent negative signs of the coefficient for 
PARK show that a larger percentage of land allocated to state or national 
parks in a state reduces the hazard rate for moving. The estimated 
coefficients on weather-related variables, namely, JAN and JULY, show more 
promising results. Some of the coefficients on JAN and JULY are 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
He found significant heterogeneity effects in the model. The 
estimate of the heterogeneity parameter 8 is significantly different from 
zero at the 1 percent level in all models. The effect of 6 is stronger 
when variables are measured at the beginning of a residence spell (Table 
7.2). The parameter 9 measures the sensitivity of the hazard rate and the 
survivor function to heterogeneity. However, the inclusion of 6 in the 
model did not significantly change the estimated coefficients of the 
explanatory variables. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients does 
change slightly, but not the signs. The largest effect is on the 
coefficient of the variables representing age, between the measurement at 
the beginning of the spells (A6EBEGIN) and the share of time spent in one's 
20s (A6B20). This is to be expected, given the way heterogeneity enters 
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the model. 
In summary, the estimation of the hazard function based on search 
theory has led to stronger results compared to the results obtained with 
the point in time discrete choice model. Individual wage performance, 
measured by actual wage relative to potential wage, is a strong migration 
determinant. Education and age also play major roles in migration 
decisions. The more educated and younger males have higher hazard rates 
for moving. Being white and unemployed also increases the tendency to 
migrate to other states. Being a labor union member, however, reduces the 
chance. Family-related variables, such as the number of school-age 
children and being married, reduce the hazard rate for moving. 
The Time Dependent Hazard Rate Model 
In the constant hazard rate model, the hazard rate is constant over 
the duration of a residence spell, and the distribution of the completed 
duration is exponential. When the duration is longer than one year, this 
assumption seems too strong, h. better model is one that allows for some 
changes in the hazard rate over the duration of residence spells. If we 
assume the distribution of duration is Weibull, a reasonably simple 
specification of the time-dependent hazard rate model can be fitted. 
The main advantage of the time-dependent hazard rate model is the 
possibility of measuring the effect of the duration of residence spells on 
the hazard rate. The use of a Weibull distribution adds only one parameter 
to our model but restricts it to being the linear form between the duration 
and the hazard rate. In other words, the estimate of this parameter {a) 
tells whether the hazard rate is linearly decreasing, constant, or 
increasing over time. One parameter seems to be inadequate in representing 
the dependence of the hazard rate on the duration of stay. However, there 
is another way to show the effect of the duration of stay on the hazard 
rate. By calculating the predicted hazard rate evaluated at the average 
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values of the explanatory variables and the duration of stay, we can plot 
the predicted hazard rate for a given range of duration. This graphical 
description will show the movement of the predicted hazard rate as a 
function of the length of duration. 
Based on the discussion in Chapter 5, we applied three research 
strategies, or treatments, in dealing with the time-dependent hazard rate. 
With the exception of the first treatment, the results are encouraging. 
The signs of the estimated coefficients are similar to those from the 
constant hazard rate model. Some estimated coefficients are stronger in 
magnitude, but others are weaker. The following discussion will present 
the result based on the treatments elaborated in Chapter 5. Because the 
effect of the explanatory variables on migration is generally consistent 
between the use of a constant or time-dependent hazard rate, the discussion 
below emphasizes the additional contribution of the time-dependent hazard 
model. To reduce the complication arising when explanatory variables 
change over time, we use the explanatory variables measured at the 
beginning of the residence spell. 
Treatment 1 
The first treatment is to select all completed and right-censored 
spells started in 1968 or after. The hazard function is fitted to the 
total of 391 spells, with 207 completed. The omission of all left-censored 
spells clearly leads to potential nonrandom selection problem. For 
example, every individual who took up residence before 1968 and remained in 
that state continuously until 1987 is excluded from the duration sample. 
Nevertheless, this first empirical strategy is conducted to examine the 
result when the hazard function is fitted based on the completely observed 
length of spells and perfectly measured explanatory variables. 
The fitted equation is presented in Table 7.3. The first and third 
columns present the estimates using AWl and AW2 without permitting 
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Table 7.3. Hazard function of migration, time dependent hazard model, 
based on all spells started in 1968 and beyond, treatment 1, 
(t-values are in parentheses) 
Using PWl Using PW2 
Explanatory 
Variable 
witnout 
Hetero­
geneity 
With 
Hetero­
geneity 
Without 
Hetero­
geneity 
With 
Hetero­
geneity 
INTERCEPT -2.886 -0.278 -2.933 -0.276 
( -2.16 ) ( -0.39 ) ( -2.20 ) ( -0.21 ) 
AWl -0.369 -0.036 — — 
( -3.09 ) ( -0.57 ) 
AW2 - - -0.386 -0.048 
( -3.23 ) ( -0.56 ) 
EDUBEGIN 0.028 -0.003 0.028 -0.002 
( 0.96 ) ( -0.23 ) ( 0.96 ) ( -0.09 ) 
AGEBEGIN -0.012 0.016 -0.011 0.011 
( -0.20 ) ( 0.50 ) ( -0.18 ) { 0.20 ) 
AGEBEGIN^/lOO 0.009 -0.022 0.006 -0.014 
( 0.12 ) ( -0.54 ) ( 0.08 ) ( -0.20 ) 
UNEHP 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
( 1-72 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 1.70 ) ( 0.16 ) 
UNIBE6IN -0.155 0.006 -0.154 0.008 
( -0.67 ) ( 0.06 ) ( -0.67 ) ( 0.05 ) 
DSLFARM -1.434 -0.091 -1.434 -0.153 
( -5.30 ) ( -0.70 ) ( -5.32 ) { -0.82 ) 
RACE 1.091 0.021 1.109 0.017 
( 1-95 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 1.99 ) ( 0.03 ) 
MARR -0.869 -0.021 -0.858 0.030 
( -3.92 ) ( -0.19 ) ( -3.88 ) ( 0.22 ) 
CHILDB6N 0.013 -0.033 0.014 -0.027 
( 0.17 ) ( -0.65 ) ( 0.19 ) ( -0.40 ) 
CRIME 0.021 -0.008 0.021 -0.007 
( 0.74 ) ( -0.47 ) ( 0.72 ) ( -0.27 ) 
PARK -0.022 -0.007 -0.021 -0.006 
( -0.44 ) ( -0.25 ) ( -0.43 ) ( -0.15 ) 
JAN 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.002 
( 1.07 ) ( 0.25 ) ( 1.09 ) ( 0.19 ) 
JULY 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
( 0.24 ) ( 0.57 ) ( 0.27 ) ( 0.32 ) 
a 1.170 0.039 1.168 0.057 
( 9-73 ) ( 0.90 ) ( 9.76 ) ( 0.98 ) 
e - 43.244 — 38.864 
( 0.88 ) ( 0.96 ) 
Log-likelihood -510.5 -342.9 -510.0 -399.2 
Completed Spells 207 207 207 207 
Total Spells 391 391 391 391 
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heterogeneity. The second and the fourth columns present the model with 
heterogeneity incorporated. By comparing the results in the first and 
third columns to the results for the constant hazard model, some 
similarities become apparent. The signs of the coefficients are 
consistent, which means that the results do not violate the prediction 
based on the theory and that they match the results of the previous models. 
The coefficients for AWl and AW2, DSLFARM, MARR, and RACE are significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent level. The results show that wage 
performance, being self-employed or a farmer, being unemployed, racial 
differences, and marital status continue to be important determinants of 
migration outcomes. 
The inclusion of heterogeneity in the model, however, leads to 
several problems. First, the estimation process had some difficulties in 
reaching convergence. Second, the estimated coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero, including the coefficient for 
heterogeneity. One possible reason is the nonrandom sample selection 
problem carried by this first treatment. The coefficients for 
heterogeneity are large in magnitude, but they are not significantly 
different from zero, even at the 10 percent level (see Table 7.3). Based 
on this finding, we conclude that the model without heterogeneity has more 
meaningful results. 
We found the estimated a to be larger than one, meaning that the 
hazard rate decreases with an increase in the duration of stay (see column 
1 and 3 of Table 7.3). However, the hypothesis that Ho: a = 1 in both 
equations can not be rejected at the 5 percent significant level. The t 
statistics are similar and equal to 1.4, which means that the hypothesis 
that the hazard rate is constant over time can not be rejected for this 
sample of duration data. This result suggests that treatment 1 does not 
lead to a significant improvement compared to the use of the constant 
hazard rate model previously discussed. 
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Treatment 2 
The second treatments utilizes all the duration spells with a known 
starting year, including those started before 1968. The spells with an 
unknown starting year are excluded. The hazard function is fitted to 865 
spells, with 284 completed. Compared to the first treatment, this 
selection increased the number of spells, especially completed spells. 
Therefore, the second treatment reduces potential sample selection 
problems. The estimated coefficients are presented in Table 7.4. The 
first two columns present the model fitted on all samples, and the last two 
colvimns show the model based on a younger male sample, namely, the males 
who were 19 to 24 years of age in 1968. The younger male sample provided 
278 spells, with 137 spells completed. 
The inclusion of heterogeneity generally improves the quality of the 
estimated coefficients and does not lead to any convergence problem in the 
computation. With an exception in the third column of Table 7.4, the 
estimated coefficients on heterogeneity (d) are all positive and different 
from zero at the 5 percent level. Therefore, we do not present the model 
without heterogeneity. Because the coefficient of heterogeneity in the 
third column is not significant, we will use the model in the fourth column 
to discuss the result from the younger male sample. Similar to the results 
in previous estimated hazard functions, the use of AWl and AW2 did not lead 
to any major differences. 
There are some interesting comparisons between the results derived 
from the full sample and those obtained from the younger male sample (young 
in 1968). In general, the use of the full sample with more spells results 
in larger t-values. This result is expected. The signs of the 
coefficients are consistent between the two samples, especially when the 
estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero. We conclude 
that the use of a more restricted sample, neunely, the younger population, 
does not alter the effect of migration determinants. 
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Table 7.4. Hazard function of migration, time-dependent hazard model, 
based on all observable residence spells, treatment 2, 
(t-values are in parentheses) 
Full Sample Young Sample 
(Age 19-45 in 1968) (Age 19-24 in 1968) 
Explanatory 
Variable Using PWl Using PW2 Using PWl Using PW2 
INTERCEPT -6.608 -6.614 -7.367 -7.394 
-7.87 ) ( -7.85 ) ( -3.02 ) ( -2.97 
AWl -0.606 — -0.435 — 
-5.06 ) ( -2.57 ) 
AW2 — -0.603 — -0.420 
( -5.05 ) ( -2.53 
EDUBEGIN 0.049 0.048 -0.001 -0.005 
1.74 ) { 1.72 ) ( -0.02 ) ( -0.11 
AGEBEGIN 0.271 0.271 0.501 0.505 
5.82 ) ( 5.80 ) ( 2.43 ) ( 2.40 
AGEBEGIN^/lOO -0.323 -0.323 -0.918 -0.926 
-4.81 ) ( -4.80 ) ( -2.29 ) ( -2.27 
UNEHP 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1.11 ) ( 1.12 ) ( 1.55 ) ( 1.59 
UNIBEGIN -0.175 -0.170 0.143 0.170 
-1.02 ) ( -0.99 ) ( 0.68 ) ( 0.81 
DSLFARM -1.229 -1.229 -1.469 -1.46 
-7.22 ) ( -7.21 ) ( -6.45 ) ( -6.44 
RACE 0.620 0.633 0.476 0.532 
1.53 ) ( 1.55 ) ( 0.90 ) ( 1.01 
MARR -1.297 -1.299 -0.252 -0.251 
-5.06 ) ( -5.07 ) ( -0.68 ) ( -0.68 
CHILDBGN -0.196 -0.194 0.333 0.331 
-4.29 ) ( -4.27 ) ( 1.57 ) ( 1.56 
CRIME 0.055 0.056 0.006 0.008 
1.99 ) ( 2.01 ) ( 0.16 ) ( 0.19 
PARK -0.084 -0.085 -0.068 -0.069 
-1.44 ) ( -1.46 ) ( -0.88 ) ( -0.90 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 
-0.19 ) ( -0.23 ) ( -0.3 ) ( -0.37 
JULY 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.019 
0.05 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.69 ) ( 0.71 
a 0.630 0.632 0.187 0.184 
7.91 ) ( 7.97 ) ( 2.66 ) ( 2.62 
e 3.876 3.843 16.364 16.750 
3.82 ) ( 3.83 ) ( 2.31 ) ( 2.29 
Log-likelihood -795.0 -795.0 -316.1 -316.3 
Completed spells 284 284 137 137 
Total spells 865 865 278 278 
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In both samples, the coefficient of age and age-squared show that the 
hazard rate for moving increases as people get older, but at a diminishing 
rate. After peaking, the hazard rate decreases as age increases. It is 
expected that the effects of age are different between the two samples. 
When the full sample is used, the peak tendency to move occurs at around 42 
years of age. In the younger male sample, the peak migration rate occurs 
at 27 years of age. It is worth mentioning that the effect of age found 
here is different from the result derived from the constant hazard rate 
model. The constant hazard rate model led to the a negative effect of age 
on the hazard rate. In this model, the effect of age is increasing and 
then decreasing after reaching its peak. This difference does not 
necessarily violate the view that, in general, the hazard rate decreases as 
people get older. 
Even though the inverted U-shape pattern fits well the stylized facts 
on how age affects migration decisions, the peak in the full sample does 
not occur when individuals are in their mid-20s. This is expected because 
the mean of individual's age for the full sample in 1968 was 33 years. 
Therefore, most migrations during 1968-87 occurred when most individuals 
were in their 30s or 40s. The result from the young sample fits to the 
fact that most migration occurred when individuals are in their 20s. The 
result showed that the peak of AGEBEGIN equals to 27 years. This is 
because the migration behavior of the young sample was observed since they 
were 19 to 24 years of age in 1968 until they were 38 to 43 years of age in 
1987. It is important to note that the AGEBEGIN is defined as the age at 
the beginning of a spell, and it marks the time when the individual makes 
the move to end the previous, not the current, residence spell. 
Another interesting difference between the full sample and the 
younger male sample in this analysis can be found in the effect of the 
number of school-age children. The number of school-age children was found 
to be a significant determinant of migration is the full sample. In the 
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young male sample, however, no significant effect was found. It is not 
surprising because, in general, individuals in the younger sample migrated 
when they were in their 20s, were unmarried, or had no children. 
There is also a difference in the effect of the crime rate. The 
coefficient for the crime rate is much more significant in the full sample 
compared to that in the younger male sample. It seems that the younger 
males were less crime conscious than the older males. 
Compared to the result in the constant hazard rate model, the signs 
of the coefficients are consistent. The coefficients for wage performance 
at the origin, education, age, being self-employed or a farmer, being 
married, and the number of school-age children are significantly different 
from zero at the 5 percent level. We conclude that this result does not 
violate the prediction based on the economic theory or the results of 
previous studies. It is important to note that the effect of the crime 
rate in the time-dependent hazard rate model seems to be more significant. 
The positive sign means that a higher crime rate in the current state of 
residence, relative to the U.S. average, increases the hazard rate of 
moving. 
The parameter a marks the difference between the constant and the 
time-dependent hazard rate. The estimates of a the first and second column 
of Table 7.4 are similar and smaller than one. The hypothesis that a = 1 
is rejected at the 5 percent level, with t-statistics of -4.6. The 
estimates for the younger sample shown in the fourth column show a similar 
result. The hypothesis that a = 1 is also rejected for the younger male 
sample at the 5 percent level, with t-statistics of -11.7. These results 
show that there is an increasing effect of length of duration of stay on 
the hazard rate. Holding other explanatory variables constant, the longer 
an individual lives in one place, the higher is the hazard rate for moving. 
However, this result should be interpreted carefully. From Equation 
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(4 .22), we know that holding X constant, a represents the marginal effect 
of t on H. Because of the nonlinear relationship between the duration (t), 
explanatory variables (X) and the hazard rate (H), the interpretation of a 
is more complicated. The interdependence between X and t has made a not 
fully capture how the hazard rate changes as the duration increases. 
Greene (1991) provides a more realistic way to illustrate the 
movement of the hazard rate as a function of the duration of a spell. The 
objective is accomplished by plotting the predicted hazard rate on the 
duration of stay. First, spells or observations are grouped based on the 
duration of stay. Then, based on the explanatory variables corresponding 
to each group, the means of the hazard rate in each group are calculated 
and plotted. Compared to the estimates of a just discussed, this method 
illustrates the relationship between the hazard rate and the duration more 
realistically. The graphical representations are more realistic for at 
least two reasons. First, this methods allows for the change in other 
explanatory variables, such as age and education, corresponding to a change 
in the duration of stay. Second, the graphical representations are simple 
to understand. 
The plots derived from the equations in the second and fourth column 
of Table 7.4 are presented in Figures 7.1 and 7.2., respectively. In 
general, the pattern of the hazard rate is an inverted u-shape curve. This 
pattern has a meaningful interpretation. With an increase in the duration 
of stay, the hazard rate for moving increases, reaches a peak, and then 
decreases. From Figure 7.1, we can see that the maximum hazard rate occurs 
for individuals staying in one place for four to six years. For the 
younger male sample shown in Figure 7.2, we can see that the peak occurs 
earlier, two to four years of residency in one place. The values of the 
scale in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. show the maximum value of the predicted 
hazard rate. The scale values show the maximum hazard rate for the 
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Figure 7.1. Predicted hazard rate and the duration of stay in the 
time-dependent hazard model, using treatment 2, for the 
full sample. 
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Figure 7.2. Predicted hazard rate and the duration of stay in the 
time dependent hazard model, using treatment 2, for the 
young male sample. 
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younger sample (0.14) is higher than that of the full sample (0.03). This 
results fits the prediction that younger people have a higher tendency to 
move. 
In general, we conclude that the second treatment performs better 
than the first one. The coefficients are better in quality and the signs 
are consistent with the results from the constant hazard rate model. Among 
other explanatory variables, the residual wage remains a strong determinant 
of migration. A decrease in the actual wage relative to the potential wage 
increases the hazard rate for moving. Higher education consistently leads 
to a strong positive effect on the hazard rate. Being white also increases 
the hazard rate. Some factors that reduce the hazard rate for moving are 
age, being self-employed or a farmer, being married, and the number of 
school-age children. In the second treatment, a higher crime rate leads to 
a higher hazard rate for moving. 
Treatment 3 
For the third treatment, we predict the unobserved starting year of 
residency and then use all spells in the computation to fit the migration 
model. This procedure utilizes all 1,268 spells, with 496 spells 
completed. The number of completed spells increases from 207 in the 
constant hazard rate model, to 284 in the second treatment, to 496 in this 
treatment. In general, the estimated coefficients are statistically 
stronger after closing the open spells. Similar to most previous results, 
the use of AWl or AW2 does not lead to any significant difference. 
The first step of this third treatment is the estimation of an 
unobserved starting date for left-censored spells. Heckman's procedure is 
used to predict the unobserved length of some spells (Heckman, 1979). The 
details of the procedure can be found in Appendix D. We conducted a test 
that the predicted completed spells are distributed Weibull. The 
hypothesis that the distribution of the predicted completed spells is 
s: -
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Welbull can not be rejected at the 5 percent level. The Chi-sguared 
atatistics for the goodness-of-fit test is 19.7 with 18 degrees of freedom. 
Therefore, we conclude that the use of predicted spells for the third 
treatment does not violate the assumption that the distribution of the 
completed spells in time-dependent hazard rate is Weibull. 
The estimated model for the third treatment can be found in Table 
7.5. The first three columns use the full sample, and the last two utilize 
the younger male sample. The third column presents the model which uses 
the share of a male's time in residence while he is 20 to 29 years of age 
(A6E20) to represent age, rather than AGBBEGIN. Compared to results in 
previous hazard function for migration, the signs of the coefficients are 
consistent. The asymptotic t-statistics are larger in magnitude, showing a 
generally higher quality of parameter estimates. This improvement can be 
seen clearly in the effects of the crime rate and personal unemployment. 
Compared to the result from the second treatment, the coefficients for 
crime rate shown in the first two columns of Table 7.5 are positive and 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.. Similarly, 
strong effects occur for personal unemployment. 
The effect of age on the hazard rate for this treatment is similar to 
the result from treatment 2. The pattern of the effect of age measured at 
the beginning of the spell is an inverted U-shape curve. The peak effect 
in treatment 3 occurs at 42 years of age for the full sample, and at 27 
years of age in the younger male sample. Using AGE20 in the model shows 
that the larger the share of time an individual spent his 20s, the higher 
is the hazard rate for moving. The coefficient of AGE20 is positive and 
significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level. We realized that 
using A6E20 might not be appropriate in this model. By construction, AGE20 
is negatively correlated with the length of the spell, and when the hazard 
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Table 7.5. Hazard function of migration, time-dependent hazard model, 
based on all residence spells, treatment 3 (t-values are 
in parentheses) 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Full Sample 
(Age 19-45 in 1968) 
Young Sample 
(Age 19-24 in 1968) 
Using PWl Using PW2 Using PW2 Using PWl Using PW2 
INTERCEPT -6.627 -6.634 -3.552 -3.938 -3.935 
(-11.44 ) (-11.47 ) ( -8.56 ) ( -2.12 ) ( -2.11 ) 
AWl -0.543 _ — -0.509 — 
( -6.66 ) ( -3.86 ) 
AW2 — -0.549 -0.516 — -0.499 
( -6.76 ) ( -5.99 ) ( -3.76 ) 
EDUBEGIN 0.044 0.044 0.090 0.078 0.077 
( 2.41 ) ( 2.38 ) ( 4.82 ) ( 2.09 ) ( 2.10 ) 
AGEBEGIN 0.274 0.274 _ 0.163 0.164 
( 8.41 ) ( 8-41 ) ( 1.08 ) ( 1.07 ) 
AGEBEGIN^/lOO -0.330 -0.330 - -0.302 -0.304 
( -7.14 ) ( -7.14 ) ( -1.05 ) ( -1.05 ) 
AGE20 — — 0.008® _ — 
( 5.74 ) 
UNEMP 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
( 1-69 ) ( 1.71 ) ( 2.81 ) ( 3.93 ) ( 3.98 ) 
UNIBEGIN -0.221 -0.219 -0.440 -0.270 -0.257 
( -1.68 ) ( -1.67 ) ( -2.98 ) ( -1.29 ) ( -1.23 ) 
DSLFARM -1.193 -1.191 -1.333 -1.658 -1.664 
( -9.35 ) ( -9.33 ) ( -9.21 ) ( -8.51 ) ( -8.53 ) 
RACE 0.507 0.512 0.669 0.131 0.142 
( 2.06 ) ( 2.07 ) ( 2.43 ) ( 0.28 ) ( 0.30 ) 
MARR -1.303 -1.294 -1.477 -0.331 -0.328 
( -7.33 ) ( -7.33 ) ( -8.15 ) ( -1.31 ) ( -1.28 ) 
CHILDBGN -0.151 -0.150 -0.096 0.143 0.155 
( -4.59 ) ( -4.57 ) ( -2.66 ) ( 1.01 ) ( 1.09 ) 
CRIME 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.050 0.052 
( 2.44 ) ( 2.47 ) ( 2.46 ) ( 1.51 ) ( 1.55 ) 
PARK -0.029 -0.028 -0.006 0.001 0.000 
( -0.90 ) ( -0.86 ) ( -0.19 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.00 ) 
JAN -0.004 -0.005 0.007 -0.005 -0.005 
( -0.71 ) ( -0.81 ) ( 1.26 ) ( -0.50 ) ( -0.55 ) 
JULY 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.006 
( 0.55 ) ( 0.55 ) ( 0.85 ) ( 0.37 ) ( 0.35 ) 
<7 0.666 0.667 0.845 0.317 0.315 
( 10.90 ) ( 10.91 ) ( 10.89 ) ( 4.41 ) ( 4.39 ) 
9 2.664 2.644 1.587 7.079 7.166 
( 4.80 ) ( 4.78 ) ( 3.68 ) ( 3.30 ) ( 3.29 ) 
Log-likelihood -1288.0 -1287.2 -1337.0 -417.4 -417.6 
Completed spells 496 496 496 191 191 
Total spells 1268 1268 1268 350 350 
^The unit of A6B20 is in percent 
109 
rate changes over time, the inclusion of this variable in the model could 
lead to misspecification. Nonetheless, to illustrate why the hazard rate 
is higher when males are in their mid-20s, we fit the effect of AGE20 (see 
Table 7.5, column 3). 
Interesting comparisons can be found between the use of full male 
sample and the young male sample. For example, the effects of family-
related variables are different. As shown in Table 7.5, having a large 
number of school-age children significantly reduces the hazard rate for 
migration. The table also shows that for the young male sample, the number 
of school-age children has no effect on the hazard rate for migration. The 
significance of the marital status in reducing the hazard rate is also 
reduced for the young male sample. 
Personal unemployment turns out to be a significant determinant of 
migration decisions for young males. Compared to the use of large sample, 
the coefficient of personal unemployment in the younger male sample is 
larger. This result reflects the fact that unemployed young males seemed 
to have a higher tendency to make long-distance moves compared to the 
unemployed older males. This result is also consistent with the view that 
younger males have lower migration cost and a higher tendency to migrate. 
The crime rate affects migration differently between the younger and 
the older males. The effect of crime rates on migration in the younger 
male sample is not significant, while the effect for the full sample is 
strongly negative. This result means that the young males were less 
concerned about the crime rate in making decisions to move. This is 
consistent with the difference in behavior toward risk between younger and 
older people. The young seem to be greater risk takers compared to the 
old. 
The parameter a shows the contribution of the time-dependent hazard 
rate model compared to the constant hazard model. The estimates of a are 
less than one and consistent with the results from treatment 2. In all the 
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equations, the hypothesis that a - 1 is rejected at the 5 percent level. 
For the full sample, the t-statistic derived from the ec[uation in the 
second column is -5.4. For the younger male sample, the t-statistics 
derived from the equation in the fifth column is -9.5. Other explanatory 
variables held equal, the hazard rate increases with an increase in 
duration. As discussed previously, the nonlinear relationship between the 
hazard rate, duration of stay, and explanatory variables complicates the 
interpretation of a as the marginal effect. As we did for treatment 2, we 
present the more realistic graphical representation of the predicted hazard 
rate and the duration of stay. 
The plot of the relationship between the predicted hazard rate and 
the duration of stay corresponding to the use of the full male sample and 
the young male sample (second and fifth column of Table 7.5) are presented 
in Figure 7.3 and 7.4, respectively. The graph shows that the effect of 
the duration of stay on the hazard rate is quadratic. The hazard rate 
first increases with a larger duration, peaks, and then decreases. This 
inverted U-shape form is consistent with the results from the second 
treatment. When the full male sample is used, the maximum hazard rate 
occurs when the duration of stay is four to six years. As expected, the 
maximum hazard rate in the young sample occurs after a shorter duration of 
stay. The maximum hazard takes place when the duration of stay is two 
years. In general, the results show that the hazard rate is small after a 
recent move, it increases until it reaches its peak when males have resided 
for six years in one place, and then it decreases. The value of the scale 
shows that the young sample has higher maximum predicted hazard rate (0.14) 
than the full Scunple (0.04). 
The signs of the coefficients are consistent with the results in the 
previous treatments. Nonetheless, we found that the third treatment 
performs better than the previous two. The third treatment shows a 
stronger result for the effect of crime rates on the migration decision. 
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Figure 7.3. Predicted hazard rate and the duration of stay in the 
time-dependent hazard model, using treatment 3 for the 
full sample. 
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Figure 7.4, Predicted hazard rate and the duration of stay in the 
time-dependent hazard model, using treatment 3 for the 
young male sample. 
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Consistently, the residual wage is a strong determinant of migration. A 
decrease in the actual wage relative to the potential wage increases the 
hazard rate for moving. More education and being white also have strong 
positive effects on the hazard rate. Factors that reduce the hazard rate 
for moving are age, being self-employed or a farmer, being married, and the 
number of school-age children. 
While temperature is a significant determinant for migration in the 
constant hazard rate model, none of the estimates from the time-dependent 
hazard model produce significant estimates. One possible reason is the use 
of a constant average 30-year temperature in the model. Clearly, the 
constant January and July temperatures fit better in the constant hazard 
rate model. The study did not show any significant effect of the 
percentage of areas belonging to state and national parks (PARK) on the 
migration decision. 
The marginal effects of some explanatory variables on the hazard rate 
for migration are calculated and presented in Table 7.6. The first column 
presents the results from the constant hazard rate model, directly taken 
from the coefficients in the fourth column of Table 7.2. The second and 
third columns present results from the time-dependent hazard model, taken 
from the second and fourth of Table 7.5. In general, the signs of the 
marginal effects are consistent across models. A comparison of the 
magnitudes can be made. The marginal effect of a 1.00 percent increase in 
wage performance on the hazard rate for migration ranges from -0.29 percent 
to -1.58 percent. Compared to the result in the constant hazard model, the 
effect of wage performance (AW2) is stronger in the time-dependent hazard 
model. The younger male sample produced the highest marginal effects 
showing that the young males were more responsive to wage performance in 
making migration decisions. 
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Table 7.6. Marginal effect of some explanatory variables on the hazard 
rate for migration 
Time-dependent Hazard Rate^ 
Constant Hazard 
rate Full sample Young sample 
Explanatory (From Table 7.2, (From Table 7.5, (From Table 7.5, 
Variable Unit Column 4) Column 2) Column 5) 
AW2 percent -0.286* -0.823*** -1.584*** 
EDUBE6IN year 0.212**' 0.066** 0.244* 
AGE20 (0 - 1)'' 1.298***« 0.947***'' -
UNEMP hour 0.002** 0.001* 0.006 
UNIBEGIN Dummy:0,1 -0.760** -0.328* -0.816 
DSLFARM Dummy:0,1 -1.744*** -1.786*** -5.283*** 
RACE Dummy:0,1 2.073*** 0.768** 0.451 
MARK (0 - 1)'' -1.240*** -1.940*** -1.043 
CHILDBGN 0, 1, 2, ... -0.167** -0.225*** 0.492 
CRIME percent® 0.052 0.069** 0.165 
'The marginal effect is /S/a, see Equation (4.23) 
''The share of time spent being married, and also being in the 20s, 
ranges from 0 to 1 
*^Derived from Table 7.1, column 4 
'^Derived from Table 7.5, column 3 
Measured relative to U.S. average 
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
''significant at the 5 percent level 
'"'"'significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Education, personal unemployment, being white, and a higher crime 
rate clearly increase the hazard rate for migration. A one-year increase 
in education increased the hazard rate of migration by 6.6 percent to 24.4 
percent. An annual 10-hour increase in unemployment augments the hazard 
rate by 1 percent to 6 percent. A 1 percent increase in the crime rate 
relative to the U.S. average increased the hazard rate by 5 percent to 17 
percent. The marginal effect of being white ranged from 0.45 to 2.07. 
Similar to the effect of wage performance, a larger marginal effect of 
personal unemployment and male education are found in the young male 
sample. The decision to move for the young males is more responsive to 
unemployment experience because, all other things held ec[ual, the cost of 
moving is smaller. The stronger effect of formal schooling for the young 
males sample is also expected. Education plays major roles because the 
lack of employment experience for the young sample. 
The effect of the crime rate on migration was found to be smaller for 
the younger males. This result is consistent with the difference in risk 
behavior between the younger and the older males. Being young also 
increases the hazard rate for migration. The marginal effect of age, 
calculated based on the effect of AGE20, was positive. We could see on 
Table 7.6 that the marginal effect of being in one's 20s on the hazard rate 
for migration is around 0.95 to 1.30. 
Being a labor union member, being self-employed or a farmer, being 
married, and having school-age children reduce the hazard rate for 
migration. The marginal effect of being a labor union member ranged from 
0.33 to -0.82. The marginal effect of being self-employed or a farmer on 
migration was large, ranging from -1.74 to -5.28. It is worth mentioning 
that the effect of being self-employed or a farmer is stronger when we use 
the younger male sample. The marginal effect of being married ranged 
from -1.04 to -1.94. Having one more school-age child reduced the chance 
to migrate by 22.5 percent to 49.2 percent. It is clear that the marginal 
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effects of fcunily-related variables such as marital status and having 
school-age children are weaker for the younger male sample. There is a 
positive marginal effect of CHILDBGN in the last column of Table 7.6; 
however, this marginal effect is derived from a coefficient which is not 
significantly different from zero in the model. 
There were some concerns related to the estimation of a time-
dependent hazard rate. First, the use of predicted length of spell in the 
estimation might lead to misspecification and violation of the assumption 
that the distribution of the completed duration is Weibull. Second, the 
use of explanatory variables measured in 1968 or after in the spell started 
before 1968, especially when the full sample is used, could lead to 
measurement error problem. These problems are reduced when we use the 
young male sample. The young sample consists of those who were 19-24 years 
in 1968. Their migration behavior and their personal and local attributes 
in their 20s and 30s, from 1968 to 1987, were perfectly observed. The data 
from the young sample in 1968 are the best to fit the time dependent hazard 
function of migration. The consistency of the results, both in terms of 
the signs and the significance of the coefficients, has shown that the 
estimation procedure appears robust. 
In summary, we conclude that using the time-dependent hazard rate 
improves the quality of the estimates. The main contribution of the time-
dependent hazard rate is to provide perspective on the relationship between 
the hazard rate and the duration of stay. We found an inverted U-shape 
relationship. An additional contribution can be found in measuring the 
significance the crime rate to the migration decision. 
We found consistency in the signs of the coefficients. A lower wage 
perfoinnance, higher education, younger age, and being white increase the 
hazard rate for moving. Being self-employed or a farmer, being in a labor 
union, being married, and having school-age children tend to reduce the 
hazard rate. Interesting comparisons between the use of the full sample 
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and the younger male sample are found. The tendency to move for younger 
males is more sensitive to wages, education, and job-related variables, 
such as unemployment experience, union membership, and occupational choice, 
but is less sensitive to family-related variables and the crime rate. This 
results show the difference in risk behavior and cost of migration between 
the younger and older males. 
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CHAPTERS. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The Search Model for Migration 
This study has developed a new model for determining an individual's 
migration decision. By applying the search theory on migration, the new 
model adds the multi-period dimension to previous one point-in-time 
decision model. Search theory allows for modelling the migration decision 
as a sec[uential decision over time. In addition, uncertainty about the 
future is treated explicitly. Therefore, the new model captures repeated 
migration and better fits the nature of migration as a life-cycle decision. 
The search model views migration decisions as sequential decisions 
made over time under uncertainty. An individual migrates to a new place 
when the expected utility to move is higher than his/her reservation 
utility for moving. Over time, the individual receives an offer to move 
represented by a utility assessment corresponding to a move, net from the 
cost of moving. The individual remains in the same place as long as the 
offer is less than or equal to the reservation utility. Therefore, the 
concept of interest in this study is the duration of someone living in one 
place before he moves and the hazard rate for moving. The search model 
develops the relationship between the hazard rate, the duration of stay, 
and some explanatory variables that determine migration. 
The model predicts that better living conditions at the origin reduce 
the hazard rate for moving and extend the duration of a stay. It predicts 
a positive relationship between the hazard rate and the expected utility 
corresponding to an offer to move. When an individual receives more offers 
to move, the hazard rate is expected to be higher. Another important 
result is the relationship between the hazard rate for moving and the 
expected life span. The hazard rate is higher when the expected life span 
after moving is longer. In other words, this relation explains the higher 
tendency for young adults to move. 
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The model la fitted empirically to a panel data set from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and local state characteristics from the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States. The study follows the 
migration behavior of male heads of households, who were age 19 to 45 in 
1968, for 20 years from 1968 to 1987. The econometric analysis consists of 
estimating the probit model based on the point-in-time discrete choice 
model and the hazard functions based on the search model. The empirical 
analysis of this study introduced the wage performance of an individual as 
one determinant of migration. 
In general, we have estimated four models. First, we estimated the 
potential wage ecpiation to derive the individual's relative wage 
performance. The relative wage performance was used in all equations to 
help explaining migration. Second, by following previous migration 
studies, we fitted a standard probit model corresponding to the point-in-
time discrete choice framework. Third, we fitted the hazard function of 
migration by assuming that the hazard rate is constant over time. Fourth, 
we modified the assumption and estimated a time-dependent hazard rate 
model. 
The Wage Equation and The Probability of Migration 
The wage equation was fitted to develop individual wage performance, 
or the residual wage, by measuring how well an individual's actual wage 
performs relative to his potential wage. The residual wage also captures 
the location- or firm-specific effects on wage. The dependency of residual 
wages on the duration of stay is useful in fitting the time-dependent 
hazard model. The potential wage is fitted to 15,367 annual individual 
observations. The estimated wage equation provided further evidence that 
human capital factors, especially education and potential experience are 
strong determinants of an individual's wage. One year of additional 
education increased an individual's real wage by about 7.5 percent. The 
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wage peak occurred at about 45 years of age. We also found that white 
males earned 11 percent more than the nonwhite males. 
State characteristics were found to play a major role in determining 
individual wage rates. Wage rates differ because of differences in living 
cost and labor market conditions. We found that areas with higher land 
prices offer higher wages. The elasticity is around 0.04 to 0.05. A 1 
percent increase in the percentage of urban population increased the wage 
rate by around 28 percent. A 1 percent increase in actual and predicted 
state unemployment rates leads to a 1.5 percent and 4.3 percent increase in 
the wage rate, respectively. A 1 percent increase in actual and predicted 
state job growth rates contributed to a 1.5 percent and 6.0 percent 
increase in the wage, respectively. The results also show that the 
potential wage responds to the unanticipated state unemployment and 
employment shocks, and state average January and July temperatures. In 
general, the real wage has declined since the early 1970s. The wage rates 
in the southern and western states are lower relatively than in the 
northern-central and the eastern states. 
The probability-of-migration equations were fitted to 915 males 
observed during the 1969-73. By assuming normality, the probit model was 
appropriate. We found that the residual wage was a strong determinant of 
migration. A 1 percent increase in the actual wage relative to the 
potential reduces the probability of migration by 0.17 percent. This 
result shows that people who earn less than other with the same personal 
characteristics living in the Scune state are at higher risk of moving. 
For variables other than the individual relative wage, we found 
similar results compared to previous studies. A 1 year increase in general 
education increased the probability of migration by 1.6 percent. We also 
found that younger males have a higher tendency to move; the marginal 
effect of age evaluated at the mean is -3.6 percent. The current study 
supported the finding of the previous results showing that white males tend 
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to participate in interstate migration more often than nonwhite males. 
Being married and being self-employed or a farmer reduced the probability 
of migrating. The marginal effect of the share of time spent married is 
around -28 to -29 percent. Being self-employed or a farmer decreased the 
probability of moving by about 12 percent. The results from this probit 
model, however, do not provide enough evidence on the effects of personal 
unemployment, the number of school-age children, being in a labor union, 
and local amenities such as crime rate, percentage of area in state and 
national parks, and temperature. One reason is the use of the younger 
sample in the early period of the PSID data (1968-73) to fit the model. 
This finding is consistent with the result obtained from the hazard model 
when it was fitted to the younger male sample. 
The Hazard Function for Migration 
The hazard function for migration was derived from the search theory 
for migration. It showed how the probability of migration can be modelled 
as a multi-period sequential decision with uncertainty. The empirical 
hazard function of migration was fitted to 1,268 spells, derived from all 
915 individual in the sample observed from 1968-87. There were two general 
models fitted in this study; a model of constant hazard rate over time and 
a time-dependent hazard rate. In general, we found that search theory 
performs better than the point-in-time standard discrete choice model in 
explaining the migration. The inclusion of heterogeneity in the model not 
only reduced the biases of the estimates but also improved their 
statistical significance. 
The constant hazard rate model was fitted to 1,268 spells. The 
completed spells is derived from all the right-closed spells starting in or 
after 1968. Similar to the result from the discrete choice model, we found 
that residual wage was a strong determinant for migration. The marginal 
effect was -0.29. Education and age also played major roles in the 
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decision to migrate. One year of additional general education increased 
the hazard rate by about 21 percent. The results also showed that being 
young, namely being in the mid-20s, increased the hazard rate by 1.30. The 
effect of racial characteristics on migration was similar to that found 
with the discrete choice model, namely, that being white increased the 
hazard rate for moving. We also found that being married and being self-
employed or a farmer reduced the hazard rate for moving. The marginal 
effects were -1.24 and -1.74, respectively. 
Compared to the probit model, the hazard function provided stronger 
results for the effects of personal unemployment, being in a labor union, 
and having school-age. We found that 10 hours of unemployment per year 
increases the hazard rate for moving by 2 percent. Being at the labor 
union and having one children at the school age reduced the hazard rate by 
76 and 17 percent respectively. The constant hazard model showed the 
significance effect of the weather temperature, but not the other local 
amenities such as crime rates and percentage of areas belong to state and 
national park. 
Time dependent hazard rate models were fitted by using several 
procedures or treatments. The first treatment used only the spells started 
in or after 1968. The second treatments utilized all spells with perfectly 
observed length. With the last treatment, the unobserved spell lengths 
were predicted, and all spells were used to fit the model. The completed 
spells increased from 207 in the first treatment, to 284 in the second, to 
496 in the third treatment. Except for the first treatment, in general, we 
found stronger results with using time-dependent model. The signs of the 
coefficients were consistent to those found with previous models, and the 
quality of the estimates is higher. In the second and third treatments, we 
fitted the model twice- one for the full sample and once for the younger 
sample. 
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The advantage of the time-dependent hazard model is the movement of 
the hazard rate over time. We found that the relationship between the 
hazard rate and the duration of stay was an inverted U-shape curve. With 
the increase in the duration of stay, the hazard rate to move increased, 
reached the mcucimum, and then decreased. Results from the full seunple 
showed that the maximum hazard occurred when individuals in one place for 6 
years. A higher tendency for the young males to move caused the maximum 
hazard rate to occur at the shorter duration of stay, namely two to four 
years. 
The determinants of migration are different for the full sample 
compared with the younger male sample. With the exceptions of family-
related variables and crime rates, in general, the effects of the 
explanatory variables on the hazard rate for migration were stronger for 
the younger male sample. For example, young males were more sensitive to 
the wage effect, h 1 percent decrease in residual wage increased the 
hazard rate for the young males by 1.6 percent, compared with only 0.8 
percent for the full sample. It is important to note that the effects of 
residual wage were stronger when we use the time-dependent hazard model. 
The decision to move for young males seemed to be more sensitive to 
unemployment experience than for older males. In general, the marginal 
effect of a 10-hour increase in unemployment per year on the hazard rate 
was 1 percent for the full sample, compared with 6 percent for the young 
male sample. The effects of occupational choice were also different 
between the two samples. The marginal effect of being self-employed or a 
farmer on the hazard rate for the younger males was around -5.28, compared 
with -1.79 for the full sample. 
Education plays an important role in the migration decision. More 
educated people have a higher tendency to move. When the accumulation of 
employment experience is small, the marginal effect of education on the 
hazard rate for migration is higher. This effect was shown to be stronger 
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when the young male sample is used. The marginal effect of one year of 
education on the decision to migrate was 0.24 for the young male sample and 
0.07 for the full sample. The marginal effect of being a union member 
was -0.82 for the young males and -0.33 for the full sample. However, 
being a union member was not a significant determinant for migration for 
the young male sample. 
The effects of fcunily-related variables on migration were weaker in 
the younger male sample than in the full sample. It is expected that being 
married and having school-age children do not affect the migration decision 
for the young male sample. The marginal effect of the proportion of time 
spent married in the spell on the hazard rate was -1.94 and -1.04 for the 
full sample and the younger male sample, respectively. Having one school-
age child reduced the hazard rate by 22.5 percent. When the younger male 
sample was used, the effect of the number of school-age children was not 
significant. The younger males also seemed to be less sensitive to the 
crime rate in the state. For the full sample, a 1 percent increase in the 
crime rate relative to the U.S. average led to a 7 percent increase in the 
hazard rate. For the younger male sample, the effect was not statistically 
significant. 
There has been no standard procedure to fit the time-dependent hazard 
rate when the length of some spells and the value of some explanatory 
variables were not observed. We had to develop several research strategies 
to fit the models. We realize that there may be some problems associated 
with those empirical procedures. However, the consistency of the results 
shows that the parameter estimates are quite robust. 
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APPENDIX A. THE DERIVATION OF THE SEARCH MODEL 
The Derivation of the Reservation Utility Equation 
From Equation (2.6) in Chapter 2, we have: 
Unm h 5h (l-5h) 
Vnm = + E(Max{Vm(Um) ,Vnm}] + Vnm + 0(h) k = Vm(Ur) (2.6) 
(1+rh) (1+rh) (1+rh) 
We could rearrange to: 
Unm S 0(h) 
Vnm = + E[Max{Vm(Um) ,Vnm}] + = Vm(Ur) (2.6a) 
(r+^) (r+5) (l+rh)(r+5)h 
The limit of the last part of the right hand side goes to zero as h->0. From 
Equation (2.7) we have Vm(Um) = Um(l-e'^)/r, and the maximum of Vnm while 
living at the origin is Vm(Ur) = Ur(l-b"'^)/r. Therefore, we can write 
Equation (2.6a) as: 
UrC Unm SC 
= + E(Max{Um,Ur}], where: C= (1-e"'^'''') (2.6b) 
r (r+S) r(r+fi) 
5C Ur 
UrC = Unm + E[Max{Um,Ur}] 
r r 
SC Ur <=0 Ur 00 
UrC = Unm + [/urdF(Um)+/umdF(Om)-/urdF(Um)-/urdF(Um) ] 
r 0 Ur 0 Ur 
With C = (l-e"*^), this leads to Equation (2.8): 
Unm S « 
Ur = + [ / (Um-Ur)dF(Um) ] (2.8) 
(l-e"*^) r Ur 
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The Effect of 6, Unm, r, jiium' ^ 
GO 
Let; [*] = [ f (Um-Ur)ciF(Um) ] > 0, from Equation (2.8), and 
Ur 
Taking derivative of Equation (2.8) with respect to S and Ur, 
[*] S 
dUr = dS (l-F{Ur)] dUr 
r r 
dUr [*] / r 
= > 0 
d5 [l+S/r(l-F(Ur)] 
Taking derivative of Equation (2.8) with respect to Unm and Ur, 
dUnm S 
dUr = — [l-F(Ur)] dUr 
(1-e-i^) r 
dUr 1 
> 0 
dUnm (l-e"*^^) [l+5/r(l-F(Ur) ] 
Taking derivative of Equation (2.8) with respect to r and Ur, 
UnrnTe"*^ 5 [ * ] S 
dUr = —— dr dr [l-F(Ur)] dUr 
(l_e-'T)2 r 
dUr [UnmTe"'^/(l-e-'^)2 + 
< 0 
dr [l+5/r[l-F(Ur)] 
Taking derivative of Equation (2.8) with respect to and Ur, 
S S 
dUr = [l-F(Ur)] d/i^m [l-F(Ur)] dUr 
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dUr S (l-F(Ur)] 
= > 0 and < 1 
d/ium (r + «[l-F(Ur)] 
Taking derivative of Equation (2.8) with respect to T and Ur, 
bre"*^  S 
dUr —- dT [l-P{Ur)] dUr 
(l-e-'^)2 r 
dUr (bre'*^) / (l-e"*^) ^ 
< 0 
dT [l+5/r[l-F(Ur)) 
The Effect of 6, Unm, r, Aium' T on H 
For Equation (2.10) the relation between Ur and hazard rate (H) is 
H = £ ^(Ur), where 
00 
^(Ur) = J f(Um) dUm = l-F(Ur) > 0, and d^/dVr = - f(Ur). 
Ur 
We take partial derivative of Equation (2.10) with respect to 6, Unm, r, 
and T respectively, and then utilize the information from above to sign the 
equation. 
aa aur 
= ^(Ur) - S f(Ur) (ambiguous) 
dS 36 
dH aUr 
= - S f(Ur) < 0 
aunm dUnm 
an aur 
= - 5 f(Ur) > 0 
ar ar 
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aur 
6 f(Ur) 
3/^Uin 
aur 
6 f(Ur) > 
ai 
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APPENDIX B. SOME STATE LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Table B.l. Employment growth, unemployment rate, and land prices, for some 
selected years 
Employment Unemployment Real Land Price 
Growth (percent) Rate (percent) ($/acre) 
State 1968 1978 1987 1968 1978 1987 1968 1978 1987 
Alabama 1 • b 5.2 3.0 4.5 6.3 7.8 358 679 555 
Arizona 5.7 10.1 3.5 3.6 6.1 6.2 186 238 273 
Arkansas 2.2 5.2 2.8 4.2 6.3 8.1 525 807 525 
California 4.1 6.8 3.7 4.5 7.1 5.8 1 ,376 1,417 1,843 
Colorado 5.0 8.3 0.4 3.0 5.5 7.7 246 430 253 
Connecticut 2.8 5.1 2.5 3.7 5.2 3.3 1 ,660 2,287 2,498 
Delaware 4.0 3.7 5.8 3.1 7.6 3.2 1 ,081 1,968 1,565 
D. C. 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.2 8.5 6.3 1 ,097 1,924 1,523 
Florida 6.1 8.1 5.3 2.8 6.6 5.3 1 ,253 2,208 2,128 
Georgia 3.6 6.7 4.0 3.3 5.7 5.5 404 907 542 
Idaho 2.1 7.5 1.5 4.3 5.7 8.0 516 923 507 
Illinois 1.8 3.2 2.8 3.0 6.1 7.4 1 ,323 2,735 1,079 
Indiana 2.2 4.3 3.7 3.2 5.7 6.4 1 ,124 2,211 934 
Iowa 2.1 3.6 3.2 2.4 4.0 5.5 1 ,105 2,361 773 
Kansas 3.5 4.7 2.0 2.7 3.1 4.9 412 620 299 
Kentucky 2.1 4.3 4.2 3.9 5.2 8.8 510 950 571 
Louisiana 2.2 7.0 -2.3 4.8 7.0 12.0 822 1,371 788 
Maine 3.3 5.6 2.5 4.5 6.1 3.2 228 487 590 
Maryland 3.6 5.6 3.8 3.2 5.6 4.2 1 ,112 1,881 1,482 
Massachusetts 3.3 5.6 2.5 4.5 6.1 3.2 940 1,332 1,549 
Michigan 3.9 5.6 1.6 4.3 6.9 8.2 636 1,140 596 
Minnesota 3.4 5.6 3.4 3.2 3.8 5.4 445 1,072 485 
Mississippi 3.0 6.1 1.9 4.5 7.1 10.2 455 783 477 
Missouri 1.4 4.8 2.5 3.4 5.0 6.3 466 872 435 
Montana 2.6 5.5 -0.4 4.7 6.0 7.4 142 264 150 
Nebraska 3.5 2.7 2.1 2.4 2.9 4.9 449 746 382 
Nevada 7.0 12.8 6.6 5.0 4.4 6.3 135 207 181 
New Heunpshire 2.1 7.2 4.8 1.8 3.8 2.5 329 871 1,138 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
1.4 4.0 1.8 4.6 7.2 4.0 2 ,082 3,141 2,812 
1.1 6.8 0.6 5.1 5.8 8.9 193 295 186 
New York 2.1 2.8 1.9 3.5 7.7 4.9 414 672 515 
North Carolina 4.6 4.5 4.2 3.2 4.3 4.5 741 1,177 881 
North Dakota 2.6 5.7 1.2 4.1 4.6 5.2 225 466 286 
Ohio 3.9 3.9 2.5 2.9 5.4 7.0 874 1,789 866 
Oklahoma 2.8 6.4 -1.3 3.5 3.9 7.4 423 670 374 
Oregon 3.6 7.4 3.8 4.4 6.0 6.2 826 1,431 878 
Pennsylvania 2.0 3.3 2.6 3.2 6.9 5.7 651 1,528 1,510 
Rhode Island 1.5 4.1 2.2 3.6 6.6 3.8 1 ,351 2,614 2,613 
South Carolina 2.4 5.0 4.0 4.3 5.7 5.6 473 822 556 
South Dakota 3. 0  4.3 2.0 3.0 3.1 4.2 234 382 203 
Tennessee 4.3 5.3 4.2 3.6 5.8 6.6 475 893 622 
Texas 4.3 7.2 -0.7 2.7 4.8 8.4 547 769 786 
Utah 2.4 7.1 0.9 5.2 3.8 6.4 209 443 381 
Vermont 2.9 7.1 5.0 3.6 5.7 3.6 326 656 803 
Virginia 3.9 5.2 3.7 2.7 5.4 4.2 547 1,017 825 
Washington 4.8 8.3 4.5 4.3 6.8 7.6 896 1,565 905 
West Virginia 0.8 3.4 0.2 5.5 6.3 10.8 225 583 427 
Wisconsin 2.3 4.8 3.2 3.4 5.1 6.1 479 1,043 561 
Wyoming 3.0 8.9 -6.9 3.9 3.3 8.6 79 151 87 
Alaska 5.2 0.6 -5.1 9.1 11.2 10.8 44 184 309 
Hawaii 6.1 4.9 4.5 2.9 7.7 3.8 366 763 992 
Average U.S. 3.1 5.6 2.3 3.6 5.7 6.2 628 1,113 833 
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Table B.2. State percentage of urban population, crime rates, areas of state 
and national park, and temperature, for some selected years 
Urban Population Crime Rate Average Temp, 
(percent) (percent) (degree F.) 
Park 
State 1968 1978 > o
o
 h
 1968 1978 1987 (Percent) Jan. July 
Alcibama 58 60 60 11.8 13.3 9.3 0.2 50.8 82.2 
Arizona 79 83 86 6.3 9.4 7.5 2.9 52.3 92.3 
Arkansas 49 51 53 8.1 9.1 7.6 0.1 39.9 82.1 
California 90 91 92 6.0 11.7 10.6 4.6 56.0 69.0 
Colorado 78 80 82 5.4 7.3 5.8 0.7 29.5 73.3 
Connecticut 78 79 79 2.5 4.2 4.9 6.2 25.2 73.4 
Delaware 71 71 72 7.7 6.7 5.1 0.7 31.2 76.0 
D. C. 100 100 100 19.1 19.9 36.2 16.1 35.2 78.9 
Florida 79 84 85 11.9 11.0 11.4 1.1 53.2 81.3 
Georgia 59 62 63 13.9 14.4 11.8 0.1 41.9 78.6 
Idaho 53 54 56 2.3 5.4 3.1 0.4 29.9 74.6 
Illinois 83 83 84 8.1 9.9 8.3 0.9 21.4 73.0 
Indiana 64 64 65" 4.7 6.2 5.6 0.2 26.0 75.1 
Iowa 56 58 60 1.7 2.6 2.1 0.1 18.6 76.3 
Kansas 65 67 68 3.7 5.7 4.4 0.1 29.6 81.4 
Kentucky 51 51 52 8.9 9.0 7.5 0.2 32.5 77.6 
Louisiana 66 68 68 9.5 15.8 11.1 0.1 52.4 82.1 
Maine 51 48 45 3.0 2.7 2.5 0.5 21.5 68.1 
Maryland 76 80 81 9.3 8.2 9.6 1.6 32.7 76.8 
Massachusetts 84 84 84 3.5 3.7 3.0 5.5 29.6 73.5 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
74 71 71 7.3 10.6 12.2 0.7 23.4 71.9 
66 67 69 2.2 2.0 2.6 0.3 11.2 73.1 
Mississippi 43 47 47 9.9 12.6 10.2 0.2 45.7 81.9 
Missouri 69 69 69 8.8 10.4 8.3 0.4 25.9 78.5 
Montana 53 53 53 3.3 4.8 4.1 1.2 18.7 69.3 
Nebraska 60 63 65 2.3 3.0 3.5 0.3 20.2 77.7 
Nevada 79 84 87 5.5 15.5 8.4 1.4 32.2 69.5 
New Hampshire 57 53 51 1.4 1.4 3.0 1.2 19.9 69.5 
New Jersey 89 89 89 5.1 5.4 4.6 5.7 31.8 74.4 
New Mexico 69 72 73 6.2 10.2 10.1 0.1 34.8 78.8 
New York 86 85 84 6.5 10.3 11.3 0.8 21.1 71.4 
North Carolina 44 47 50 9.7 10.8 8.1 1.4 40.5 78.5 
North Dakota 42 48 52 1.1 1.2 1.5 0.0 6.7 70.4 
Ohio 75 74 74 5.3 6.9 5.8 0.7 28.9 75.4 
Oklahoma 67 67 68 6.4 8.5 7.5 0.2 35.9 82.1 
Oregon 66 68 70 3.2 5.0 5.6 0.1 38.9 67.7 
Pennsylvania 72 70 69 4.0 6.2 5.4 1.1 31.2 76.5 
Rhode Island 87 87 86 2.4 4.0 3.5 1.6 28.2 72.5 
South Carolina 46 53 54 13.6 11.5 9.3 0.3 44.7 81.0 
South Dakota 44 46 49 3.8 1.9 1.8 0.2 12.4 74.0 
Tennessee 58 60 61 8.7 9.4 9.1 1.3 39.6 82.1 
Texas 79 80 80 10.6 14.2 11.7 0.5 44.0 86.3 
Utah 79 84 86 2.9 3.7 3.3 2.4 28.6 77.5 
Vermont 33 33 33 2.6 3.3 2.7 2.7 16.6 69.6 
Virginia 62 65 68 8.3 8.8 7.4 1.3 39.9 78.4 
Washington 72 73 76 3.6 4.6 5.6 2.3 39.1 64.8 
West Virginia 39 37 36 5.5 6.8 4.8 1.0 32.9 74.5 
Wisconsin 65 65 65 2.2 2.5 3.5 0.2 18.7 70.5 
Wyoming 60 62 64 6.3 7.1 2.0 3.9 26.1 68.9 
Alaska 46 61 67 10.5 12.9 10.1 0.9 21.8 55.7 
Hawaii 82 86 89 2.8 6.7 4.8 0.6 72.6 80.1 
Average U.S. 66 67 68 6.3 7.8 7.0 1.5 32.2 75.5 
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APPENDIX C. LOCATION-SPECIFIC TENURE IN 
THE RESIDUAL WAGE 
To show the importance of location-specific tenure in the residual 
wage, we fitted the wage equation with the duration of stay in a state up 
to year y (Tjy, in years) as an additional explanatory variable. Because 
Tjy is endogenous, we also fitted the equation with the predicted tenure, 
PTjy, as an instrumental variable. We used Tjy derived from the procedures 
described in Appendix D. Table C.l. below presents the results. The first 
column presents the wage equation with the actual tenure, the second column 
shows the estimated equation to derive the instrumental variable PTjy, and 
the third column presents the wage equation with the predicted tenure. 
The result shows that the estimated coefficient for actual tenure 
(Tjy) is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. The 
positive sign means that wage increases with tenure. The second equation 
demonstrates the endogeneity of tenure by showing the tenure as a function 
of other regressors in the wage equation. The third equation shows a 
higher t-statistics on the coefficient for the predicted tenure (PTjy), 
even though the magnitude of the coefficient is similar to that of the 
first ec[uation. The procedure presented in this section is not meant to 
perfectly measure the effect of location-specific tenure on wages. We used 
this procedure to illustrate the importance of tenure in the residual wage. 
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Table C.l. The estimate o£ wage equation by including the effect of location 
specific tenure (t-statistics are in parentheses) 
Wage Equation Equation Wage Equation 
with Actual to Predict with Predicted 
Tenure Tenure Tenure 
Dependent variable: Ln(wijjy/py) t-^ly Ln(wij,y/py) 
Regressor: 
INTERCEPT 1.431 8.23) 45.744 ( 25.38) 1.397 ( 8.05) 
EDU 0.072 31.38) 0.009 ( 0.40) 0.075 ( 34.18) 
EXP (AGE-EDU-6) 0.047 17.89) 0.050 ( 20.43) 
EXP2/100 -0.098 -19.61) -0.100 (-19.98) 
RACE 0.114 4.91) 0.560 ( 2.23) 0.113 ( 4.87) 
Ln(PLAND/P) 0.046 2.94) 3.766 ( 26.44) 0.027 ( 1.72) 
URBAN 0.317 4.40) 0.332 ( 4.60) 
PJ0B6R 0.065 8.03) 0.065 ( 8.06) 
PURATE 0.042 6.86) 0.042 ( 6.86) 
RSHOCK 0.009 3.00) 0.009 ( 2.99) 
RURATE -0.005 -1.01) -0.005 ( -1.00) 
CRIME 0.015 6.12) 0.106 ( 4.75) 0.015 ( 5.90) 
JAN -0.004 -3.15) -0.075 ( -6.51) -0.003 ( -2.67) 
JULY -0.018 -10.92) -0.026 ( -1.68) -0.018 (-11.00) 
TIME -0.010 -1.53) -0.008 ( -1.26) 
TIME^/lOO -0.013 -0.48) -0.013 ( -0.46) 
DS -0.086 -2.94) -1.980 ( -7.54) -0.081 ( -2.78) 
DW -0.138 -4.51) 0.121 ( 0.42) -0.144 ( -4.71) 
DNC -0.014 -0.70) -2.363 (-•10.84) -0.007 ( -0.38) 
T (actual tenure) 0.005 5.71) 
PT (predicted tenure) 0.005 ( 5.97) 
AGEBEGIN^ -2.702 (-•46.01) 
AGEBEGIN^/100 2.917 ( 32.03) 
CHILDBGN^ -3.267 (-•37.92) 
TPARK® -0.435 ( -8.12) 
DADED^ -0.197 ( -9.36) 
momkid'' -0.151 ( -0.67) 
MARR® 3.062 ( 63.90) 
n 15 ,367 15, 367 15, 367 
R-square 0.160 0.505 0.160 
^For definitions, see Table 5.3 
''For definitions, see Appendix D. 
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APPENDIX D. PREDICTING UNOBSERVED RESIDENCE 
SPELLS 
The PSID data have no clear information on how long individual has 
lived in the state before 1968. Therefore the information on the starting 
time of every first spell started before 1968 is not perfectly observed. 
For those who lived in the same state where they grew up in 1968, we 
assumed that the beginning of their first spell is the year when they were 
19 years old. For those who lived in a state different from the state 
where they grew up, the length of their first spells are not observed. 
Therefore, the selection process which separates between the observed and 
the unobserved length of first spells is the migration which took place 
before 1968. 
When some observations are censored by a selection process, we could 
use Heckman's procedure to predict the unobserved by utilizing the observed 
ones (Heckman, 1979). The selection equation is the equation explaining 
the decision to migrate or to stay prior to 1968. To simplify the model, 
we fitted a standard probit model to estimate this selection equation. The 
explanatory variables were personal and local characteristics that are 
expected to affect migration before 1968. 
Among 874 left-open spells which started before 1968, 585 are right-
censored and 289 are right-closed spells. Because these two groups came 
from different populations of spells, we should estimate probit equations 
separately. In the right-censored group, the unobserved length of spells 
are 127. In the right-closed group, the unobserved length of spells are 
138. Therefore there were 265 potentially unobserved spells. When the 
prediction of starting time was before the year when the person was 19, we 
used the year when he was 19 as the starting point. Similarly, when the 
prediction of the starting time was after the year when the individual was 
observed at first time in 1968 or later, we used the year when the 
individual was observed as the start. The last step reduced the number of 
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unobserved spells from 265 to 208, out of the total 1268. The estimates of 
probit equations which explain migration decision before 1968 can be found 
in Table Appendix D.l. The table consists of two equations, one for the 
right-closed group and the other for the right-censored group. These 
equations are the selection ec[uation which can be used to derive the 
Inverse Mill's Ratio (IMR), defined as f (X^*)/F(Xj9*). The /S* is the vector 
of estimated coefficients in probit equation, X is the corresponding 
explanatory variables, and f(.) and F(.) are the corresponding normal 
density and distribution function. 
To predict the unobserved length of spells, we utilized the 
information from the observed spells. Based on the observed spells, we 
regressed the log of spell on some explanatory variables, including the 
selection bias correction, IMR. Having fitted the equation for the 
observed spells, we used the estimated coefficients to predict the 
unobserved length of spells. The prediction equations corresponding to 
right-censored and right-closed group are presented in Table Appendix D.2. 
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Table D.l. Probit selection equation for predicting unobserved length of 
spell, t-statistics are in parentheses 
VaricQsle Right-closed Right-censored 
Name Description Spells Spells 
Dependent variable; 
M68 Dummy variable, equal to 1 
if the person moved from the state 
he grew up before 1968 (the duration 
of the first spell is not observed), 
and equal to 0 otherwise 
Explanatory variables; 
CONSTANT Intercept -5. 384 (-2. 24) -7. 060 (-2. 93) 
DADEDU Father's education (years) 0. 048 ( 1-70) -0. 022 (-!• 10) 
MOHKID Number of mother's children -1. 307 (-0. 34) 0. 275 ( 1-62) 
EDU68 Education in 1968 (years) 0. Oil ( 0. 39) 0. 059 ( 2. 64) 
AGE68 Age in 1968 (years) 0. 168 ( 1-46) 0. 153 ( 1-45) 
AGE68^ AGE682/100 -0. 216 (-!• 22) -0. 170 (-!• 11) 
RACE Dummy variable, equal 1 
if white and 0 otherwise 
-0. 587 (-2. 03) -0. 694 (-3. 28) 
DSLFARM Dummy variable, equal 1 
if self employed or a farmer 
and 0 otherwise 
-0. 224 (-0. 99) -0. 193 (-!• 39) 
Ln(PLAND/P) State price of land 
(thousand $/acre) 
0. 156 ( 0. 66) 0. 056 ( 0. 29) 
URBAN State percentage of urban 
population (percent) 
2. 208 ( 1-81) 1. 221 ( !• 32) 
PURATE State predicted unemployment 
rate (percent) 
-0. 176 (-2. 61) 0. 172 ( 2. 34) 
PJOBGR State predicted job growth 0. 220 ( 2. 17) 0. 311 ( 2. 58) 
DNC Regional dummy, equal 1 if 
living in the North Central, 
and 0 otherwise 
-0. 203 (-0. 64) 0. 361 ( !• 47) 
DW Regional dummy, equal 1 if 
living in the West and 0 
otherwise 
0. 028 ( 0. 06) 0. 068 ( 0* 16) 
DS Regional dummy, equal 1 if 0. 107 ( 0-23) 0. 206 ( 0. 49) 
living in the South, and 0 
otherwise 
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Table D.l. Problt selection equation for predicting unobserved length of 
spell, t-statistics are in parentheses (continued) 
Variable 
Name Description 
Right-closed 
Spells 
Right-censored 
Spells 
CRIME State crime rate relative 
to US average 
PARK Percentage of area belong to 
state and national park 
relative to US average 
JAN January temperature 
relative to US average 
JULY July temperature 
relative to US average 
GRUPFARH Dummy variable, equal 1 if 
individual grew up in farm 
and 0 otherwise 
Log-1ike1ihood 
Number of observation 
Number of H68=l (Move) 
Number of M68=0 (Do not move) 
0.005 ( 0.11) -0.035 (-0.78) 
0.023 ( 0.37) -0.042 (-0.63) 
-0.004 (-0.24) 0.102 ( 0.76) 
-0.043 (-1.67) -0.013 (-0.66) 
0.191 ( 1.03) -0.215 (-1.38) 
-200.0 
289 
138 
151 
-306.1 
585 
127 
458 
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Tetble D.2. Prediction equation of unobserved length of residence spells, 
based on the observed group, t-statistics are in parentheses 
Variable Right-closed Right-censored 
Name Description Spells Spells 
Dependent variable; 
LT Log of the duration of residence 
spells, from the observed group 
Explanatory variables: 
CONSTANT Intercept -27.952 -2.93) -8.325 -3.44) 
AW2 Average annual residual wage 
in a spell 
0.088 3.66) 0.045 4.62) 
EDU68 Education in 1968 (years) -0.011 -1.22) -0.000 -0.18) 
A6E68 Age in 1968 (years) 3.255 2.60) 1.251 4.02) 
AGESS^ AGE682/100 -13.897 -2.29) -5.578 -3.77) 
A6E68^ AGE683/1000 2.650 2.10) 1.108 3.65) 
A6E68^ AGE68'*/10000 -0.188 -1.92) -0.082 -3.55) 
UNEMP Average annual unemployment 
hour in a spell (hr/year) 
0.0002 0.74) -0.0000 -0.01) 
DSLFARM (see Table D.l) 0.213 3.52) 0.021 1.87) 
RACE (see Table D.l) 0.170 1.37) 0.076 2.47) 
CHILD68 Number of school-age children -0.009 -0.61) -0.001 -0.34) 
Ln(PLAND/P) (see Table 0.1) 0.165 2.54) 0.061 4.02) 
URBAN (see Table D.l) -0.529 -1.16) -0.020 -0.24) 
PURATE (see Table D.l) 0.208 6.27) 0.063 8.72) 
PJOBGR (see Table D.l) -0.061 -1.20) 0.030 2.18) 
DNC (see Table D.l) 0.060 0.71) -0.076 -3.79) 
DW (see Table D.l) 0.042 0.38) 0.004 0.12) 
DS (see Table D.l) 0.056 0.49) 0.025 0.89) 
CRIME (see Table D.l) -0.014 -1.05) -0.082 -2.40) 
PARK (see Table D.l) -0.057 -2.51) -0.010 -1.75) 
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Table D.2. Prediction equation of unobserved length of residence spells, 
based on the observed group, t-statistics are in parentheses 
(continued) 
Variable 
Name Description 
Right-closed Right-censored 
Spells Spells 
JAN (see Table D.l) 
JULY (see Table D.l) 
DADEDU (see Table D.l) 
MOMKID (see Table D.l) 
A Selection bias correction 
(IMR) 
R-square 
Number of observation 
-0.046 (-1.17) 
0.036 ( 3.60) 
-0.014 (-1.28) 
0.005 ( 0.04) 
-0.456 (-1.45) 
0.904 
151 
-0.007 (-6.29) 
0.013 ( 7.62) 
-0.002 (-0.90) 
-0.006 (-0.27) 
-0.059 (-0.78) 
0.845 
458 
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APPENDIX E. NOMINAL AND REAL INTEREST RATES, 1953-93 
Table E.l. Nominal and real interest rates, 1953-93 
Nominal Rates, GNP Implicit Inflation Real Rates 
3 month T-Bills Price Deflator® in percent" in percent® 
Year in percent (i) (P) (JT) (r) 
1953 1.93 26.39 0.87 1.05 
1954 0.95 26.48 0.33 0.63 
1955 1.75 26.68 0.76 0.99 
1956 2.66 27.48 2.97 -0.30 
1957 3.27 28.26 2.78 0.47 
1958 1.84 28.78 1.81 0.03 
1959 3.41 29.26 1.68 1.70 
1960 2.93 29.72 1.56 1.35 
1961 2.38 29.87 0.48 1.89 
1962 2.78 30.21 1.15 1.61 
1963 3.16 30.55 1.13 2.00 
1964 3.55 30.90 1.12 2.40 
1965 3.95 31.36 1.47 2.44 
1966 4.88 32.30 2.97 1.85 
1967 4.32 33.19 2.72 1.56 
1968 5.34 34.48 3.82 1.47 
1969 6.68 36.03 4.39 2.19 
1970 6.46 37.75 4.67 1.71 
1971 4.35 38.90 2.99 1.31 
1972 4.07 40.08 2.98 1.06 
1973 7.04 43.26 7.65 -0.56 
1974 7.89 48.66 11.75 -3.46 
1975 5.84 51.62 5.90 -0.06 
1976 4.99 54.21 4.91 0.07 
1977 5.27 56.85 4.75 0.49 
1978 7.22 61.37 7.65 -0.40 
1979 10.04 67.21 9.09 0.88 
1980 11.51 74.16 9.85 1.51 
1981 14.03 79.88 7.43 6.15 
1982 10.69 83.80 4.79 5.63 
1983 8.63 87.60 4.43 4.02 
1984 9.58 90.70 3.48 5.90 
1985 7.48 94.60 4.21 3.14 
1986 5.98 97.00 2.51 3.39 
1987 5.82 101.60 4.63 1.13 
1988 6.69 106.10 4.33 2.26 
1989 8.12 111.00 4.51 3.45 
1990 7.51 117.50 5.69 1.72 
1991 5.42 121.30 3.18 2.17 
1992 3.45 125.30 3.24 0.20 
1993 3.02 128.10 2.21 0.79 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current BuBineas (1965-93), 
and The Council of Economic Advisers (1994) 
'Personal Consumption Expenditure, 4^** quarter 
\ = [(Ln(pt) - Ln(pt.i)] x 100 
^Calculated based on: (1 + i) = (1 + r) x (1 + jr). 
